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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42680 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY HANSEN 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO · 
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Date: 1/28/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:51 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 5 Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley 
Date Code User Judge 
4/19/2013 NCRF PRSCHOKF New Case Filed - Felony Magistrate Court Clerk 
PROS PRSCHOKF Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor Magistrate Court Clerk 
CRCO TCMCCOSL Criminal Complaint Magistrate Court Clerk 
HRSC TCMCCOSL Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment Theresa Gardunia 
04/19/2013 01:30 PM) 
ARRN· TCCAMPAM Hearing result for Video Arraignment scheduled Theresa Gardunia 
on 04/19/2013 ~1:30 PM: Arraignment/ First 
Appearance 
HRSC TCCAMPAM Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 05/10/2013 Theresa Gardunia 
08:30 AM) 
BSET TCCAMPAM BOND SET: at 150000.00 - (137-2732B(a)(1) Magistrate Court Clerk 
Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana ) 
NOTH MAHOLMSM Notice Of Hearing Magistrate Court Clerk 
4/22/2013 BNDS TCWADAMC Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 150000.00 ) Magistrate Court Clerk 
4/23/2013 PROS PRBRIGCA Prosecutor assigned Holly A Koole Magistrate Court Clerk 
5/1/2013 NOAP TCTONGES Notice Of Appearance/ Bublitz Magistrate Court Clerk 
RODD TCTONGES Defendant's Request for Discovery Ma~istrate Court Clerk 
! 
RODD TCTONGES Defendant's Request for Discovery/ specific Magistrate Court Clerk 
5/8/2013 PHRD TCTONGES Preliminary Hearing Response to Request for Magistrate Court Clerk 
Discovery and Objections 
RODS TCTONGES State/City Request for Discovery Magistrate Court Clerk 
STIP TCCHRIKE Stipulation to Vacate and Reset Preliminary Magistrate Court Clerk 
Hearing 
5/9/2013 ORDR CCMANLHR Order to Vacate and Reset Preliminary Hearing Magistrate Court Clerk 
CHGA CCMANLHR Judge Change: Administrative Theresa Gardunia 
CONT CCMANLHR Continued (Preliminary 06/12/2013 08:30 AM) Theresa Gardunia 
5/29/2013 PHRD TCTONGES Preliminary Hearing Response to Request for Theresa Gardunia 
Discovery and Objections 
I first supplemental 
6/12/2013 HRWV CCMANLHR Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on Theresa Gardunia 
06/12/2013 08:30 AM: Hearing Waived 
PHWV CCMANLHR Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on Theresa Gardunia 
06/12/2013 08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing 
Waived (bound Over) 
CHGB CCMANLHR Change Assigned Judge: Bind Over Theresa Gardunia 
HRSC CCMANLHR Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 06/28/2013 Theresa Gardunia 
09:00AM) 
COMT CCMANLHR Commitment Theresa Gardunia 
NOTH CCMANLHR Notice Of Hearing Theresa Gardunia 
6/13/2013 INFO TCCHRIKE Information Timothy Hansen 
PROS PRMORTIF Prosecutor assigned Jill Longhurst Timothy Hansen 
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Date: 1/28/2015 
Time: 03:51 PM 
Page 2 of 5 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley 
Date 
6/28/2013 
7/1/2013 
7/3/2013 
7/18/2013 
7/19/2013 
7/26/2013 
7/29/2013 
8/16/2013 
8/19/2013 
8/30/2013 
9/4/2013 
9/11/2013 
9/12/2013 
Code 
DCAR 
HRSC 
HRSC· 
User 
DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 
06/28/2013 09:00 AM: District Court 
Arraignment- Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Pages: less than 50 
I 
DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference · 
09/13/2013 01:30 PM) 
Judge 
Timothy Hansen 
Timothy Hansen 
DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/07/2013 09:00 Timothy Hansen 
AM) 3 Days 
PLEA DCOLSOMA A Plea is entered for charge: - NG Timothy Hansen 
(137-2732B(a)(1) Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana) 
ORDR 
MDQJ 
RQDS 
ORDR 
MOTS 
MEMO 
RSDS 
AFFD 
NOHG 
HRSC 
MEMO 
CONT. 
OBJE · 
MOTS, 
DCHH 
HRVC 
HRVC 
DCOLSOMA Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial Timothy Hansen 
Timothy Hansen TCCHRIKE Motion For Disqualification Of Alternate Judge 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(6) 
TCCHRIKE State/City Request for Discovery and Demand for Timothy Hansen 
Alibi 
DCOLSOMA Order for Disqualification of Alternate Judge 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(6) - Judge McKee 
Timothy Hansen 
Timothy Hansen TCTONGES 
TCTONGES 
TCTONGES 
TCTONGES 
TCOLSOMC 
TCOLSOMC 
Motion to Suppress and Notice of Hearing 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Timothy Hansen 
Suppress 
State/City Response to Discovery Timothy Hansen 
Affidavit of Thomas Campbell Kelly in Support of Timothy Hansen 
Motion to Suppress 
Notice Of Hearing (8/19 @3pm) Timothy Hansen 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
08/19/2013 03:00 PM) 
TCTONGES State's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Timothy Hansen 
Timothy Hansen 
Timothy Hansen DCOLSOMA Continued (Hearing Scheduled 09/11/2013 
03:00 PM) 
TCTONGES Objection to the Form of the Defendant's Motion Timothy Hansen 
to Suppress and Motion to Limit Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress to Issues Identified by the 
Defendant in his Motion/Brief 
TCTONGES Supplemental Brief in Support of The Defendant's Timothy Hansen 
Motion to Suppress 
DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 09/11/2013 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 09/13/2013 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
10/07/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 3 Days 
/ 
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Date: 1/28/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:51 PM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 5 Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley 
Date Code User Judge 
9/12/2013 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress Timothy Hansen 
10/16/2013 09:00 AM) 
HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Timothy Hansen 
11/15/2013 01:30 PM) 
HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/02/2013 09:00 Timothy Hansen 
AM) 2 days 
ORDR DCOLSOMA Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial Timothy Hansen 
10/2/2013 RSDS TCCHRIKE State/City Response to Discovery / First Timothy Hansen 
Addendum 
10/16/2013 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 10/16/2013 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
10/23/2013 MISC TCCHRIKE Defendant's Closing Arguments Timothy Hansen 
10/30/2013 MISC TCCHRIKE States Written Closing Statements Regarding Timothy Hansen 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
11/5/2013 HRSC' DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Timothy Hansen 
11/06/2013 04:00 PM) Closing Arguments on the 
Motion to Suppress 
11/6/2013 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 11/06/2013 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: D. Cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
11/15/2013 CONT DCOLSOMA Continued (Pretrial Conference 03/05/2014 Timothy Hansen 
03:00 PM) 
CONT DCOLSOMA Continued (Jury Trial 03/17/2014 09:00 AM) 2 Timothy Hansen 
days 
11/18/2013 ORDR DCOLSOMA Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial Timothy Hansen 
12/18/2013 MEMO DCMAXWKK Memorandum Decision and Order Timothy Hansen 
3/5/2014 CONT' DCOLSOMA Continued (Jury Trial 06/16/2014 09:00 AM) 2 Timothy Hansen 
days 
CONT DCOLSOMA Continued (Pretrial Conference 06/04/2014 Timothy Hansen 
03:00 PM) 
3/7/2014 ORDR TCWEGEKE Order Setting Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial Timothy Hansen 
6/4/2014 DCHH DCOATMAD Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Timothy Hansen 
on 06/04/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: S Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 25 
HRVC DCOATMAD Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
06/16/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 2 days 
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Date: 1/28/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:51 PM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 5 Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell 
State of Idaho vs. Th.omas Campbell Kelley 
Date Code . User Judge 
6/4/2014 HRSC DCOATMAD Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 10/15/2014 Timothy Hansen 
03:00 PM) 
PLEA DCOATMAD A Plea is entered for charge: - GT Timothy Hansen 
(137-2732B(a)(1) Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana) 
GPA DCOATMAD Guilty Plea Advisory Timothy Hansen 
PSl01 DCOATMAD Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered Timothy Hansen 
HRSC DCOATMAD Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/13/2014 08:30 Timothy Hansen 
AM) 
6/20/2014 MISC· TCLANGAJ Agreement for Conditional Plea Pursuant to ICR Timothy Hansen 
11 (a)(2) 
8/13/2014 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Status scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
08/13/2014 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
10/8/2014 MOTN TCLANGAJ Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal Timothy Hansen 
10/15/2014 CONT DCOLSOMA Continued (Sentencing 11/05/2014 03:00 PM) Timothy Hansen 
11/5/2014 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on Timothy Hansen 
11/05/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: V. Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
FIGT DCOLSOMA Finding of Guilty (137-2732B(a)(1) Timothy Hansen 
Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana) 
JAIL DCOLSOMA Sentenced to Jail or Detention (137-2732B(a)(1) Timothy Hansen 
Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana) Confinement 
terms: Credited time: 2 days. Penitentiary 
determinate: 1 year. Penitentiary indeterminate: 7 
years. 
STAT· DCOLSOMA STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Timothy Hansen 
SNPF DCOLSOMA Sentenced To Pay Fine 5280.50 charge: Timothy Hansen 
137-2732B(a)(1) Drug-Trafficking in Marijuana 
11/6/2014 BNDE I DCMAXWKK Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 150,000.00) Timothy Hansen 
JDMT DCMAXWKK Judgment of Conviction and Commitment Timothy Hansen 
11/12/2014 RULE35 TCLANGAJ Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to ICR 35 Timothy Hansen 
and Request for Hearing 
APSC TCLANGAJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Timothy Hansen 
NOTA TCLANGAJ NOTICE OF APPEAL Timothy Hansen 
11/13/2014 MOTN TCLANGAJ Motion for Exemption from Paying Fee for Timothy Hansen 
Preparation of Record 
AFFD · TCLANGAJ Affidavit of lndigency Timothy Hansen 
11/20/2014 TCMILLSA Miscellaneous Payment: Clerk's Record Paid by: Timothy Hansen 
Kelley, Thomas Campbell Receipt number: 
0120419 Dated: 11/20/2014 Amount: $100.00 
(Check) 
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Date: 1/28/2015 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 03:51 PM ROA Report 
Page 5 of 5 Case: CR-FE-2013-0005250 Current Judge: Timothy Hansen 
Defendant: Kelley, Thomas Campbell 
State of Idaho vs. Thomas Campbell Kelley 
Date Code User Judge 
11/20/2014 ORDR DCOLSOMA Order on Rule 35 Motion Timothy Hansen 
12/18/2014 HRSC DCOLSOMA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Timothy Hansen 
01/22/2015 02:00 PM) Restitution Hearing 
1/5/2015 ORDR DCOLSOMA Order Denying Rule 35 Motion Timothy Hansen 
1/21/2015 DCOLSOMA Order to Transpor:t Timothy Hansen 
1/23/2015 ORDR DCOLSOMA Order for Exemption from Paying Fee for Timothy Hansen 
Preparation of Record 
CONT DCOLSOMA Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/06/2015 Timothy Hansen 
03:00 PM) Restitution Hearing 
DCOLSOMA Order to Transport Timothy Hansen 
1/26/2015 NOTC TCWEGEKE (2) Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Timothy Hansen 
No.42680 
1/28/2015 NOTC TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Timothy Hansen 
42680 
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., 
/ 
\ 
NO.it \ 
A.M . ...l.l ', 30 FIL~~-· ---
DR# 13-001161 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kari L Higbee 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
APR 1 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By STORMY McCORMACK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAlvfPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
COMPLAINT 
Kelley's   
Kelley's   
PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this~ of April 2013, Kari L Higbee, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, who, being first 
duly sworn, complains and says: that THOMAS CAlvfPBELL KELLEY, on or about the 
19th day of April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime of 
TRAFFICKING IN MARIJUANA, FELONY, I.C. §37-2732B(a)(l) as follows: 
COMPLAINT (KELLEY), Page 1 
000008
That the Defendant, THOMAS CMvIPBELL KELLEY, on or about the 19th day of 
April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess one (1) pound or 
more of Marijuana, a Schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Kari'IIBibee 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
JI,, 
SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this (L day of April 2013. 
Magistrate 
COMPLAINT (KELLEY), Page 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PROSECUTOR--1"'~-"-+-,µ.L....µ~~------
COMPLAINING WITNESS _________ _ 
JUDGE 
D BERECZ 
0 BIETER 
0 CAWTHON 
0 COMSTOCK 
0 DAY 
0 GARDUNIA 
0 HARRIGFELD 
0 HAWLEY 
0 HICKS 
D 
D 
COMMENTS 
0 AGENT'S WARRANT 
0 RULE 5(8) 
0 FUGITIVE 
0 MacGREGOR-IRBY 
0 MANWEILER 
0 McDANIEL 
0 MINDER 
0 OTHS 
O__BEARDON 
_z-- STECKEL 
0 SWAIN 
0 WATKINS 
0 MOTION & ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM 
CASENO. ~2M 
CLERK ~ n fei _..:(l~ll 
DATE ~ 2013 TIME \Q;?o[) 
CASE ID=~ Y:lv\ \·?;BEG. \ tt,1)( Lp 
COURTROOM WY: END \ \ DDOV' 
STATUS 
PC FOUND ___________ _ f STATE SWORN COMPLAINT SIGNED 
AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED 
0 AFFIDAVIT SIGNED 
0 JUDICIAL NOTICE TAKEN 0 NO PC FOUND _______ _ 
0 EXONERATE BOND 
0 SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED 
0 WARRANT ISSUED 0 BOND SET$ ________ _ 
0 NOCONTACT 
D.R.# __________ _ 
DISMISS CASE 
IN CUSTODY 
[REV 12-2011] 
000010
\1 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
  
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MAGISTRATE MINUTES/ NOTICE OF HEARING 
;a-PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Case Number: CR-FE-2013-0005250 
-----------~ ) D Interpreter: ________________ _ 
-.gf AC D BC DEA D GC D MC VJ~ :BC~ PD/ Private_---=-=--------
Defendant:')21 Present D Not Present ?"In Custody D PD Appoint~en~Waived Attorney 
D Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. Bond $ ______ _ 
~ Advised of Rights D Not Guilty D Guilty Plea/ PV Admit D Written Guilty Plea D No Contact Order 
~Bond$ \'JOI (56D D Pre-Trial Release Order D Provide Evaluation 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
D Sentencing on _____________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
D Court Trial Conference on at am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
D Pre-Trial/ Jury Trial on I at am/pm w/ Judge ~ .PH: on '5!0( \") at CO;?;{) @tpmw/Judge~~:.=...._ __ 
D Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telep 
You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest, or 
default judgment may be entered if you are charged with an infraction. 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET, BOISE, ID 83702 
I hereby certify copies of this nog·ce were served as follows: C ..... _ ~- fl ~ 
Defendant: Hand Delivered Via Counsel D Signature ___ Je[Y_""'""""-~~_.._. ....... fn_=--~-...,.....--
Defense Atty: Hand Delivered _ 
Prosecutor: Hand Delivered D 
, Clerk of the District Court Magistrate Judge (for Pre-Trial Memorandum) 
DATED 4/tlf{t , . 
000011
.. 
.. May 08 13 03:48p . Bublitz Law ?"~3436104 p.4 
NO·-----::::-=--=-=-.-,.. 
Fl~ED ·2'.2,~ A.M. ____ ,P.M ....... J:2. __ ·~=----
GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
MAY O 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HEIDI MANLEY 
501 WEST GROVE STREET 
BOISE,IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
AECE\V.ED 
MAYO 8 2013 
Ada county Clerk 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISJ'RICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
***** 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) 
) ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET 
) PRELI~ARYHEARING 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
Upon stipulation of counsel, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Preliminary Hearing scheduled for the 10th day of 
May, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. is hereby vacated and reset. The Preliminary Hearing will be reset to the 
~ay of 1::E /'Nz..., , 2013, at '8· 30§),'fr.ffl':" 
SO ORDERED this 1._ day of M4 , 2013. 
~) 
ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARING-Page 1 
000012
.. ,. May 08 13 03:48p Bublitz Law r--3436104 p.5 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was served on the following this the _9_ day of ~ , 2013, by the 
following method: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
Gerald R. Bublitz 
Bublitz Law, PC 
501 W. Grove St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: (208) 343-6104 
~and Delivery l~) 
0U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
D Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S. Mail 
D 9vernight Courier 
[!3'Facsimile Transmission 
ORDER TO VACATE AND RESET PRELIMINARY HEARlNG-Page2 
000013
h, 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Holly Koole . 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
NO. g I O Fll,ED 
A.M._J P.M.----
JUN 1 2 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HEIDI MANLEY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
COMMITMENT 
Defendant's  
 
\ 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, THOMAS CAMPBELL KE~LEY, 
h ving been brought before this Court for a Preliminary Examination on the ~ day or 
l/VV'{. , 2013, on a charge that the Defendant on or about the 19th day of April 
, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime(s) of: TRAFFICKING IN 
H~ ~L~JUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l) as follows: 
COMMITMENT (KELLEY), Page 1 
000014
That the Defendant, THOMAS CAl\.1PBELL KELLEY, on or about the 19th day of 
April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess one (1) pound or 
more of Marijuana, a Schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance. 
The Defendant having so appeared and having had/having waived preliminary 
examination, the Court sitting as a Committing Magistrate finds that the offense charged as 
set forth has been committed in Ada County, Idaho, and that there is sufficient cause to 
believe that the Defendant is guilty of committing the offense as charged. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant be held to answer to the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Ada, to the charge herei~ . Bail is set in the sum of$ 
DATEDthis~dayof ~ ,2013. 
150 ,coo- . 
t 
COMMITMENT (KELLEY), Page 2 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY_..,__..:..._~=--==-\----' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) PRELIMINARY HEARING NOTICE/ MINUTE SHEET 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
~~~~! 
Defendant. ) 
________________ ) 
Case Number ~l3, ~ fo~ 
Case Called BL q_ 2:::, 
J!1 Ada D Special :t\ , ~ J :olk 
PD/ AJom!!y 0 ,&Jkij~ 
Defendant:~ Present D Not Present D In Custody D PD Appointed OWaived Attorney 
D Advised of Rights D Waived Rights D In Chambers D Interpreter _____________ _ 
~Bond $ l9)Jv::p D Motion for Bond Reduction Denied I Granted-------------
0 Amended Complaint Filed D Complaint Amended by lnterlineation D Reading of Complaint Waived 
D State/ Defense/ Mutual Request for Continuance--------------------
0 State/ Defense Objection / No Objection to Continuance------------------
0 Case continued to _________ at ____ am/pm for ___________ _ 
)0 Defendant Waives Prelimina1\Hearing D Hearing Held %ommitment Signed 
)o Case Bound Over to Judge ~ on k:, l~h~ at 9:-ou e~ 
D Case Dismissed after Preliminary Hearing I On State's Motion D Release Defendant, This Case Only 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT ST., BOISE, ID 83702 
You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest. 
DATED Cail&/ 16 :;RI~ Clerk of the District Court 
Depu1erk 
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as follows: 
Defendant D Hand Delivered Signa~ (>L~~ 
Defense Attorney 
Public Defender 
Prosecutor 
~nd Delivered 
D Hand Delivered 
~Delivered Clerk_~---- Date 0~d-/J3 
t 
PRELIMINARY HEARING NOTICE/MINUTE SHEET [REV 12-2010] 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
- N0.-,11J.,---:F:;:-:ILE=o----
A.M. OM --- r. , ___ _ 
JUN 1 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
Oe:PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
INFORMATION 
Defendant's  
 
GREG H. BOWER, Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of 
Idaho, who in the name and by the authority of the State, prosecutes in its behalf, comes 
now into District Court of the County of Ada, and states that THOMAS CAMPBELL 
KELLEY is accused by this Information of the crime(s) of: TRAFFICKING IN 
MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l) which crime(s) was/were committed as 
follows: 
INFORMATION (KELLEY), Page 1 
000017
That the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, on or about the 19th day of 
April, 2013, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did knowingly possess one (1) pound or 
more of Marijuana, a Schedule I non-narcotic controlled substance. 
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
INFORMATION (KELLEY), Page 2 
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User: PRFREDSM 
Wednesday, May I, 2013 
Ada County Mugshot - Prosecutor's Office 
Photo Taken: 2013-04-19 01 :20 :00 
Name: KELLEY, THOMAS CAMPBELL 
Case#: CR-FE-2013-0005250 
LE Number: 1051391    
Weight: 180 Height: 600 
Drivers License Number: Drivers License State: 
Sex: M Race: W Eye Color: BLU Hair Color: BLN Facial Hair: 
Marks: SHOULDER, LEFT 
Scars: 
Tattoos: 
.REIINST ALLS\ InHouse\Crystal\Analyst4\Sheriff\SHF MugshotProsecutor.r~ 
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Hansen, Miren, 06/28/13, Gosney Courtroom507 
Time Speaker Note 
9:21 :48 AM l (State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 
9:21 :58 AM istate Attorney !sen Harmer 
9:22:00 AM joefense Attorney \Jessica Bublitz - Private Counsel 
9:22:08 AM fJudge Hansen icalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel 
9:22:23 AM lJudge Hansen !arraigns the def. on the Information 
9:23:51 AM joefense Attorney twill enter a NG Plea 
9:23:55 AM \Judge Hansen !will set for a 3 day JT on 10/07/13 at 9 and PTC on 
I j09/13/13 at 1:30 p.m. 
9:25:24 AM I [END CASE 
I i 
6/28/2013 1 of 1 
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' 
NO. ED \O' 31 FIL A.M. P.M-----
JUL O 1 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST&mfs?bPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MIREN OLSON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA DE'PUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ) Case No. CRFEI3-5250 
) 
THOMAS KELLEY, ) 
) ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL 
Defendant. ) CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL 
A jury trial will be held on October 7, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. 
A pretrial conference will be held on September 13, 2013 at 1:30 pm. The defendant must 
be personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a 
written list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all 
parties. If the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be 
continued. 
Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that 
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a 
list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G.D. Carey 
Hon. Dennis Goff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr. 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. Renae Hoff 
Hon. W.H. Woodland 
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen 
Any sitting Fourth District Judge 
Hon. James C. Morfitt 
Hon. Gerald Schroeder 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Gregory Culet 
Hon. Michael McLaughlin 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2cb....day of June, 2013. 
cc: ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
JESSICA BUBLITZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
501 WEST GROVE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TIMOTHYHANSEN 
District Judge 
ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL - PAGE -1 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jill Longhurst 
, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 287-7700 
Fax: (208) 287-7707 
AM. ~ 
----
JUL O 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Sy KAiFIINA CHRISTENSEN 
O!'.Pl.liY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION OF 
ALTERNATE JUDGE 
PURUSANT TO I.C.R. 25(a)(6) 
COMES NOW, Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, 
State of Idaho, and moves the court pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a)(6) to disqualify alternative Judge 
Duff McKee. 
DATED this ~ ofJuly 2013. 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION v,c.R. 25(a)(6) (KELLEY) Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2!l:. day of July 2013, I caused to be served, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF 
ALTERNATE JUDGE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 25(a)(6) upon the judge presiding in this 
matter and upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Gerald Bublitz 
501 W. Grove St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
j By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
D By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
D By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: 
D By depositing copies of the same in the interdepartmental mail: 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF ALTERNATE JUDGE PURUSANT TO 
I.C.R. 25(a)(6) (KELLEY) Page 2 
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-- ' \ 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jill Longhurst 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
NO.---cFii'i:ILE:no --;V,7.:"7:~;-jy,~ 
A.M.----P.M._.:..-----
JUL O 3 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MIREN OLSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
ORDER FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION OF 
ALTERNATE JUDGE 
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 25(a)(6) 
The above entitled matter having come before this Court and being timely 
filed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Duff McKee shall be 
disqualified as the alternate trial judge in this matter. 
DATED this~ day of July 2013. 
Judge Hansen 
ORDER FOR DISQUALIFICATION (KELLEY), Page 1 
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GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
501 WEST GROVE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
" 
N0.-~4s_·b 
FILl!'.9 AM. ___ _,... __ M 
JUL 1 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) 
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
* * * * * 
COMES NOW the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his 
attorney of record, Jessica B. Bublitz, of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C., and moves this Court for an 
order to . suppress statements and evidence in the above entitled case. This motion will be 
supported by the attached Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress. The Defendant's 
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Suppress will be filed soon hereafter. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above Motion to Suppress _will be heard on the 
29th day of July, 2013, at 3:00, p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard before the 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 1 
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• 
Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen. 
DATED this §d.ay of July, 2013. 
JE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \&t day of July, 2013, I caused a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
IZ! Facsimile Transmission 
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GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
501 WEST GROVE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO- """ ~, 
_..P.M- , 
A.M.------
JUL, 8 2m3 
0 RICH Clerk 
CHRIST~~~;.~HRISTENSEN 
By Kl}; DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) Case No. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
* * * 
COMES NOW the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his 
attorney of record, Jessica B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C., and hereby moves this Court 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution for an order suppressing all statements and evidence obtained as a 
result of an illegal search and seizure. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as articulated in this memorandum are those pertinent to the motion to suppress 
· only. Officer Higley of the Idaho State Police writes in a report dated 4/19/2013 that on April 
~ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 1 
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19, 2013 at approximately 0020 hours, he stopped a green colored Honda Civic on Eastbound 
I84 at approximately milepost 50 in Ada, County Idaho for improper signaling. Specifically, he 
writes that he first observed the vehicle traveling in the second lane from the left, and the vehicle 
activated his tum signal briefly for approximately two seconds, and then moved over one lane to 
the right, thus completing a lane change without the required five seconds. (See Addendum A). 
However, in reviewing the dash cam of the officer which was disclosed in this case, the attorney 
for the defendant would assert that it appears the defendant used his blinker five or six times 
when making the lane change, for approximately four to five seconds at least. 
The officer writes that he made contact with the driver, identified as Thomas Kelley, and 
a passenger. The officer writes that Kelley was borrowing the vehicle and did not have a current 
insurance card in the vehicle. (See id.) The officer further writes that Kelley was talkative, 
informing the officer that he had been stopped in Oregon and searched by the police, and that he 
had been stopped for approximately two hours and had to wait for a canine vehicle to arrive on 
scene for 30 minutes, and that it took him approximately one hour to put the items back into his 
vehicle. (See id.) However, in reviewing the audio from the dash cam, it would appear the 
defendant was consistently and appropriately responding to a series of questions from the officer. 
The officer notes that he was suspicious of the time frarrie Kelley had given him and he noticed 
Kelley had reddened conjunctiva and exhibited eyelid tremors. The officer questioned Kelley 
about recent drug use and Kelley denied use of marijuana in two years. (See id.) The officer 
apparently at that point searched the glove box and found rolling zig zag papers, which Kelley 
stated were for tobacco use only. When asked for permission to search the vehicle, Kelley 
declined. 
At this point the officer requests Kelley to step out of the vehicle and moved him to the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2 
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shoulder of the roadway, and he continues to question him and to discuss his plans for travel. 
The officer noted his travel plans did not make sense, as he was traveling from Tahoe to Jackson 
Hole to visit friends only to return to Tahoe, and then depart again. He also found it odd that 
Kelley spent two hours with law enforcement but could not say which agency it was that stopped 
him. At some point Officer Plaisted arrives on scene with a drug canine, and he observed as 
Officer Plaisted opened the driver's door and began searching the interior. Officer Plaisted 
indicated in a separate report that the search was conducted according to alerts the d?g Turk was 
giving him. This officer writes in his report that Turk alerted to what appeared to be under the 
rear seat. A third officer on the scene, Officer Cagle, searched the trunk area and located three 
large plastic bags containing a substance suspected to be marijuana. The probable cause for the 
search of the trunk is not indicated in the reports. (See Addendum B). 
ARGUMENT 
I. I. C. § 49-808(2) is void for vagueness as applied to this case because the 
statutory terms have not been clearly defined so that average individuals 
would understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute; in addition, the 
lack of sufficient clarity in the wording of the aforementioned statute invites 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute 
defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does 
not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,490 (1982). It is a basic principle of due process that a 
statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). Vague laws offend several important values. First, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 3 
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"because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that 
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." Id. at 108. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) Second, 
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them in order to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to police officers, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Id. at 
109. Furthermore, due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess at the meaning of the 
criminal law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998). Thus, "a statute may be void for 
vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the 
conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or 
others who must enforce the statute." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003). 
In this case, officers alleged that the above named defend 
d signaling 2 
seconds prior to a lane change. As noted above, however, the defendant disputes this. It would 
appear as though he made the lance change, signaling for several seconds prior to the change. 
The posted speed limit in this area is 65 mph. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999). A traffic stop, which 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, must be supported by reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws or that either the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 4 
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vehicle or occupant is subject to detention in connection with a violation of other laws. United 
States v. <;ortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). It is the position of the defendant that LC. §48-
808(2) does not provide adequate notice as to the conduct which is proscribed. 
LC. §48-808(2) states, "A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required 
shall be given c9ntinuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before 
turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) 
seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled.by 
the vehicle before turning. The term "controlled access highways" is defined in LC.§ 49-
109(5)(b) as, "Any highway or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting 
lands and other persons having no legal right of access to or from the highway except at such 
points only or in such manner as may be determined by the public authority having jurisdiction 
over the highway." It should be noted that this section is distinguished from the definitions of 
arterial and through highways. It would by definition qualify as a through highway, defined as, 
"Any highway or portion of it on which vehicular traffic is given preferential right-of-way, and 
' 
at the entrances to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to yield 
the right-of-way to vehicles on the through highway ... " LC. §49-109(5)( c ). 
In addition, linguistically, this statute can be interpreted in one of two ways, either 
dictating that an individual in one circumstance ( driving on controlled-access highways and 
before turning from a parked position) must give a continuous signal of turning for not less than 
5 seconds; while in all other circumstances for not less than one hundred feet; Or, dictating that 
in one circumstance ( driving while on controlled access highways and before turning from a 
parked position) an individual must give a continuous signal for five seconds; and in all other 
circumstances must do this (signal for five seconds continuously) and for not less than one 
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hundred feet. 
In this case, the phrase "in all other instances" is separated by commas. A prepositional 
phrase ought to be able to be deleted from a sentence without changing the meaning of the 
sentence. In this case, that would not be possible. If we delete the prepositional phrase from the 
sentence, it reads, "On controlled access highways and before turning from a parked position, the 
signal shall be given for continuously for not less than five seconds and for not less than the last 
100 feet before turning." Clearly, this would set up the impracticality that all vehicles, even those 
turning from a parked position must signal for 100 feet prior to turning, regardless of the speed 
or length of travel. The legislature may have intended the "and" to signify a connecting sentence. 
If that is the case, then the phrase "and, in all o~her instances, for not less than the last 100 feet 
traveled by the vehicle before turning" is missing a subject and a verb. If we are to presume it is 
meant as a phrase modifying "the signal shall be given" then it is correctly proscribing only that 
in all other instances a signal shall be given for not less than the last 100 feet traveled by a 
vehicle before turning. 
In Burton v. State Department of Transportation, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P. 3d 933 (2010), 
the court held that the first subsection of this statute was void for vagueness as applied to the 
facts in that case. In that case, Burton challenged I.C.§49-808(1) for failing to give adequate 
notice that a signal is required when before one drives into a single lane that stems from the 
merger of two lanes. See Id. The court held that, because it was simply not apparent from the 
language of the statute whether a signal is required when two lanes blend into one, and persons 
of ordinary intelligence could only guess at the statute's directive in that circumstance, that this 
statute subse~tion (1) was unconstitutionally vague in that circumstance. Id. In this case as well, 
subsection (2) of the statute does not provide adequate notice to persons of ordinary intelligence 
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whether, when not on a controlled access highway or from a parked position, a turn signal for 
five seconds in addition to 100 feet is required. Therefore, this subsection is unconstitutionally 
vague as well when applied to the facts in this case. 
II. The officer in this case did not have justification or sufficient information 
which would give rise to reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond the 
original purpose of the stop. · 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an investigative detention "must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 500 (1983). While officers may ask unrelated questions from the purpose of the stop 
itself, on topics such as drugs and weapons, the proper analysis is whether the police action 
increased the scope of the detention beyond a routine traffic stop. See Id. In State v. Gutierrez, 
the occupants of a vehicle were questioned about drugs and alcohol for between 60 to 90 seconds 
after receiving a warning for speeding. 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002). The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the officer's interrogation of the driver was unlawful because it was entirely 
unrelated.to the purpose of the stop and unreasonably lengthened the detention after the purpose 
of the stop was accomplished. Id. at 653. The case at hand is analogous to Gutierrez in the 
sense that the duration of the investigatory stop was extended after the purpose of the stop was 
effectuated, and without sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the purpose of the stop. 
The officer in this case extended the purpose of the stop according to his police report by 
several minutes subsequent to when he stopped the vehicle in order to bring a canine unit to · 
assist him in a search of the vehicle. In this case, the officer notes as reasonable suspicion to 
extend the purpose of the stop eyelid tremors and red eyes, along with a story with regard to his 
route their and a detention in Oregon that he finds questionable. While Courts have held that 
strong odors in vehicles, combined with inconsistency in occupants' stories, can justify 
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reasonable suspicion to extend a stop to obtain a drug dog, we do not have those factors here, or 
even a combination of factors that would rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. (See State v. 
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P. 3d 706). It is the position of the defendant that there is an 
insufficient link between a route as described here by the defendant, or a detention of an alleged 
amount of time that the officer finds questionable, and actual drug activity, and that any link 
which could be made would fall into the category of "circumstances that describe a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures 
were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a 
seizure". See Reid v Georgia, 448 U.S.438, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980). Idaho courts have held that 
bloodshot eyes alone are not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion of drug activity; Whereas 
eyes which are both bloodshot and glassy, coupled with eyelid tremors and reddening of the 
conjunctiva of the eyes, are enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. See State v. Grigg, 149 
Idaho 361, 233 P. 3d 1283 (2010.) Any widening at all of this standard would encroach upon the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
III. There is no probable cause alleged which would have justified a search of the 
trunk area. 
The existence of probable cause to search the interior of a vehicle is not necessarily 
sufficient to justify a search of the car's trunk. See State v. Schmakeda, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P. 3d 
633 (2001). There must be specific, articulable facts supporting probable cause to believe that the 
contraband or evidence is, in fact, concealed in the trunk. See id, citing Wimberly v. Superior 
court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 547 P. 2d 417, 424-427 (1976). In this case, it is the 
position of the defendant that there is an insufficient indication that the officers in this case had 
any specific probable cause pursuant to the trunk area that would have justified a search of the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 8 
000034
entire vehicle. Reports from both officers indicate only that the dog was hitting upon the main 
body of the vehicle, and that it was a different officer entirely who searched the trunk area. 
CONCLUSION 
The attorneys for the above named Defendant respectfully request that any evidence 
obtained as a result of the detention which occurred on April 19, 2013, and the events thereafter, 
including any statements by the Defendant which were made, be suppressed in the above entitled 
action as they were obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure or the fruits thereof. 
,'] 
DATED this~day of July, 2013. 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
~BLIT 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I he~eby certify that on this ~day of July, 2013, I caused a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
IZ! Facsimile Transmission 
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Incident Report 
IDAHO STATE POLICE 
813001161 Supplement No ORIG 
'-......; ,tam ·-1nvolvamanl --···-.. ----·- -----··"··-----··-·----·--··-·--·-···········-·····---······-······ ·-·········-·--······:·In' Custody? l"Tag··No --·--··-···-····-T Item No · ........ ,. ....... --····-·-·--··-, ~ ::IZED (Drugs.[ ~Zt!f :~:::::n::::i::·;:om ~x::: __ i.,130000 98 9 I. 4 -- I j 1'. J --~ 
l~~~UG PARAPHERNALI,0 ~~bll N~ .... 1 ~~~~ ... NARCOTI.C .. EQUIPMEl NT ___ 1 ..•. i ~:;~;rerfield __ L. ......... -·······-······-···-·-·-·_l 
Link I Involvement lnvl No I roame Race . Sex 
1
1  I I 
i SUS ARR 1 I KELLEY ,THOMAS C ; W / M  1 
1. On April 19, 2013 at approximately 0020 hours, I, Trooper Blake Higley, stopped a green 
colored Honda Civic (California registration 6SAS345) on eastbound Interstate 84 at 
approximately milepost 50 in Ada, County Idaho. I observed the vehicle traveling in second lane 
from the left. The vehicle activated its turn signal briefly for approximately two seconds, and 
move over one lane to the right. The vehicle completed a lane change without signaling for the 
required five seconds. 
2. I approached the vehicle and made contact with the driver. and passenger. T
identified by his New Hampshire Driver's License as Thomas C KELLEY (   
'---".nformed KELLEY the reason for the stop as asked for his Identification. KELLE . 
asked about the vehicle's registration. KELLEY informed me it was not his vehicle, but he was 
borrowing it. KELLEY did not have a current insurance card in the vehicle. KELLEY informed me 
he had been stopped in Oregon and searched by the police. KELLEY later stated he had been 
stopped for approximately two hours, had to wait for a canine to arrive on scene for 30 minutes, 
then It took him approximately one hour to put the items back into his vehicle. Very little luggage 
was visible in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. The rear seat on the passenger side 
was folded down because of skis, allowing me to see Into the trunk area. I observed very little in 
the trunk as well. I was suspicious of the time frame KELLEY gave. I observed KELLEY had 
reddened conjunctiva, and exhibited eyelid tremors. I asked about marijuana use. KELLEY 
advised he had not used since college, approximately two years ago. I observed Zig Zag rolling 
papers In the glove box. I also observed rolling tobacco. KELLEY denied the presence of 
marijuana in the vehicle. I asked KELLEY if I could search his. vehicle. KELLEY stated, 11 1 rather 
you dldn't. 11 KELLEY advised he was traveling from Tahoe to Jackson Hole Wyoming. Sergeant 
Jason Cagle of the Idaho State Police arrived on scene and advised me a drug detecting canine 
was also on scene. 
3. I requested KELLEY exit the vehicle with his dog. KELLEY exited the vehicle and was moved 
to the shoulder of the roadway. I continued to speak with KELLEY about his. trip. KELLEY's 
travel plans did not make sense, as he was traveling from Tahoe to Jackson Hole to visit friends 
only to return ,to Tahoe, and then depart again. KELLEY advised he works in New Hampshire 
during the summer doing landscaping, and skis during the winter. I also found it odd that 
KELLEY spent two hours with law enforcement, but was unsure of which agency they worked 
for . .Qfficer Marshall Plaisted of the Boise Police Department arrived on scene. Officer Plaisted 
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deployed his drug detecting canine 'Turk" on the vehicle. I observed as Officer Plaisted opened 
the driver's door and began searching the interior. At this time I placed KELLEY and his dog In 
~ ------------. .. ,,,,..-"·--------= 
4.Sgt. Cagle, Officer Plaisted, and I searched the vehicle. Sgt. Cagle located two vacuum 
sealed bags under the trunk floor, near the spare tire. A green backpack was also discovered 
with a third bag. All three bags contained a green leafy substance, which I recognized as 
marijuana. A Tupperware container with two separate packages of marijuana. Upon discovery 
of the contraband, I returned to my patrol car and placed KELLEY under arrest for trafficking 
marijuana. I placed KELLEY in handcuffs, checked the handcuffs for tightness and double 
locked them. I searched KELLEY for contraband and placed him back into my patrol car on the 
passenger side. No other contraband was located Inside the vehicle. 
5.1 advised KELLEY of Miranda. I asked KELLEY if he would like to talk with me about what was 
found in his vehicle. KELLEY stated, "Not really, it would only be bad to talk about it at this 
time. 11 I confirmed with KELLEY he did not want to try and work with us. KELLEY inquired as to 
what I meant. I explained about conducting a controlled delivery. I asked if KELLEY was really 
heading to Jackson Hole. KELLEY said "No.'' I asked him where he was going. KELLEY stated, 
"Go on." While continuing to explain the controlled delivery process, KELLEY stated he was not 
interested. I stopped talking with KELLEY at this time . 
._., 6.Sgt. Cagle retained possession of the marijuana. Ada County Animal control was requested 
for KELLEY's dog. I transported KELLEY to the Ada County Jail and booked hini in for 
Trafficking Marijuana. KELLEY was turned over to the jail staff, and I had no further contact with 
him. 
7.1 responded to the Idaho State Police District 3 Evidence Room. I meet with Sgt. Cagle. We 
weighed the three packages together for a weight of 3.2 lbs. I opened one of the sealed bags 
and tested the green leafy substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK). The test was 
presumptive positive for marijuana. 
8.0n April 23, 2013, with assistance from Cpl. Cottrell, I repackaged all three of the bags into 
one bag. Total, weight was still 3.2lbs. I combined the two smaller packages and weighed them 
separately. Total gram weight was 4.9grams. I also tested the contents using a Narcotics 
Identification Kit (NIK). The test was presumptive positive for marijuana. The remainder of the 
contraband was packaged. I photographed the cell phone, and removed the battery. I recorded 
the phones information including serial and model numbers. 
9.0n April 24, 2013, I submitted the evidence for processing. 
10.0n April 25, 2013 I applied for and was granted a search warrant to search KELLEY's cell 
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11.0n April 29, 2013, I contacted Evidence Technician Danielle Hendershot and advised her of 
the warrant. Hendersh'ot advised the phone would be turned over to Karen Montgomery for 
processing . 
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On 4-19-13 at 0022 hours, I responded to a K9 request by Trooper B. Hlgley in the area of eastbound 
Interstate 84 near Cole Road. Trooper Higley had informed me that he had received information in 
regards to' a particular vehicle that would be traveling through Idaho from Oregon. Trooper Higley told 
me that he had located the vehicle and would be making a traffic stop on it for a lane violation. 
When I arrived at the traffic stop Trooper Higley was already at the passenger side of the vehlcle talking 
with the driver. ISP Sergeant Cagle was also on scene upon my arrival. Trooper Higley had the driver 
exit the vehicle along with his dog and had them stand on the roadside while he continued his traffic 
stop investigation. 
I deployed my trained and state certified drug dog, Turk. Turk is a four year old Yellow Labrador that is 
trained and state certified to sniff for, and alert to, the odors of marijuana, meth, heroin, and cocaine. 
Turk receives weekly POST certified training along with annual state certifications. 
I approached the vehicle with Turk and saw that it was a green four door vehicle. I saw that the driver's 
window was nearly rolled down all the way and the front passenger window was also rolled down. I 
began working Turk from the front of the vehicle towards the driver's side. As I presented the driver's 
door to Turk, I watched as his sniffing began to increase, he placed his front paws on the window seal, 
sniffed along the lower door seam while his tail wagged, and he sat down. When Turk sat down, he 
gave me an excited look in anticipation of being rewarded. I continued to present and tap along the 
driver's side rear door, but Turk remained at the driver's door. Based upon Turk's change in behavior 
coupled with the fact that he did not leave the driver's door as I continued to present other parts of the 
vehicle, I knew this to be his alert. 
I continued to work the exterior of the vehicle around to the passenger side. When Turk reached the 
passenger side he once again began to sniff more rapidly, became excited, pressed his nose up agalnst 
the passenger door with his mouth slightly opened, and sat down. I then placed Turk Into the vehicle via 
the drive(s door. Turk jumped into the back seat where I saw a large bag of dog food. Turk began to 
bury his nose under the bag of dog food near the seat back. Turk's tail was wagging excitedly as he 
attempted to push the bag of dog food away. I removed the bag of dog food and placed it on the 
ground outside the vehicle. Turk also began sniffing along the rear passenger ·floorboards. A section of 
the back seat was down allowing several skis to fit inside the vehicle. From my observation, Turk was 
sniffing low and the source of the odor appeared to be coming from under the rear seat. 
Myself, Trooper Higley, and Sergeant Cagle began to search the vehicle {Sergeant Hunsaker, Boise 
Police, was also on scene and stood by with the driver). Sergeant Cagle searched the trunk area and I 
was informed that he located three large plastic bags that contained suspected marijuana. 
Officer M. Plaisted #818 
Boise Police Department, K9 Unit 
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JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDA~O, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ' 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
Count)' of ADA ) 
* * * * * 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF TH01\:IAS CAMPBELL 
) KELLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
) SUPPRESS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
1)1:?UTY 
], THO::vfAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, do swear to the following to be true and a::curate to 
th.e best ofmy knowledge: 
1. On April 19, 2013 I was pulled over in Ada County, Idaho allegedly for an illegal 
lane change. 
2. The Officer who pulled me over did not have a warrant 
3. I did not feel free to leave. 
4.' The officer searched the vehicle 1 was dl"ivir.g and the trunk without a warrant and 
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v...i.thout my permission. 
DATED tltis,;?_')day of July, 2013. 
SUBSCRIBED A.'ND SWORN TO before me this.2.5'day of Ju:y, 2013, before me, 
No1try Republic in and for said state, personaU:y appeari11gh11s· Ker~ , known or 
identified to me by the person who executed the foregoing ins1rumentacknowledged to me 
that he(she executed the same. 
lN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the 
day and year first above written . 
. -:•:J,)I:, . . MARCIE SHEAN 
.:{~li·\ Notary Pul>lic, Slate ot Nevada 
1~~- · Appo!n1ment No. 11-4063-2 
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7. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jill Longhurst 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
)~.--;:;:'.;:;;::-FU3 ~? L/....::.___D 
AM. ____ ..,-.. M Q 
AUG 1 6 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs." ) STATE'S MEMORANDUM 
) IN OPPOSITION TO 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
Defendant, 
) TO SUPPRESS ) 
) 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW, Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, in and for the 
County of Ada, State ofldaho, and hereby opposes the defendant's motion to suppress. 
I. FACTS 
The State anticipates that Trooper Higley will testify in detail to the facts and 
circumstances relating to this traffic stop and consistently with the brief summary of the 
events as contained in the police report which was attached to the defendant's 
memorandum and the Affidavit for Search Warrant attached herewith [Exhibit l]. 
Additionally the State anticipates that the Trooper will also testify to additional 
information known to him at the time of this traffic infraction which had been provided 
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by other law enforcement officers from Oregon who had had contact with the defendant 
and his vehicle prior to the traffic stop at issue in this case and information provided to 
him by other officers during the course of this stop. 
II. ISSUES 
1. I.C. §49-808 is clear and unambiguous as to what conduct is 
prohibited and is factually clear as it is applied to this defendant. 
2. Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant 
was engaged in criminal conduct before the traffic stop occurred and 
his concerns were further extended during the course of the traffic 
stop . 
. 3. Trooper Higley had probable cause to believe that the defendant's 
vehicle, including his open trunk area, contained narcotics after a 
drug detection dog alerted to the odor of a controlled substance in the 
vehicle and based on information provided to the Trooper from other 
law enforcement officers. 
III. 
PROCEDURAL CLAIMS 
LC. §49-808(2) delineates both when a driver is required to signal an impending 
change in his vehicle's position and the appropriate method, by either distance or time, to 
perform and signal depending on the nature of the roadway. The statute requires drivers 
on a controlled access highway, such as an interstate highway, shall signal their intention 
to move their vehicles to the left or right for not less than five seconds. 
As to when a signal is required, in 1999 the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a 
challenge to this code section and concluded that the signal requirement is necessary 
when a driver is traveling from one passing lane to the next. During the course of the 
court's review, the _Court of Appeals stated: "The language if LC. §49-808 is plain and 
unambiguous and must be given effect." State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 666, 991 P.2d 
388,391 (Ct.App.1999). The Dewbre Court further noted that as to LC. §49-808 there 
are "no exceptions to the signal requirement" and that a signal is required "whenever a 
movement is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement 
is made necessary to comply with highway signage." Dewbre, Id., citing State v. 
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Pressley, 131 Idaho 277,279,954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App.1998). In the instant case, 
Defendant Kelley was changing lanes on an interstate highway with a speed limit of up to 
75 miles per hour. See, LC.§ 49-654(2)(c). Changing lanes clearly falls within the plain 
language of LC. §49-808(2) which states: "A signal of intention to turn or move right or 
left when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic." There is not a 
reasonable interpretation of this statute which would lead to the conclusion that a driver 
need not signal prior to changing marked lanes. Consequently, there is no valid argument 
that Defendant Kelley was not required to signal his intention before changing lanes or 
that the requirement that a signal precede a lane change was unclear from this statute. 
Defendant Kelley, however, claims that LC. §49-808(2) is unclear, and therefore 
unconstitutionally vague as to the manner by which a signal must occur. The State 
disagrees. LC. §49-808(2) specifically indicates "On controlled-access highways and 
before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less 
than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances ... " Kelley argues this provision is 
"vague" for two reasons. His first claim is that Idaho law is unclear what constitutes a 
"controlled access highway." His second claim is that the statute itself supports some 
"linguistic" confusion due to what he claims is the ambiguous placement of a comma 
which he alleges makes it confusing whether a driver should signal for 5 seconds or 100 
feet. 
In support of his first assertion of vagueness, Defendant Kelley claims that the 
interstate highway, 1-84, where this crime occurred could be construed as either a 
"controlled access highway," LC. §49-109(5)(b) or to the definition of a "through" 
highway under LC. §49-109(5)(c). Although LC.§ 49-109(5) does provide a definition 
of highway, Defendant Kelley's reading, which he claims, would cause 1-84 to be either a 
"controlled access highway" or a "through" highway is amiss. 1-84, particularly the 
portion of this highway which is involved in this traffic stop, does not allow vehicles 
crossing the highway from stop signs or other traffic-control devices to cross the highway 
in a perpendicular fashion. Therefore, 1-84 is by no means a "through" highway as 
described by LC. §49-109(5)(c). Moreover, not only is Kelley simply wrong about his 
interpretation of what the definition of a "controlled access highway" as opposed to a 
"through" highway, but his attempt to limit the definition of a controlled access highway 
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to LC. § 49-109 is likewise erroneous. Idaho Code §40-310(9) grants the Idaho Board of 
Transportation clear authority to "designate state highways, or parts of them, as 
controlled-access facilities and regulate, restrict or prohibit access to those highways ... " 
See also Wylie v. State, Idaho Transp. Bd. 151 Idaho 26,253 P.3d 700 (201 l)("There is 
no question that ITD is vested with the authority to designate state highways as 
I' 
'controlled access facilities.' ... "). Accordingly, ITD has specifically designated 1-84 as 
an interstate highway- which is by definition a controlled access highway. See e.g. 
Idaho Transportation Department Highways Access Control Guide, August 2000 
(designating Interstate 84 as a fully controlled access highway)[attached as Exhibit 2]; 
Idaho Transportation Department Access Management: Standards and Procedures for 
Highway Right-of-Way Encroachments, April 2001 (section 1.3.6 regarding signing and 
indicating the limitations to signs "on interstate and other controlled access highways." 
providing the definition of Controlled Access Highway, p. 9; Interstate Highway and 
Highway, p. 11; and National Highway System (NHS) p. 13) [attached as Exhibit 3]; 
Idaho Transportation Department/Idaho Driver Education and Training Strategies for 
Controlled Access Highways Part 1 M13 April 2005 (PowerPoint presentation for 
education at slide M13-3 "The words 'limited' and 'controlled' access highways are 
interchangeable with 'freeways' and 'expressways"' and listing multiple designations 
through the program or 1-84 as an interstate highway)[attached Exhibit 4]; Standards and 
Procedmes for Specific Service Signs on the Interstate and Other Fully Controlled Access 
Highway, ITD 2007 at p. 7 ("'Fully controlled access highway' -Any section of highway 
system where access is prohibited except for interchange connections.") [attached as 
Exhibit 5]; see also State, Idaho Transp. Bd. v. Hi Boise LLC, 153 Idaho 334,282 P.3d 
595 (2012)(discussing eminent domain claims regarding improvements/alterations to 1-84 
at the involving the on/off ramp); Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 147 Idaho 232,207 P.3d 
963 (2009)(deterrnining the Chinden Boulevard is a controlled access highway). 
Nonetheless, definitions of "controlled access highway" aside, common sense and 
the ordinary application of the commonly meanings and common usage would clearly 
indicate that a "controlled access highway" is a freeway or interstate highway such as 1-
84. This term is used in its ordinary and commonly known meaning repeatedly in the 
I . 
Idaho Driver's Services Manual, also published by the Idaho Transportation Department. 
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The manual uses the term "controlled access highway" interchangeably or as a synonym 
for a "freeway." For example, the manual indicates that a driver may not park "On any 
controlled-access highway (freeway)." at p. 2-8. [attached Exhibit 6] Drivers are 
instructed that backing is "always prohibited on freeways, expressways, and other 
controlled-access highways." P. 2-11. [attached as Exhibit 6]. Not only does the I.C. 
§49-109(5)(b) make it clear that 1-84 is a "controlled access highway," but Idaho law 
grants ITD the authority to designate whether a road is a controlled access highway, 
which they have clearly and repeatedly done. More importantly, when considering 
whether I.C. § 49-808 clearly and unambiguously gives motorists notice of which acts 
are prohibited, it is clear in the common and known usage of the word that an interstate 
highway is a controlled access highway. Accordingly, Defendant Kelley's argument that 
LC. §49-808 is "vague" because Idaho law is unclear regarding whether interstate 84 is a 
controlled access highway fails. Idaho law is abundantly clear that 1-84 is a very 
controlled access highway. Defendant Kelley was clearly on notice that this was a 
controlled access highway and the access restrictions of this road are known and obvious. 
Similarly, Defendant Kelley claims that the statute is unclear whether a driver 
should signal for 5 seconds or for 100 feet because of what he suggests is a confusing 
co:rrima placement. There is no confusion as to the meaning and intent of LC. §49-808(2) 
nor does the comma placement create any confusion. "The task of the court 'in 
interpreting the meaning of language contained in a statute is to give effect of the 
legislature' intent and purpose."' State v. Dewbre,133 Idaho 663, 665 991 P.2d 388, 
390(Ct.App.1999) quoting State v. Coleman, 128 Idaho 466,469,915 P.2d 28, 31 
(Ct.App.1996). What is more, Idaho Courts have clearly held that "[t]he plain, obvious 
and rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning." 
State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40, 966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.App.1998). A clear and 
con~ise reading of the language of LC. §49-808(2) indicates drivers operating a motor 
vehicle on a controlled access highway should signal for not less than 5 seconds. The 
five-second signal requirement applies to vehicles moving from a parked position and 
vehicles traveling on a controlled access highway. All other times the signal should be 
given for 100 feet. Common sense alone suggests that the signal requirement for vehicles 
traveling at high speeds on controlled access highways should be for five seconds. A 
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signal to other motorists traveling at highway speeds up to 7 5 miles per hour of only 100 
feet is simply not safe nor is it ample warning. To imply that the legislature really meant 
that vehicles traveling at 75 miles per hour could safely "warn other traffic" (LC. §49-
808(2)) of the intent to move with only 100 feet notice is by definition, unsafe. In State 
v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277,279,954 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ct.App.1998), the court made it 
clear, safe warning was a clear prerequisite of I.C. §49-808. 
If a statute truly were "void for vagueness" the statute would lack sufficient 
clarity for "ordinary people" to understand what "conduct is prohibited." Burton v. State, 
Dept. ofTransp. 149 Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d 933, 935 (Ct.App.2010) (citation omitted). 
Idaho drivers' education courses throughout the State and the clear language of the Idaho 
Driver's Manual very clearly explains this statute indicating that "Signals must start at 
least 100 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds ( on freeways or highways) 
before you turn or change lanes." Idaho Driver's Manual, at 2-9 [ attached as Exhibit 6]. 
These manuals are written to be understood by 14-year-old learner's permit driving 
students and foreign nationals. There is seemingly no confusion or inability to interpret 
the comma to clearly explain what is prohibited in these State publications. 
In order to prevail on a claim that a statute is unconstitutionally vague, a 
defe!ldant must show either the statute is vague on its face or vague on its application. 
"A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a 
complainant's conduct." Burton v. State, Dept. ofTransp. 149Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d 
933,935 (Ct.App.2010)(citation omitted). Defendant Kelley makes both claims. 
Defendant Kelley claims that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it does not 
give him "adequate notice as to the conduct which is proscribed." Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 5. As noted above, in 1999 the Idaho 
Court of Appeals noted that "The language ifl.C. §49-808 is plain and unambiguous and 
must be given effect." State v. Dewbre,133 Idaho 663,666, 991 P.2d 388,391 
(Ct.App.1999). The Dewbre Court further noted that as to I.C. §49-808 there are "no 
exceptions to the signal requirement" and that a signal is required "whenever a movement 
is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement is made 
necessary to comply with highway signage." Dewbre, Id The holdings ofDewbre 
clearly manifest that this statue is indeed, "clear and unambiguous." Defendant Kelley's 
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clai~ that he did not have notice as to which conduct was proscribed by this statute is 
clearly contrary to the specific determination of the Dewbre court. There is no lack of 
clarity that LC. §49-808 requires motorists to signal a lane change so Kelly's argument 
fails in this regard. 
Defendant Kelley also claims that this statute is unconstitutionally vague when 
applied to "the facts of this case." Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, p. 7. The Burton Court indicated "[t]o succeed on an 'as applied' vagueness 
challenge, a complainant must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that the 
complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines 
such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the 
complainant." Id. citations omitted. Similarly, Defendant Kelley's claim that the statute 
is vague as it is applied fails because there is no confusion as to how a driver on a 
freeway or controlled access highway should signal a lane change. Kelley relies on 
Burton, supra, for this argument. However, Burton is clearly distinguishable from the 
facts of this case. In Burton, the Court of Appeals held that the statute was void as it 
applied to situations where two lanes were merging into one lane, however, the Court 
noted that the situation in Burton "differs significantly from that where one of two lanes 
ends and the other continues" as in the Dewbre case. Burton, at Idaho 749; P.3d at 936. 
Similarly, in the current situation, there is no confusion as to whether the signal 
requirement applies to the defendant's driving. Defendant Kelly was changing clearly 
marked lanes on a fully access controlled interstate highway. The plain language of the 
statute renders no confusion as to whether drivers on an interstate should signal for five 
seconds or not. Even 14.5 year old student drivers are able to understand this statute and 
act accordingly. Thus, Defendant Kelley's claims that this statute is unconstitutionally 
vague because the statute fails to provide notice of what conduct is prohibited and 
because of how the statute applies to the facts of his situation are incorrect. Accordingly 
his motion to suppress on these grounds should be denied. 
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IV. REASONABLE INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION FOLLOWING A TRAFFIC 
STOP 
The mere lack of a warrant does not necessarily violate the defendant's 
constitutional right. As clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court, 
Not all seizures of the person need be justified by probable cause to arrest for a 
crime; a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
manner, detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior 
even though there is no probable cause for arrest. Such a seizure is justified under 
the Fourth Amendment if there is an articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime. 
State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992)(citations omitted). See 
also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 2868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889(1968). Although the State 
acknowledges that by conducting a traffic stop on a motor vehicle the driver of the 
vehicle is technically seized or detained, this traffic stop was not an improper seizure. In 
the instant case, Trooper Higley observed a traffic infraction committed by the driver of 
this vehicle in violation of I.C §49-808(2). "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer 
may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is articulable and 
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." State v. 
Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416,419 (Ct.App. 2000)(citations omitted). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure of a driver/passengers in a traffic stop 
is treated like an investigative detention and is evaluated on the "totality of the 
circumstances then known to the officer." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59,266 P.3d 
1161, 1164 (Ct.App. 2011). Although the investigative detention necessarily should be 
"related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop," the scope of the detention 
may be expanded based on events occurring during the scope of the stop. Johnson, Id. 
Accordingly, during the course of an investigative detention, "[i]f a police officer's 
suspicions are 'confirmed or further aroused, the stop may be prolonged and the scope of 
the investigative stop enlarged."' State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292,295 
(2000) (quoting State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,877,736 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1987)). 
In the instant case, the Trooper observed a traffic infraction which led him to 
properly stop the vehicle. However, Trooper Higley's reasonable suspicion was based on 
more than a traffic infraction. He had recent information from a reliable source, an 
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Oregon State officer, regarding the defendant transporting controlled substances in the 
vehicle while traveling toward Boise.· He made observations of the defendant and the 
contents of his vehicle, including the visible trunk area which were inconsistent with · 
statements made by the Defendant and inconsistent with information the trooper knew. 
Although Defendant Kelley by his motion has made the assertion that there was 
an improper seizure of his person related to this stop, or that this was a pre-textual stop, 
the facts are inconsistent with that assertion. The reasonableness of detention is 
evaluated by a totality of the circumstances then known to the officer. The length of the 
detention of the Defendant Kelley was not excessive and was reasonably related in scope 
and duration to what Trooper Higley knew before the stop and what he observed and 
became aware of during the stop. The traffic stop did not constitute an improper seizure 
of Defendant Kelley and was reasonably related in scope to information known to the 
o~fi?er during the time of the stop or developed and properly expanded during the stop. 
V. SEARCH OF THE TRUNK 
The search of Defendant's vehicle occurred after Trooper Higley determined he had 
probable cause to believe that Kelley's vehicle contained contraband. This information 
was developed by information made available to the trooper by other officers, his own 
observations and his expertise and experience with narcotics trafficking and the positive 
alert of a trained narcotics dog. Under a totality of the circumstances, when an officer 
has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband, the automobile exception 
permits the warrantless search of the vehicle. 
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows law enforcement 
officers to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles if they have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). These searches may 
include the search of any container within the car if the container could reasonably 
contain the suspected contraband or evidence. United States v. Ross, 456 US. 798, 
825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 594 (1982). Probable cause is the 
possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to 
believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty. State 
v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 137, 922 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1996). When analyzing the 
existence of probable cause, this Court must determine whether the facts available to 
the officers at the moment of the search warranted a person of reasonable caution to 
believe that the action taken was appropriate. Julian, 129 Idaho at 136, 922 P.2d at 
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1062; State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920,925,523 P.2d 523,528 (1974). The facts 
making up the probability are viewed from an objective standpoint. Julian, 129 Idaho 
at 136-37, 922 P.2d at 1062-63. Additionally, in passing on the question of probable 
cause, the expertise and experience of the officer may be taken into account. State v. 
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319,323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct.App.1991). 
State v. Gomez, 144 Idaho 865, 870, 172 P.3d 1140, 1145 (Ct.App.2007). Likewise, our 
courts have clearly indicated that a positive alert to the odor of a controlled substance by 
a trained narcotics detection dog will give an officer probable cause. Florida v. Harris, --
- S.Ct. ---, 2013 WL 598440 (February 19, 2013). 
It does not appear from Defendant Kelley's brief that he claims that Trooper Higley 
d~d not have probable cause to believe there were controlled substances in his car, but 
rather, only that even with probable cause to search a vehicle for suspected controlled 
s~bstances, the officer may not search the trunk of a vehicle. Kelley's application of 
applicable law is incorrect on this issue. In the instant case, the Trooper had probable 
cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. The rear seat of the vehicle was 
down exposing the trunk in order to accommodate skis leaving the officer able to visually 
see into the trunk from outside the vehicle, and likely comingling any odors of narcotics 
to the entire interior of the vehicle. "The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile 
is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather it 
is d~fined by the object of the search and the places in which there is- probable. cause to 
believe it may be found." State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,210,226 P.3d 1220, 1225 
(Ct.App.2011) citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 
572 (1982). 
Moreover, in State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 71 P.3d 1072 (Ct.App.2003) a 
defendant challenged the search of his vehicle, and specifically the trunk, incident to 
arrest. As is with the present case, in Veneroso the trunk compartment was 
visible/partially visible to law enforcement outside the car. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
declined to address Veneroso' s claim that a search incident to arrest did not allow the 
search of the trunk, stating: "we conclude that the trunk search was lawful under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Under the automobile exception, police 
officers may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have cause to 
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believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Id. Idaho at 
939; P.3d at 1076 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case Trooper Higley had probable cause to believe that the vehicle may 
-
contain narcotics - the exposed trunk area as well as the interior portion of the vehicle. 
Accordingly, the search of the trunk was not improper. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Defendant Kelley claims that LC. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague and therefore this 
traffic stop was invalid. He is wrong. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to 
give notice of the prohibited conduct or if the statute is vague on how it is applied to 
individuals in a particular fact pattern. This statue clearly requires a signal before 
changing lanes. Likewise the statute clearly applies to all motorists on interstate 
highways, controlled access highways, traveling at high speeds and requiring them to 
signal for no less than five seconds. Neither the prescribed conduct nor the application as 
to the length of a required signal is vague in this case. Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate unconstitutional vagueness and his motion should be denied. 
Defendant Kelley also claims that the officer unreasonably extended the length of 
his detention. Trooper Higley had knowledge from other officers before and during this 
stop, coupled with irregular and inconsistent statements by the defendant and visual 
observations the officer made while at the side of the vehicle properly extended the 
length of the detention for this officer to investigate his reasonable suspicions that 
criminal activity was occurring. The length of the detention was not improper. 
Fina!ly, Defendant Kelley seemingly acknowledges that the positive alert of the 
trained narcotics detention dog to his vehicle gave the officer probable cause to search his 
vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; however, Kelley 
complains that the officer's search should not have included a search of his trunk area. 
This argument is simply not consistent with Idaho law. 
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Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that the court dismiss the defendant's 
motion to dismiss. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \~August 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \Af ~ay of August 2013, I caused to 
be served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress upon the individual(s) named below 
in the manner noted: 
Name and address: Gerald Bublitz, 501 W. Grove St., Boise, ID 83702 
f.. .By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first 
class. 
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available 
for pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS (KELLEY), Page 13 of 13 
000055
.... [I COPY 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Kari L. Higbee 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
APPLICATION FOR SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________ ) 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Trooper Blake Higley of the Idaho State Police, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is a duly appointed, qualified, and acting peace officer within the County of Ada, 
State ofidaho, and that he has reason to believe that certain evidence of the crime(s) of Trafficking 
in Marijuana, Delivery of a Controlled Substance; Possession of a Controlled Substance wi~ Intent 
to Deliver; and/or Possession of Controlled Substance and/or Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of 
Idaho Code §37-2732 to-wit: Any evidence of the described crimes contained in the memory or call 
history of the cell phones, including any names, phone numbers, addresses, contact information, 
.. 
data, text messages, emails, instant messages (SM), images, videos, photographs, screen name lists, 
a "buddy" list, or other information relating to communications or contacts with individuals 
regarding the planning and/or coordinating criminal activity, contained in any address book, speed 
dial, calendar, call history, or other part of the cellular phone, SIM -card or its memory; any and all 
electronic accounting record(s), in the forn1 of computer generated logs of criminal activity, 
including, but not limited to, diaries, journals, calendars, or computer system audit records; 
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.. 
electronic mail messages, opened and unopened, to or from co-conspirators, associates, or victims; 
electroni~ chat room logs, and other electronic logs, of communications with co-conspirators, 
associates, or victims; computer account information, including but not limited to computer host 
names and Internet addresses, account names, passwords, access telephone numbers, password 
files, and other information about computer systems, users, accounts and related topics, and 
documents that show ownership and control are located in the following described property, to-wit: 
Cellular Phone: Verizon LG, black in color, using unknown phone number, 
believed to belong to Thomas C KELLEY (  ). The Serial Number 
recorded on the back of the phone is 107CYMR0998683. The phone is listed as 
exhibit No. 05 on Idaho State Police report Bl3001161. The phone is currently 
located in an evidence locker at the lSP Region 3 Patrol and Investigations Office at 
700 Stratford Rd. Meridian, Ada County, Idal10. 
That he has probable cause to believe and is positive the same is true because of the 
following facts of which he has personal knowledge: 
Your affiant is employed as a Trooper with the Idaho State Police and has been since May 
of 2008. Your affiant has completed the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training Academy 
(P.O.S.T.), Idal10 State Police Academy, Pipeline and DIAP Interdiction Training and other 
Training in Law Enforcement type classes, with approximately 1800 total P.O.S.T. training hours. 
Your affiant holds an Intermediate Certificate from the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and Training 
Council. 1his initial training also included a course designed to prepare your affiant to recognize 
common signals or indicators of the presence of controlled substances on a person or within a 
vehicle, how to visually identify various controlled substances (methamphetarnine, cocaine, 
marijuana, and heroin), and how to recognize physical manifestations of controlled substance use in 
the field. 
During the course of his law enforcement career, your affiant has been involved in 
investigations of the distribution and/or manufacture of marijuana and other drugs.· Your affiant has 
participated as a surveillance officer during a prior controlled purchase of controlled substance. 
Your affiant has participated in the execution of search warrants related to devices used in 
controlled substance transactions, such as cellular phones, computers, and Global Positioning 
Systems. 
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Your affiant's training related to investigations for controlled substances includes a course 
taught by the Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) called the ''Pipeline" course. This course 
· . was a three-day course related specifically to criminal and drug enforcement interdiction. It 
highlighted investigative tactics and considerations related to motor vehicles used to transport or 
deliver controlled substances. 
During the course of his law enforcement career, your affiant has been involved m 
investigations of the distribution and/or manufacture of marijuana and other drugs. As a State 
Trooper, your affiant has participated in or executed multiple search and seizure warrants. 
Your affiant knows, based on his training and experience, that persons involved in the 
illegal sales and distribution of Marijuana and/or other drugs often use cell phones to communicate 
with persons to whom they sell their Marijuana and/or other drugs. Your affiant also knows that 
persons involved in the illegal sales and distribution of Marijuana and/or other drugs use cell 
phones to communicate with persons that are the source of supply for their Marijuana and/or other 
drugs. 
Your affiant knows that evidence of Marijuana and/or other drug distribution and sales is 
often found in cellular phones used by those who buy and sell drugs. Drug dealers often use 
cellular phones to communicate with buyers and suppliers. They sometimes store contact 
information in address books, speed dial lists, or in other areas of the phone. These 
communications can occur through typical telephone calls or through instant messaging or text 
messages. To the extent that criminals use services such as instant messaging or text messages, 
these messages can sometimes be found on the cellular phone itself. Criminals also use cellular 
phones to document criminal activities both by photographs as well as digital memos. 
Your affiant knows that these images and memos are also stored on the handset or SIM 
(Subscriber Identity Module). 
Your affiant knows that people involved in the distribution of Marijuana and/or other 
drugs often store phone numbers, names and nicknames of both their suppliers and potential 
customers. Your affiant knows that cell phones contain pictures of illegal activities as well as text 
and voice messages that are related to Marijuana and/or other drug distribution. Your affiant 
knows that devices such as these phones can store a large number of phone numbers and call 
history and some mobile phones can also contain contact information. Camera phones can 
contain images. This information can be valuable evidence in determining if there are other 
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participants in a criminal enterprise. Further, your affiant knows that images in a camera can 
contain evidence of where a subject has been and with whom the subject has associated. 
Your affiant knows from training and experience that cellular telephones are capable of 
holding several types of digital files to include movies and pictures. Technology in the cellular 
telephone industry has phones capable of accessing the Internet, and is capable of running a 
v~riety of software applications. With the cellular telephone users can gain access to several of 
the same types of digital media that can be accessed with a computer. As such, your affiant 
needs to examine the cellular telephones described in this affidavit for further contraband and 
criminal activity. 
CURRENT INVESTIGATION 
On April 19, 2013 at approximately 0020 hours, your affiant stopped a green colored Honda 
Civic (California registration 6SAS345) on eastbound Interstate 84 at approximately milepost 50 in 
Ada County, Idaho. Your affiant observed the vehicle signal briefly, approximately two seconds, 
and more to the right. The vehicle failed to signal for the required five seconds. This maneuver was 
in violation of Idaho Code §49-808, which requires a motorist on highway to signal for five (5) 
continuous seconds before any movement right or left or entering/exiting a highway. Your affiant 
approached the vehicle and made contact with the driver identified by his New Hampshire Driver's 
License as Thomas C KELLEY (  ). Your affiant observed KELLEY was nervous, 
and exhibited this through his talking. KELLEY's travel plans did not malce sense. KELLEY also 
advised he had been stopped and search by law _enfo_rcement earlier for over two hours. KELLEY 
also stated it took him approximately one hour to put the contents of his vehicle back after the 
search. Your a:ffiant could see KELLEY had very little luggage, as the rear seat was folded down, 
allovdng him to look into the trunk area. Your affiant observed KELLEY had reddened 
conjunctiva, and eyelid tremors, consistent with marijuana use. KELLEY denied using marijuana, 
and denied consent to search his vehicle. A drug detecting canine was requested to assist. Boise 
Police Officer M. Plaisted arrived on scene with his drug detecting canine "Turk". Officer Plaisted 
advised "Turk" had alerted on the vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed three large vacuum 
packed bags of a green leafy substance which I recognized as marijuana. A small Tupperware was 
also located with a small amount of marijuana inside (4.9 Grams). The bags were located under the 
trunk floor,. near the spare tire. Your affiant advised KELLEY he was under arrest for Trafficking a 
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Controlled Substance (in violation ofldaho Code 37-2732B (I) (A)). KELLEY was transported to 
the Ada County Jail. In addition to the contraband seized, a black cellular phone was removed from 
the vehicle. Total weight of the three vacuum sealed bags was 3.2lbs. Your affiant tested the 
contents of one of the bags using a Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK). The test was presumptive 
positive for marijuana. 
THEREFORE, your Affiant has probable cause and is positive that said property and 
evidence. described herein is concealed within the above-described property and therefore prays 
that a Search Warrant be issued. Your affiant further prays that this search warrant order that the 
items seized may be submitted for analysis, examination and comparison. Your affiant further 
prays that this search warrant order that a search of items seized include the contents of the 
items' internal, removable, or other memory held within. Your affiant further prays that this 
search warrant grant authorization to open closed containers. 
Trooper Blake Higley 
Idaho State Police 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before your affiant this __ day of----~ 
20 
Magistrate 
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CONFLICT POINT - An area where intersecting traffic either merges, diverges, or 
crosses. 
CONGESTION - A restriction or interference to the normal free flow of travel. 
"Congestion" is directly related to VOLUME such that as traffic volumes increase, 
congestion in_creases. 
CONSTRUCTION - Build new or modify existing facilities, other than maintenance. 
CONTROLLED ACCESS HIGHWAY - Any highway or roadway where access to or 
from abutting properties is restricted by the public authority having the jurisdiction. 
CORNER CLEARANCE -The distance along the curb line or outside edge of the 
shoulder measured from the beginning or end of the intersecting roadway flare to the 
nearest edge of the adjacent approach, excluding flares or transitions (see Figures 1.5.1 
and 1.5.2). 
DEPARTMENT - The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD). 
DIRECTOR - The director of the Idaho Transportation Department, or a delegated 
representative. 
DISTANCE BETWEEN APPROACHES-The distance measured along the curb line 
or outside edge of the shoulder between the nearest edges of adjacent approaches, 
excluding the flares, transitions, or radii (see Figures 1.5.1 and 1.5.2). 
DISTRICT - An administrative and maintenance subdivision of the Idaho 
Transportation Department encompassing a particular geographical region of the State of 
Idaho. 
DISTRICT ENGINEER - The administrator of an Idaho Transportation Department 
administrative district, or a delegated representative. 
DRILLING - Creating a path for a casing(s) through the use of an approved mechanical 
method. 
DRIVING - A mechanical means to forcibly install a casing without the means of 
drilling or boring. 
EMERGENCY - As used in this manual, any unscheduled work required to correct or 
prevent a hazardous situation that poses an imminent threat to life or property. 
ENCROACHMENT - Any authorized or unauthorized use of highway right-of-way or 
easements or the air space immediately above the highway right-of-way. 
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ENGINEER - A professional engineer licensed in the State ofldaho. 
EXCHANGE DEED - A legal document of title, between the Idaho Transportation 
Department and the owner of real property, transferring and describing a property right 
(easement, usage, access, etc.). 
FARMING - See AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES. 
FHWA - The Federal Highway Administration, a division of the U. S. Department of 
Transportation. 
FIBEROPTIC CABLE -A cable containing one or more glass or plastic fibers that has 
the ability to transmit light along its axis. 
FIELD APPROACH - An approach that serves only non-residential agricultural 
property, including farmyards. 
FIXTURE - Any sign, guard rail, bridge, tunnel, or other appurtenances placed within 
the highway right-of-way. 
FLARE TANGENT DISTANCE-The distance of the approach radius measured along 
the edge of pavement (see Figure 1.5.2). 
FRONTAGE -The distance measured along the highway right-of-way line between the 
frontage boundary lines of property that is contiguous to highway right-of-way (see 
Figures 1.5.1 and 1.5.2). 
FRONTAGE ROAD - A road auxiliary to and located to the side of the highway for 
service to abutting properties and adjacent areas for the purpose of controlling access to 
the highway. 
FRONTAGE BOUNDARY LINE - A line perpendicular to the highway centerline that 
begins at the point of intersection of the abutting property line and the highway right-of-
way line (see Figures 1.5.1 and 1.5.2). 
FULL CONTROLLED ACCESS HIGHWAY - Any section of a highway system 
where access is prohibited except for interchange connections. 
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION - A grouping of highways by the character of 
service (access and mobility) they provide. These include, but are not limited to, a minor 
collector, major collector, minor arterial, principal arterial, and interstate as defined in the 
latest edition of the Highway Functional Classification Manual by the U. S. Department 
of. Transportation, FHW A. 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES-As used in this manual, includes federal, state, county, 
city, or local highway jurisdictions. 
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GRADE. SEPARATIONS - A structure separating the elevations of two or more 
intersecting roads above or below a highway. 
HIGHWAY(S) - The entire width between the boundary lines of every main traveled 
way publicly maintained when any part is open to use by the public for vehicular travel, 
with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property line, including sidewalks, shoulders, 
berms, and rights-of-way not intended for motorized traffic. The term "street" is 
interchangeable with highway. Also, roads, streets, alleys, and bridges laid out or 
established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. Highways shall 
include necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, embankments, retaining 
walls, bridges, tunnels, grade separation structures, roadside improvements, adjacent 
lands, or interests lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works, 
or fixtures incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways. Roads laid out 
and recorded as highways, by order of a board of commissioners, and all roads used as 
such for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at 
the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of commissioners, 
are highways. 
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY - Property rights to land generally designated for 
transportation purposes, open to the public, and under the jurisdiction of a Public 
Highway Agency. 
IDAP A - the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. 
IMMINENT THREAT - Includes major traffic control deficiencies or safety situations 
that are likely to result in serious injury or loss of life. 
INTERSTATE HIGHWAY - As identified by federal code, a part of the National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highway System. An FHW A-approved arterial 
highway, freeway, or expressway with a fully controlled access, and having medians, 
grade separations at cross roads, and ramp connections for entrance to and exit from the 
traveled way. 
ITD - The Idaho Transportation Department. 
JACKING - A method of providing an opening for drainage or other purposes 
underground, by cutting an opening ahead of the pipe and forcing the pipe into the 
opening by means of horizontal jacks. 
JETTING - Drilling with high pressure water or air jets. 
JOINT-USE APPROACH -An approach constructed at a common boundary between 
adjacent properties that abut the highway. A joint-use approach is equally owned and 
shared as common access by both property owners. 
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LANDLOCKED PARCEL - A parcel of land without a legal right to access. 
LANDSCAPING - Any action taken to change the features or appearance of the 
highway right-of-way or abutting property with plants, soil, rock, and related material. 
LEAN CONCRETE BACKFILL - An approved concrete mixture using cement, water, 
sand, and aggregate material used to replace excavated material (see the current special 
provision for Trenching). 
LEVEL OF SERVICE - A qualitative measure describing operational conditions within 
a traffic stream, generally described in terms of such factors as speed and travel time, 
freedom to maneuver, traffic interruptions, comfort and convenience, and safety (see 
CAPACITY, CONGESTION, and VOLUME). 
LOADED RATE - As used in this manual, includes hourly wages plus the cost of 
associated benefits. 
LOCAL AUTHORITY - See LOCAL HIGHWAY AGENCY. 
LOCAL HIGHWAY AGENCY - Any city, county, highway district or other local 
board or body having authority to enact regulations, resolutions, and/or ordinances 
relating to traffic on the highways, highway rights-of-way, and streets within their 
respective jurisdiction. 
LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION - A county, city, or highway district with 
jurisdiction over a highway system. 
LOCAL ISSUING AUTHORITY - See LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION. 
LOCAL ROAD-A city, county, or highway district highway whose primary function is 
to provide access to adjacent properties. 
LOGO SIGNS - Signs giving specific information in the interest of the traveling public 
along interstate highways and other fully controlled access highways. 
MAINTENANCE - The continuous work or in kind replacement that is required to keep 
any encroachment within the highway right-of-way from deterioration due to wear and 
tear, and to preserve the general character of the original improvement without alteration 
of any of its component factors. 
MAJOR COLLECTOR - Any public highway designated as a route to provide traffic 
circulation and collect traffic from local roads within residential neighborhoods and 
commercial and industrial areas and channel it into the arterial system. 
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MEDIAN - The portion of a divided highway or approach that separates opposing 
traveled ways. Medians may be raised, flush, or depressed relative to the roadway 
surface, and may be landscaped or paved. 
· MEDIAN OPENING - A paved area bisecting opposite directions of a divided roadway 
that is designed to permit traffic to cross at least one direction of travel. 
MEMORIAL -An object established in memory of an event or person(s). 
MINOR COLLECTOR - These roads are located only in rural areas, are off the State 
Highway System, and are subject to local highway jurisdiction. 
MINOR ARTERIAL - Any rural or urban public highway designated as a route that 
provides substantial corridor movement with trip length arid density suitable for linking 
cities, counties, states, and other traffic generators. 
MULTIPLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL - A single parcel of land containing more than 
one residence (i.e., duplexes, apartments, trailers). 
MUTCD - The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, 
latest edition, as adopted by the Idaho Transportation Board in accordance with Idaho 
Code 49-201(3). A manual written by the Federal Highway Administration that sets 
national minimum standards for signing, striping, and traffic control devices. 
NATIONAL HIGHWAY SYSTEM (NHS) - The system of federal-aid highways, 
urban and rural, designated and approved in accordance with the provisions of 23 U. S. 
C. 103(b). 
NCHRP-350 - A National Cooperative Highway Research Program report that provides 
testing procedures that evaluate the safety and crash worthiness of roadway features and 
traffic control devices on the National Highway System and the State Highway System. 
NON-STANDARD APPROACH - Any approach that does not meet Department 
standards. 
OFFSET - A distance measured at right angles to the left or right of the highway 
centerline. 
PARK or PARKING - As used in this manual, the temporary stopping of a vehicle, 
wh.ether occupied or not, for purposes other than emergencies, unless authorized. 
PARTIAL CONTROL OF ACCESS IDGHWAY -Any section of the State Highway 
System that has restrictions placed on any encroachment within the State highway right-
of-way. 
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daho Driver Education and Training 
Strategies for Controlled Access Highways 
Part I 
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Introduction to Controlled 
Access H·g ways 
• Plans for the "Interstate 
System," began in the late 
1930s 
• The system was created in 
1956 and named for 
President Dwight 
Eisenhower 
• Without a system of 
interstate highways, life in 
America would be far 
different 
- It would be more risky, 
less prosperous, and 
lacking in the efficiency 
and comfort that 
Americans now enjoy 
and take for granted 
Source: The US Interstate Highway System: 40 Year Report 
American Highway Users Alliance., June 1996 
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Characteristics 
• The words "limited" and "controlled" access highways 
are interchangeable with "freeways" and "expressways" 
- Travel on these highways is limited to motor vehicles 
- Drivers are limited as to where they can enter and exit 
• Drivers have minimum and maximum speed limits 
• Opposing traffic has some type of barrier {median grass 
strip, guardrail, concrete wall, etc.) 
• There are multiple lanes in both directions 
• They are designed to carry lots of traffic quickly and 
efficiently 
• Distance between entrance and exit locations may only 
be a mile apart or many miles apart 
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Charact ristics 
• The U.S. Interstate Highway System has enriched the 
quality of life for every American 
-- It provides virtually all Americans with the ability 
to move quickly to any destination within their 
communities and to travel throughout the nation, 
inexpensively, and at whatever time or date they 
desire 
M13 · 4 
Photo courtesy of http://americanhistory.si.edu/onthemove/exhibition/exhibition_ 16_7.html 
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Character·stics 
• There is a high 
injury severity rate 
when a collision 
occurs because of 
the higher speeds 
• On Idaho's 
interstates, 2,460 
collisions occurred 
during 2004 
causing 38 fatalities 
Photo courtesy of AAA Foundation 
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• Emergency crossovers on limited access 
roadways are restricted to emergency or law 
enforcement vehicles only 
• Driving in these restricted areas can result in 
a large fine 
Photo courtesy of http://www.photodiary.org/kw_freeway.shtml 
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To I oads and Bri ges 
• Roads and bridges are generally 
paid for with fuel taxes 
• From 1864 to 1872 Idaho was 
completely dependent on toll roads 
and bridges 
• Idaho chartered toll companies to 
build and maintain roads and 
bridges 
• There were so many toll roads and 
bridges, The Legislature received 
complaints that tolls were seriously 
eating into their profits 
• The system was abolished in 1872 
• Yankee Jim's National Park Toll 
Road in Park County was the last toll 
road in Idaho 
The Snowden Bridge over 
the Missouri River charged 
tolls until 1956 
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Hi h Occupancy V hicle (HOV) Lanes 
• High-Occupancy 
Vehicle (HOV) lanes 
allow vehicles with 
two or more people 
to use diamond and 
express lanes 
• The goal of HOV 
lanes is to use the 
current freeway 
system more 
efficiently and to 
provide a quicker, 
more reliable trip to 
those who car pool 
M13 • 8 
April 2005 
000079
ADVA AG S O LI ITED ACCESS OAD 
• Collision and fatality rates 
are lower 
• Cross traffic is not 
present 
• Opposing traffic is 
separated by a barrier 
• There are no stops 
• Signs are large and 
placed well in advance 
• Higher speed limits allow 
for fast, efficient travel 
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DISADVA TAGES OF CO TROLLED 
A CESS H GHWAYS 
• Lane selection is critical 
• Increased stopping 
distance 
• Small driving errors can 
be disastrous 
• Different size and weight 
of vehicles adds 
additional challenges 
• Rush hour congestion 
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H·ghway Hypno is 
• A dull or drowsy condition 
that can occur because of 
the concentration needed 
while driving long 
distances 
• It becomes worse when 
the driver's eyes focus on 
the yellow line 
REST 1 
AREA,-
• Plan breaks and rest stops to 
combat highway hypnosis 
• Pull to a safe area for rest and 
sleep when tired 
M13- 11 
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Ve ocitation 
• Unknowingly accelerating to a 
higher speed while driving is 
known as velocitation 
• When driving at faster speeds 
for a period of time the body 
adjusts and causes the driver 
to think the vehicle is going 
slower than it actually is 
Photo courtesy of AAA Foundation 
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CLOVERLEAF INTERCHANGE 
Allows for 
interchange of 
two expressways 
. 
or maJor 
roadways 
Allows minimal 
disruption of 
speed or 
movement 
M13 • 13 
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DIAMO D I TE CHA GE 
Allows for 
interchange of a 
major roadway 
with a secondary 
dual or multiple 
lane roadway 
Little room available for 
left turns onto freeway 
Traffic can build up on 
the ramps creating 
congestion 
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u E I TE C A GE 
Allows for interchange 
of secondary two-way 
streets to a multiple 
lane roadway with 
minimal traffic mix 
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0 TAG 
Allows for interchange 
of vehicles using 
parallel secondary two-
way or one-way 
roadways and a major 
multiple-lane roadway 
AD I TE HAG 
Allows drivers to exit a multiple-lane roadway and 
use the opposing frontage road to enter the 
multi-lane roadway in the opposite direction 
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SAFETY DES GNS 
• Pedestrians, animals, non-motorized vehicles, and slow 
moving vehicles are prohibited 
• Fences restrict pedestrian and animal traffic 
• Wide shoulders and underpasses 
• Curves are banked 
• Sharp curves and steep grades are reduced or eliminated 
M13 • 17 
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SAFE Y DESIG S 
• Breakaway support on signs 
and light poles are designed 
to break when struck by a 
vehicle 
- Lessening the damage to 
the vehicle and injury to 
the occupants 
Photo courtesy of 
http://www.aaroads.com 
• Rumble Strips are 
corrugated road sections 
used to alert the driver 
through the noise tires make 
when driven over them 
- Warn of approaching 
hazards 
- Alert the driver that they 
are leaving the lane 
M13 • 18 
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SAFETY DE IGNS 
• Guardrails prevent vehicles that • 
leave the roadway from impact 
with retaining walls, fences, or 
other vehicles 
Crash barrels lessen the impact 
if a vehicle collides with a 
bridge or overpass support 
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SAFETY DESIG S 
• Changeable message signs warn drivers of traffic 
accidents, stalled vehicles, or other traffic 
problems 
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SAFETY DESIG S 
• Runaway truck ramps 
are on downhill grades 
for use by large, semi-
tractor trailers that have 
lost brake power and 
are unable to stop 
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INTERSTATES IN Idaho 
- · 
. 1r~ Tt ~:ST~.,-TE . 
. - ~ -, . ..... . -· ~····. - ~ : .... ~·-· - .. . ...., 
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Interstate sign 
trHCRSTfl,T [ 
84 
Warning sign 
SG S 
Guide sign 
Prison 
Zoo 
NEXT RIGHT A t FLAGSTAF'f" +- PHOENIX TUCSON -+ 
Speed limit 
NIGHT 
35 
SPEED 
LIMIT 
55 
MINIMUM 
45 
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INT STATE HIGHWAY UMBERS 
• Even numbers go 
east-west (1-90, 1-94) 
• Odd numbers go 
north-south (1-15) 
• Numbers begin in 
the west and get 
larger as they move 
east 
• Alternate routes are 
usually three-digit 
I Hr I f 
,i f I I I 
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IN E STA E IGHWAY UMBERS 
• If the first digit is even, the alternate route 
goes around the city 
• If it is odd, it leads into the city (1-184) 
M13 • 25 
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Lane Markings 
• Lane markings on 
expressways mean the 
same as on any other 
roadway 
• The HOV marking is 
unique to high 
occupant vehicles 
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• The speed limit on limited access highways in 
Idaho is 75 mph outside urban areas of 50,000 
population and 65 mph within urban areas of 
50,000 population 
• These fixed speed limits are based on optimal 
road/weather conditions 
Source: Idaho Drivers Manual 
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ILE ARKE S 
• Usually green or white and have 
the word MILE along with a number 
- some just have the number 
• Mile markers show the number of 
miles from where the Interstate 
route entered a state 
• The counting always begins at the 
state line in the south (for north-
south routes) and in the west (for 
east-west routes) 
• Mile marker numbers always get 
larger as drivers travel east or 
north 
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MILE MA K 
• Knowing how to read mile 
markers can help drivers know 
exactly where they are in their 
destination 
• Watching these numbers will be 
useful if a driver needs to call for 
assistance by giving an exact 
location 
• Exit numbers will be the same 
number as the mile marker as 
shown in the two pictures 
• Mile markers on roads off the 
Interstate system exist, however, 
the numbering system may be 
different from state to state-or 
even county to county 
s 
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IDAHO TRANS PORTATION DEPARTMENT 
Boise, Idaho 
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 
FOR 
SPECIFIC SERVICE SIGNS ON THE INTERSTATE 
AND OTHER FULLY CONTROLLED ACCESS HIGHWAYS 
(LOGO SIGNS) 
April 2007 
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LEGAL AUTHORITY 
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
· RULE NO. 39.03.62 of the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT establishes 
the following: 
1. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Under the authority of Sections 40-312, 40-313, 40-1911(5) and 67-5229 Idaho Code and 
U.S. Code Title 23, Chapter 1, Parts 625 and 655, the Idaho Transportation Board 
incorporates by reference its March, 2007 publication entitled "Logo Signs" 
2. TITLE AND SCOPE 
The publication provides regulations for the installation and administration of Specific 
Service signs giving information in the interest of the traveling public informing 
motorists of gas, food, lodging, camping, attraction and 24-hour pharmacy facilities with 
their related tourist services which are accessible from eligible interchanges. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this document is to provide standard operating procedures for installation 
and administration of Specific Service signs informing motorists about the availability of 
· Gas, Food, Lodging, Camping, Attraction and 24-Hour Pharmacy facilities that are 
. accessible from eligible interchanges. 
The intent of the logo sign program is to provide the availability of specific service 
signage to a business or activity that offers specific motorist services that are of interest 
to the traveling public. It is the sole intent of this program to provide motorist 
information to the traveling public and not to promote outdoor advertising of a business 
or activity. 
2. DEFINITIONS 
. The following definitions shall apply throughout this document unless the context clearly 
indicates otherwise: 
"24-Hour Pharmacy" - A licensed facility that is continuously operated 24 hours per 
day, 7 days per week having a State-licensed pharmacist present and on duty at all times 
for the dispensing of a prescribed drug or device. 
· "Approach" - That section of the highway right-of-way between the outside edge of 
shoulder and the right-of-way line which is designed as a roadway for the movement of 
vehicles between the highway and the adjoining property. 
"Attraction" - A tourist-oriented facility whose primary purpose is to provide 
amusement, historical, cultural, or leisure activities to the public. 
"Authorized operator" - A person or entity, other than an owner, who operates an 
independent motorist service facility and who has authority to enter into agreements 
relevant to matters covered by this document. 
"Camping" - An area designed to accommodate but not limited to any combination of 
tents, pickup campers, camp trailers, fifth wheel trailers, or motor homes. 
"Conditionally Qualified" -- A facility run as a profit or non-profit business to provide 
' tourist oriented services, attractions or activities to road users that cannot meet all criteria 
· for specific service signing. The Department may approve conditional status for a logo 
facility if the Department determines that signing of the facility would benefit the 
motorist. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
"Department" - The Idaho Transportation Department. 
"District" - Any Idaho Transportation Department district facility. 
"Facility" - A facility run as a profit or non-profit business to provide tourist oriented 
services, attractions or activities to road users. 
"Food court" - Any facility with two or more food businesses sharing a common seating 
area that serve food to the public as their primary source of revenue. 
"Food facility" - Any business that serves food to the public as their primary source of 
revenue. 
"Fully controlled access highway" - Any section of a highway system where access is 
. prohibited except for interchange connections. 
"Gas court" - Any facility with two or more gas businesses sharing a common service 
island or fuel storage. 
"Gas facility" - Any business that serves gas to the public as their primary source of 
revenue. 
"Interchange" -A ramped access point to or from a fully controlled access highway. 
"Interstate highway system" - Every State highway that is a part of a national system 
of interstate and defense highways established pursuant to Title 23, Section 103 (e), U.S. 
Code. 
"Logo" - An identification symbol or trademark or a word message for a qualified 
motorist service facility. 
"Logo panel" - A separate affixed sign attached to a Specific Service sign displaying the 
logo for a qualified motorist service facility. 
"Main traveled way" - The through traffic lanes of the highway system that are fully 
controlled access highways. 
"MUTCD" -Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways. 
"Owner" - The holder of fee title, or holder of leasehold estates from the owner of the 
real property. 
"Pharmacy" - See 24-Hour Pharmacy. 
"Regional significance" - Facilities that attract continuous motorist attendance from 
locations extending beyond the borders of Idaho. 
7 
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Parking on a Hill 
To keep your vehicle from rolling into traffic when parked on a hill, tum 
your front wheels (1 ) sharply toward and against the curb or edge of the 
road if you are facing downhill , or (2) if you are facing uphill , tum your 
wheels sharply away and against the curb (if there is no curb, tum the heels 
sharply toward the edge of the road) . 
No-Parking Zones 
Parking is not allowed: 
• On sidewalks. 
• On the street side of any parked vehicle. (This is known as "double 
parking .") 
• In intersections . 
• Within 50 feet of railroad tracks. 
• On bridges or overpasses. 
• In front of a driveway. 
• Within 15 feet of a fire hydrant. 
• Within 20 feet of a crosswalk. 
• Within 30 feet of a stop sign, yield sign, or 
traffic signal. 
• Within 20 feet of a fire station driveway . 
• On any controlled-access highway (freeway). 
• Where prohibited by signs or a red , yellow, or 
white "no parking" curb. 
Handicapped Parking 
The symbol shown here indicates parking spaces reserved for handicapped 
persons. Vehicles displaying this symbol on their license plate or a special 
card may park in handicapped spaces. Non-handicapped drivers are 
prohibited from parking in such spaces and may be fined for violations. A 
handicapped person may park automobiles displaying the handicapped 
symbol in public parking spaces without paying and for unlimited time. 
2-8 
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Using Your Turn Signals 
Always give a turn signal when you: 
• Change lanes or pass another vehicle. 
• Turn at an intersection or into a driveway. 
• Enter or leave a freeway or interstate highway . 
• Pull away from a parked position along a road or street to enter the 
traffic lane. 
• Pull over to the side of the road . 
Proper signalling may prevent a rear-end collision. Signals must start at 
least 100 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds (on freeways 
or highways) before you turn or change lanes . If you plan to turn just 
beyond an intersection , signal just after you pass through the intersection so 
you won't confuse other drivers. You may use either electric tum signals or 
arm signals . 
The correct arm signals are: 
• Left: Your arm and hand extended straight out the window. 
• Right: Your arm and hand extended upward out the window. 
• Stop: Your arm and hand extended downward out the window 
(see illustration below). 
You must signal before every turn or lane change . 
; 
' 
--~ 
Left Turn 
Left turns. 
' 
Right Turn Slow or Stop 
Right turns. 
2-9 
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"open range," which means almost all areas outside of city 
limits and herd districts upon which livestock by custom, 
license , lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam. The 
presence of fences does not necessarily mean that animals are 
not present or do not have the right of way. Be especially 
careful driving at night. If you strike and injure or kill livestock or domestic 
animals that are on the open range or under controlled movement, the 
owner of the animal(s) is not liable for damages to you or your vehicle. 
You may be liable for the injuries or death of the animal if you are found to 
have been negligent. 
OPEN CONTAINER LAW 
It is against the law for any person in a motor vehicle on a public roadway 
to drink alcoholic beverages , or to transport open (unsealed) containers of 
alcoholic beverages. It is a misdemeanor for a driver in actual physical 
control of a vehicle to violate the open container law- it is an infraction for 
passengers. An unsealed alcoholic beverage container may be legally 
transported in the enclosed trunk compartment or behind the last upright 
seat of a vehicle without a trunk compartment. Passengers may drink and 
possess alcoholic beverages in the passenger area of a vehicle designed , 
maintained, or primarily used to "transport people for compensation," or in 
the living quarters of a recreational vehicle. 
Other Laws You Need to Know 
• Lights: Headlamps and taillamps must be lighted from sunset to 
sunrise and when poor visibility makes them necessary for safety. 
Headlamps must be dimmed 500 feet before meeting and 200 feet 
before overtaking another vehicle. When lights are needed for 
driving, use headlamps, not parking lights. 
• Median Strip: It's illegal to drive across a barrier or unpaved strip 
that separates two halves of a roadway except at an authorized 
opening or crossover. This is not allowed on Interstate highways 
(freeways)-crossovers are for emergency vehicles only. 
• Racing: It's illegal to engage in any vehicle race , speed 
exhibition , or speed contest on any public road, street, or highway . 
• Driving on Sidewalks: Driving on sidewalks is prohibited except 
to cross into or out of a driveway or alley. 
• Keep Windows and Windshield Clear: Windows and 
windshields must be kept clean of signs, posters, and stickers 
except those required by law. You must also clean windows of ice, 
snow, or dirt before driving to ensure that you have maximum 
visibility in all directions. 
• Backing: Backing is always prohibited on freeways, expressways, 
and other controlled-access highways including the shoulder. 
Elsewhere, backing is prohibited unless it can be done safely and 
2-11 
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Hansen, Miren, 08/19/13, Gromwell Courtroom504 
Time Speaker Note 
12:38:09 PM! !State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 
3:00:32 PM jstate Attorney jBen Harmer 
~ ~ 
3:00:42 PM !Defense !Jessica Bublitz 
!Attorney l 
3:00:48 PM !Judge Hansen Jcalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel 
3:01 :23 PM 1Defense !will be requesting a continuance 
!Attorney ! 
3:01 :46 PM f state Attorney Jno objection 
3:01.:54 .. PM lJudge Hansen lwith .. the acknowledment from the State of the late filling - will grant 
! (the motion to continue the suppression motion - does have some 
l !time for speedy trial - the Court can hear the motion to suppress 
l lon 09/11/13 at 3:00 p.m. - will caution that the trial date may be in I !danger of being rescheduled 
3:05: 16 PM l Defense Jwill be asking for time to file a reply to the State's response 
\Attorney l 
3:05:27 PM f Judge Hansen f will give Ms. Bublitz until 09/04/13 at 5:00 p.m. for final reply 
~ i 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ,0, .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
3:06:33 PM ! !END CASE 
I I 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jill Longhurst 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
FILED P.M. ___ _ 
AUG 3 0 ·2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO LIMIT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS TO ISSUES IDENTIFIED 
BY THE DEFENDANT IN HIS 
MOTION/BRIEF 
COMES NOW, Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and moves this 
court for and order limiting the Defendant's argument and evidence to legal issues 
specifically identified by the defendant in his motion to suppress. 
On July 18, 2013 the Defendant filed a "Motion to Suppress and Notice of 
Hearing." State's Exhibit One, attached. On the same day, Defendant Kelley also filed a 
"Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress." State's Exhibit Two, 
attached. 
OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES 
IDENTIFIED BY THE DEFENDANT IN ms MOTION/BRIEF (KELLEY), Page 1 
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The Defendant's Motion to Suppress does not specify what evidence he seeks to 
suppress nor the reasons for the motion. Defendant's document merely reads: "Comes 
now the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, ... and moves this Court for an 
order to suppress statements and evidence in the above entitled case." I.C.R. 47 requires 
a motion to "state the grounds upon which the motion is made and shall set forth the relief 
or order sought." Defendant Kelley's motion fails to do so. In State v. Holland, 135 
Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000) the Idaho Supreme Court refused to address the appeal of 
issues the defendant did not completely raise during her suppression hearing stating: 
Idaho Criminal Rule 4 7 requires that a motion contain the ground for granting the 
motion. Holland's motion contains only one ground for suppressing the evidence: the 
pre se illegality of a warrantless search. A challenge to a warrantless search, however, 
does not automatically bring into issue the justification of the initial stop. Indeed, the 
law of searches and seizures are as different as they are similar. Therefore, Holland 
did not expressly raise the issue of the stop in the trial court. 
Holland at Idaho 161; P.3d 1169. 
I.C.R. 47 requires that a moving party give fair notice to the opposing side and 
clearly and specifically give the court notice of the motion and the legal reasons therefore. 
As noted by the Holland court, there are many divergent claims under the law of search 
and seizure. Fairness and due process require a moving party to give both notice of the 
issue and the grounds. Motions to suppress are not fishing expeditions wherein the 
defendant can raise any claim he wishes without prior notice. 
Defendant Kelle~ did provide the court with a memorandum in support of his 
motion. Defendant Kelley by his motion asks the court for an order suppressing "all 
statements and evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure" p. 1; 
however, the defendant does not articulate with any specificity which evidence or any 
actual statements in his memorandum. This memorandum fails to clarify or state any 
"issues" to be addresses. 
In the argument portion of his memorandum, the Defendant does identify three 
specific areas of the law upon which he, presumably, believes support his motion to 
OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES 
IDENTIFIED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HIS MOTION/BRIEF (KELLEY), Page 2 
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suppress. These are: First, that LC. §49-808(2) is void for vagueness. p. 3. Second, a 
claim that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the length of the traffic stop, 
p. 7. Third, that there is no probable cause to justify the search of the trunk area, p. 8. 
Based on these three topics outlined by the defendant in his memorandum, the State is on 
notice that the defendant intends to ask the court to suppress some unspecified evidence 
for these reasons alone. 
Accordingly, the State moves this court for an order limiting the Defendant's 
argument and evidentiary presentations to the three issues for which he provided notice 
and only to those issues. Defendant's failure to comply with I.C.R. 47 and vague 
references to the laws of search and seizure should not permit the Defendant to surprise 
the State or the Court and raise issues heretofore unannounced. 
Alternatively, the State moves the Court for an order requiring the Defendant to 
file a supplemental motion to suppress stating with specificity the exact statements he 
seeks to suppress, and all legal claims therefore, as well as which items of physical 
evidence he claims were improperly seized and the legal basis therefore. This Motion is 
based on ICR 47 and the fact that defendant's vague reference to the suppression of 
"statements" and "evidence" which should be suppressed "pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment" and "the Idaho Constitution" unduly prejudice the responding party. 
1A~ , 
DATED this-{;A- day of August 2013. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES 
IDENTIFIED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HIS MOTION/BRIEF (KELLEY}, Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 'Zq{!i... day of August 2013, I caused to be 
served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Discovery upon the 
individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Gerald Bublitz 
604 N. 16th St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
/ By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first 
class. 
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for 
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: ___ _ 
OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO ISSUES 
IDENTIFIED BY THE DEFENDANT IN HIS MOTION/BRIEF (KELLEY), Page 4 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By 1:LAINE TONG 
'tla>t.flY 
IN TlfE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICV\.L DISTIUCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THO);l!\S CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) CASE NO. CR-li'E-2013-5250 
) 
) 
) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
) THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) SUPPRESS 
) 
) 
-------------) 
X * * 
COMES NOW the Defendant, THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his 
attorney of record, Jessica B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C. 
The purpose of this Supplemental Brief in Aid of Defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
primarily to respond to the state's analysis of the wanantless search of the 1runk that occuned in 
this case. The state is asserting that the automobile exception applies in this case, giving officers 
probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including the trnnk itself. The state does not assert 
that the dog aletied upon the trunk itself, or that there is probable cause to search the trunk in 
particular. Rather, the probable cause appears to be based upon the observations of the officer 
with regard to the defendant's reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors, along with the 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page I 
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particular. Rather; the probable cause appears to be based upon the observations of the officer 
with regard to the defendant's reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors, along with the 
allegations that the drug dog hit upon the driver's side door, passenger's side door, (where there 
was a bag of dog food) and rear passenger floorboards. The state's position is that any probable 
cause to search a vehicle automatically extends to the entire vehicle, including the containers 
therein. The defendant disputes that this is an accurate interpretation of current Idaho law on the 
subject. 
Probable cause to search the entirety of a vehicle does not automatically exist throughout 
a vehicle simply because jt exits for a ce1iain part of e vehicle. The history of case law on the 
subject is not as simple as the state asserts in its brief. Whether probable cause exists to search a 
trunk of a vehicle is actually contingent upon what the probable cause leads the officer to belief 
as far as the illegal activity, and the logical extension as to in particular where evidence of it may 
be found. See 'fVilson v. State, 174 Md. App. 434, 921 A. 2d 881 (Md. App. 2007). As 
explained in the case involving probable cause to search particular containers within an 
automobile, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,824,102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L.Ed. 2d 572 
(1982), ''probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains 
contraband or evidence does notjustffy a search ofihe entire cab." However, if the probable 
cause extended. to the entirety of the vehicle, then the containers therein would be included in the 
search. Id In a case where the state also argued that a drug dog hitting upon the passenger side of 
a vehicle automatically gave the officer probable cause to search the entire vehicle, the court 
stated, "[w]e think that overstates the matter. Because probable cause must be tailored to specific 
compartments and containers within an automobile, the key is whether the dog "alerted" in the 
precise vicinity of the trunk. That js a question of fact that the district court resolved in favor of 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF lN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 2 
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finding on the fact that first marijuana was found in the center console, which led to an additional 
smell leading to the trunk itself.) See U.S. v. Carter, 300 F. 3d 415,422 (4111 Cir. 2002). 
The law in Idaho is not as simplified nor as broad as the state asserts in its brief. "The 
existence of probable cause to search the interior of a car is not necessarily sufficient to justii}' a 
search of the car's trunk." State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P.3d 633 (2001). In that case, 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that the smell of burnt marijuana was not sufficient to search the 
trunk of a vehicle as well. See Id. The reason is because burnt marijuana only leads to probable 
cause to believe use of drug activity may be present, not trafficking in drug activity (consistently 
with a long line of other cases in other jurisdictions.) Id, at 1226. Since the smell ofraw 
marijuana could indicate trafficking activity may be prese11t, the probable cause would extend to 
the search of the entire vehicle. 
The state relies upon State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 71 P. 3 d 1072, to support its 
contention that probable cause to believe the vehicle contains narcotics automatically leads to 
probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including the trwlk. It points to the fact that "as with 
the present case, the trunk compartment was visible/partially visible to law enforcement outside 
the cur." Efo'wcver, this fact of the courts analysis was only pertinent to the search incident to 
aITest that the state relied upon in that case as a grorn1d for a lawful sem-ch. The visibility of the 
item in the vehicle had to do with whether it was in fact a concealed weapon or not, thus 
justifying the search incident to a lawful arrest. As the state notes, this was an issue the court 
declined to address, and it has no factual analogy to U1e automobile exception asserted in this 
matter. The com1 in that case did hold the search was lawful as part of the automobile exception 
' 
to the wainnt requirement, but not because any eviden·ce of narcotics ipso facto allows a search 
of the emire vehicle. It had to do vvHh what the evidence had lead the officers to believe may be 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 3 
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to the warrant requirement, but not because any evidence of narcotics ipso facto allows a search 
of the entire vehicle. It had to do with what the evidence had lead the officers to believe may be 
the illegal activity unden.vay, trafficking. It stated,« Veneroso's car vvas parked on a dark street 
during the early moming hours in a residential area that was under construction. No other 
persons or traffic were observed .... After approaching the vehicle, the officer observed a small 
spoon lying on the backseat floorboard. From previous training experience, the officer 
recognized the spoon as of the type commonly used by those involved in illegal drugs . 
... Venernso's body language and statements led the officer to believe he was nervous and there 
was something illegal in the vehicle .... Once inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle, 
[they] discovered in the front seat area, two notebooks containing information ... officers 
recognized as being associate(/ with dmg trafficking, including names, phone numbers, dolJar 
amounts, and numbers indicating measurements of weight." See Id, emphasis added. This was 
therefore analogous and in Jine with the cases that have held that probable cause to believe 
trafficking is occuning, such as the smell ofraw marijuana, will provide a basis to search a trunk 
as well, \Vhere trafficking materials are commonly located. 
In this case, the officer did not have facts that would lead to a belief the defendant was 
trafficking in marjjmma. He had some indicators that may be associated with drug use, such as 
reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors. The drug dog did not alert on the trunk of the vehicJe, 
only on the doors a floorboards of the passenger compartment. The state's assertion that any 
probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle automatically leads to the trunk is overbroad 
and mjsstates the law. The defendru1t has noted that the state asse11s it is in possession of 
additional knowledge which has not been disclosed to date, wherein the Trooper was given 
additional infonnation from an Oregon State Trooper \Vhich led him to believe the defendant was 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRJEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS- Page 4 
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transporting narcotics. The defendant can only base this memorandum on the info1mation 
provided in police repo1is so far. 
DATED thisLf 'f'Y)ay of September, 2013. 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
JE~Z 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
p.5 
I hereby certify tha1 on this !,;/~ay of September, 2013, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
Ada County Clerk 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-6919 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mai1 
D Overnight Courier 
[ZJ Facsimile Transmission 
L~yR?b#~ 
Para~ 
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Hansen, Miren, 09/11 /13, \.:JOSney Courtroom503 
Time Speaker Note 
1 :39:09 PM i iState v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 
3: 15: 19 PM f state Attorney jJill Longhurst 
3: 15:23 PM J Defense Attorney [Jessica Bublitz 
: : 
3:15:28 PM f Judge Hansen !calls case, def. is present on bond with counsel 
-!: ~ ::!~ -=~ -1~~~:n:!1:~=~ney :::::~-:~ -~:~::~ -- -------- --- --
3:15:47 PM f Judge Hansen !cautions the parties - will limit the parties to the 5:00 i i hour may need to continue to a later date if not done 
3:16:28 PM loefense Attorney lno opening remarks - did file an Affidavit shifting the 
i iburden to the State 
3: 17:02 PM f state Attorney lno opening remarks - couple of concerns 
3:17:30 PM loefense Attorney jcomments to the Court · 
: : 
.... ;:~~:~~--=~ --,~~:!\~:~~:~ --i::~1~o;,~; !t~;~;seI _________________________ _ 
3:20:35 PM lather/Witness joavid Szplett - is sworn · 
3:21 :36 PM ioefense Attorney iwould have a motion in Limine that this witness does 
! !not have anything to add to the hearing today and my 
i i not be relevant 
3:22:41 PM lstate Attorney lresponse 
3:22:46 PM jJudge Hansen jcomments - will not prohibit this witness from testifying 
i iand counsel may object during testimony 
: . ! 
3:23:28 PM istate Attorney idirect examination of Mr. Spzlett 
3:25:09 PM ioefense Attorney iobjection 
3:25:22 PM f State Attorney f response to the objection 
3:25:56 PM jJudge Hansen jquestion to Ms. Bublitz 
3:27:01 PM joefense Attorney jresponse to the Court 
~ I 
3:28: 12 PM 1Judge Hansen I overrules the objection 
3:28:18 PM istate Attorney icontinues with direct examination 
3:29:29 PM f Defense Attorney !objection - leading 
! i 
I : 
................................................ l .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
3:29:38 PM !Judge Hansen jsustained 
3:29:41 PM f state Attorney icontinues with direct examination 
3:32:43 PM f oefense Attorney !cross-examination of Mr. Spzlett 
i i 
3:37:11 PM !State Attorney Ire-direct examination 
3:37:23 ·PM jJudge Hansen [witness stands down and is excused 
3:37:54 PM f state Attorney [calls next Witness 
9/11/2013 1 of 3 
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Hansen, Miren, 09/11 /13, Gosney Courtroom503 
3:37:59 PM !,_Other/Witness !Officer Blake Higley - is sworn and direct examined by 
. jMs. Longhurst 
3:40:46 PM 1Defense Attorney [Objection - hearsay 
i i 
3:41 :35 PM f Judge Hansen [question to Ms. Bublitz 
3:42:23 PM jDefense Attorney jresponse to the Court 
: : 
: : 
3:44:03 PM tJudge Hansen [comments to Counsel - question to Ms. Longhurst 
~ i 
····~::::!~··:~···l~::e Ai;~:=~ -!;~::;:::~~~~·~o~~ ·Longhurst ___ ---- -----
3 :45: 50 PM jstate Attorney jresponse to the Court 
3:46:09 PM iDefense Attorney !will need additonal time 
i ~ 
3:46: 17 PM f state Attorney I does not think that the additional time is necessary 
3:47:16 PM lDefense Attorney iresponse 
3:48:42 PM lstate Attorney f response 
3:49:34 PM jJudge Hansen jcomments to counsel 
3:52:51 PM jDefense Attorney jresponse to the Court 
i i 
3:53:07 PM tstate Attorney [response 
3:55:03 PM iJudge Hansen idiscussions with counsel on the Oregon stop 
4:02:54 PM !Judge Hansen iwill have Officer Higley stand down today subject to 
! !recall 
4:07:53 PM 1Judge Hansen twill allow the designation of Officer Higley as the case 
I !officer and will allow him to remain in the Courtroom 
! !over the Defenses objection 
4:09:50 PM lstate Attorney icalls next witness 
4:09:54 PM iother/Witness iofficer Marshall Plaisted - is sworn and direct examined i ! by Ms. Longhurst 
4:21 :57 PM 1Defense Attorney [objection - leading 
4:22:04 PM Ludge Hansen !sustained 
4:22:09 PM istate Attorney !continues with direct-examination 
4:27:21 PM istate Attorney !would like the Video marked as State's 1 admitted and i i published as to the dog search 
............................................................................................................. t ................................................................................................................................................................................... ... 
4:33:06 PM !Judge Hansen iwill allow that 
; I 
4:33:10 PM !Defense Attorney !cross-examination of Officer Plaisted 
i I 
i i 
4:39:15 PM !state Attorney !objection - speculation 
I I 
4:39:23 PM lJudge Hansen [overruled 
4:39:26 PM lDefense Attorney lcontinues with cross examination 
I I 
................................................ l ............................................................ !.. .................................................................................................................................................................................. .. 
5:00:08 PM istate Attorney !re-direct 
: : 
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Hansen, Miren, 09/11/13, Gosney Courtroom503 
5:03:45 PM \Judge Hansen \witness stands down and is excused 
5:04: 16 PM iJudge Hansen iwill need to recess for the day - will set the motion to 
! !suppress to 10/16/13 at 9:00 a.m. and will set for 2 day 
! !JT on 12/02/13 at 9 and PTC on 11/15/13 at 1:30 p.m. 
~ ~ 
5:14:26 PM f IEND CASE 
! I 
• 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O~EP 1 2 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA By MIREN OLSON 
DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) Case No. CRFE13-5250 
) 
THOMAS KELLEY, ) 
) ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL 
Defendant. ) CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL 
A jury trial will be held on December 2, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. 
A pretrial conference will be held on November 15, 2013 at 1:30 pm. The defendant must 
be personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a 
written list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all 
parties. If the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be 
continued. 
Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that 
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a 
list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G.D. Carey 
Hon. Dennis Goff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr. 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. Renae Hoff 
Hon. W.H. Woodland 
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen 
Any sitting Fourth District Judge 
Hon. James C. Morfitt 
Hon. Gerald Schroeder 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Gregory Colet 
Hon. Michael McLaughlin 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
IT IS SO ORDERED this /2-f....day of September, 2013. 
cc: ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
JESSICA BUBLITZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
604 NORTH 16TH STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL - PAGE -1 
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Hansen, Miren, 10/16/13, ...:,vsney Courtroom503 
Time Speaker Note 
09:06:01 AM! ! State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 
09:06:33 AM1 State I Jill Longhurst 
!Attorney i 
09:06:39 AM1 Defense l Jessica Bublitz 
!Attorney I 
09:06:47 AMf Judge [ Calls case, def. is present on bond with counsel 
1 Hansen I 
09:07:00 AMt Judge t reviews file I Hansen ! 
09:07:50 AM J State I would ask that the video of the stop be viewed in chambers 
!Attorney 1 
................................................ + ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
09:08:41 AM! Defense ! would stipulate to that 
!Attorney I 
............................................... +·············· .. ·············· .. ····"·i···············"··············································"··"······ .............................................................................................................................. . 
09:08:48 AM 1 Judge i will grant that stipulation 
i Hansen ! 
................................................ J ........................................ i ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
09:08:57 AM! State ! calls first witness · 
!Attorney I 
09:09:04 AM{Other/Witn !Trooper Blake Higley 
jess ! 
09:09:42 AMl State ! begins direct examination 
!Attorney ! 
09: 18:52 AM 1 State l would like to admit Ex. 2 and 3 for illustrative only 
!Attorney I 
09: 19: 13 AM f Defense I would object to the admission 
!Attorney ! 
09: 19:21 AM f Judge [ would note the objection and overrrule it - will allow the 
l Hansen ! admission for illustrative only 
................................................ ,0. ........................................ 5, ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
09:20:20 AM! State ! continues with direct examination 
!Attorney I 
09:22:32 AM f Defense f objection foundation 
!Attorney i 
................................................ , ........................................ f .........................................................................................................................................................................................................  
09:22:39 AM 1 State i response to the objection 
!Attorney l 
09:22:52 AMf Defense ! response 
!Attorney I 
................................................ ~ ........................................ , ........................................................................................................................................................................................ '! .............. . 
09:23:43 AM 1 Judge ! will overrule the objection 
! Hansen ! 
09:23:51 AMj State I continues with direct 
!Attorney ! 
................................................ t ........................................ 1 ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
09:32:52 AM I Defense ! objection - leading 
!Attorney I 
................................................ , .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
09:32:57 AM l Judge ! will sustain the objection 
i Hansen I 
................................................ ,1 ........................................ 1 ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
09:33:01 AM! State I continues with direct 
!Attorney I 
......................................................................................... , ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
09:38: 17 AM! Defense I cross-examination of Trooper Higley 
!Attorney I 
10/16/2013 1 of 3 
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09:42: 19 AM! State ! objects to the form of the question 
(Attorney ! 
09:42:30 AMf Judge [ question to Ms. Longhurst 
! Hansen ! 
09:42:45 AM! State [ response to the Court 
!Attorney ! 
09:42:50 AMI Defense · [ response to the Objection 
!Attorney l 
......................................................................................... , ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
09:43: 14 AM! Judge I will overrule the objection 
! Hansen ! 
09:43:21 AMt Defense f continues with cross-examination 
!Attorney ! 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
09:57:07 AM I State \ re-direct of Trooper Higley 
(Attorney ! 
09:57:42 AMf Defense [ objection 
(Attorney l 
09:57:47 AM{ State I response 
!Attorney l 
09:57:57 AMI Judge f question to Ms. Bublitz ! Hansen ! 
09:58:08 AM f Defense i response to the Court 
!Attorney l 
09:58:13 AMI State f no further comments 
i Attorney i · 
09:58: 17 AM i Judge [ comments - will sustain the objection in part and overrule it in 
! Hansen ! part 
09:58:44 AMI State f continues with re-direct 
!Attorney ! 
................................................ , ........................................ ; ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
10:04: 16 AM! Judge ! witness stands down and is excused 
i Hansen ! 
................................................ i ........................................ i ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
10:04:35 AM! State ! no further evidence 
!Attorney i 
10:04:41 AM I Defense f no evidence i Attorney i · 
10:06:39 AM l Judge I discussion on closing arguements 
! Hansen ! 
10:06:54 AM f Judge I will give Ms. Bublitz until 10/23 by 5 p.m. and the State will 
! Hansen ! have until 10/30 at 5:00 p.m. for final closing 
10: 10: 19 AM i Judge f questions to the Def. on the waiver of speedy trial 
I Hansen ! 
................................................ , ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ... 
10:13:51 AM I Defendant ! will waive speedy trial 
i I 
I I 
I, I 
................................................ + ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ... 
10:14:01 AM i Judge i will accept the waiver 
I Hansen I 
................................................ t ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................  
1 O: 14:07 AM I Defense ! would like the def. to be able to waive presence at the Oral 
I Attorney ! Aruguments 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
10:14:26 AM I State I no objection 
!Attorney ! 
10/16/2013 2 of 3 
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Hansen, Miren, 10/16/13, -.:i0sney 
1 O: 14:28 AM l Judge 1 comments to Mr. Kelley on his right to appear I Hansen I 
.. 1.0:15:06 AM! END CASE 
10/16/2013 
i 
! 
i 
I 
: 
: 
i 
! 
i 
! 
Courtroom503 
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GERALD BUBLITZ- ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
604 N 16th STREET 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
DEPUTY 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COL'RT F THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IBOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
I~ANDFORTHECOUNTYOFADA 
***** 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) 
) DEFENDANT'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------1---) 
***** 
CO:MES NOW the Defenda , THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, by and through his 
attorney ofrecord, Jessica B. Bublitz, of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C. 
1. I.C §49-808(2) is Constitutio aJly void for vagueness on its face. 
I.C §49-808(2) states, "Turning vement.s and required signals. (1) No person shall turn a 
vehicle onto a highway or move a ve · cle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit 
from a highway unless and until the ovement can be made with reasonable safety nor without 
giving an appropriate signal. (2) A si al of intention to turn or move right or left when required 
shall be given continuously to warn o er traffic. On controlled-access highways and before 
Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page l 
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tlll11ing from a parked position, the si nal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) 
seconds and, in all other instances, fo not less than the last one hundred ( I 00) feet traveled by 
the vehicle before turning." As stated in the Defendant's memorandum in support of the motion 
to suppress, this statute is void for va eness because it fails to clearly define it prohibitions by 
p.2 
( 1) confusing readers as to whether" all other instances" a signal continuously for the last l 00 
feet of travel is required, or both a si al for the last one hundred feet and for not less than 5 
seconds is required. (2) It is unclear to what is meant by a controlled access highway as 
opposed to "all other instances." The expert from the DOT testified that he did not know the 
difference between a controlled acce s highway and a through highway. In addition, he believed 
the I-84 ,vould qualify as both. If the statute is read to mean that the signal is required for five 
continuous seconds on a controlled a cess highway but for not less than the last 100 feet before 
turning in "all other instances" (whi would include a through highway) then it is unclear which 
standard applies in the instant case. I an expert from the Department of Transportation does not 
know the difference, then surely the tatute should not expect that ordinary people of common 
intelligence wou1d. 
The statute is also void as to 2) how long the signal is required and when exactly. The 
officer who pulled over the defend t testified he believed the statute required the signal to take 
place after the tires touched the mid e line and during the period of crossing over. Ifwe are to 
assume the portion of the starute, w 'ch applies in this case, is that the signal shall be given 
continuously for five seconds, the o y qualifier as to when it shall be given is the word 
"continuously." Ifwe are to assume he portion is the 100 feet, then the qualifier is that it shall be 
given for not less than the last 100 ~ et "before turning." If the portion of the statute which 
appl.ies is ''in all other instances", th n the signal should be given both "continuously" and "for 
Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page 2 
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the last 100 feet before turning." 
Th~ statute is also void for vague ess as applied: (1) In this instance: what type of highway is 
1-84? Without knowing for sure, eve if one were to say the statute is clear as to what is required, 
if you aren't sure which category the ·ghway falls into, you cannot be sure which conduct ts 
prohibited. In addition, (2) The offic testified that in his opinion, the claimant only signaled for 
one or two seconds because he was o y counting the time when he was actually crossed over the 
center lane~ which is not stated anyw ere in the statute. 
2. The officer in this case did ot have justification or sufficient information that 
. would give rise to reasonab e suspicion to extend the stop beyond the original 
' purpose of the stop. 
For case law and primary suppo , the counsel for the defendant defers to the Memorandum 
in support of the motion to suppress led with the court. Of note, the state had suggested in its 
reply that there was in fact addition information known to the officer that had been given to 
him. via dispatch from Oregon State olice. In the First Addendum to Discovery filed by the state 
on October 2, 2013, Officer Higley who did not testify at the suppression hearing) indicated 
only that he had received informati from the Oregon State Police that the defendant's vehicle 
had been stopped and was "actings piciously," was making a "quick trip and had denied 
consent" and that he therefore susp cted illegal activity. He did not have a drug dog, and had not 
specific information which would ve rise to reasonable suspicion, however. While pretextual 
stops are legally permissible (if the e is an actual legal basis for the stop), the stop cannot be 
extended longer than the stated p 
Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page 
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. 
The officer in this case stated he lt be was justified in his extension of the stop because (I) 
he had caught the defendant in a lie, hen the defendant stated he had been already searched in 
Oregon and (2) he noted that the defi dant had red eyes and "eyelid tremors." 'When on the 
stand, the officer indicates that the w y he saw the eyelid tremors was by asking the defendant to 
tilt his head back and close his eyes he could observe him. Howe,ier~ according to the video, 
he does not ask him to do this until h has already ex.tended the purpose of the stop, at six to 
seven minutes into a lengthy convers tion about the defendant's travel plans. Therefore, 
according to the standards articulate in State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002), 
the extension that occurred was illeg I. The findings that an officer makes through investigation 
into drug activity cannot also be use as the basis to extend the stop into an investigation into 
drug activity. The officer asked him o step out of the car at 12:24, when clearly the purpose of 
the stop had already been extended. 
As to the allegation that he exten ed the stop because he had already caught the defendant 
lying about the search, this conversa on does not take place on the video until after they are 
already running the drug dog around he car, at minute 12:25. Therefore, the stop had already 
been extended beyond the purpose o the stop at that point and cannot be a justification for the 
extension of the stop. Therefore, the nly immediate, legitimate observation the officer could 
possibly have made that made hims spicious of drug activity would have been red eyes, if they 
were immediately observed. This in ombination with a travel story that the officer finds 
"questionable" as unduly lengthy in oute and travel, even if legitimate, would fall in the 
category of cases such as Reid v. Ge rgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S. Ct 2752 (1980). 
Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page 4 
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3. _ There was no probable caus that would have justified a search of the trunk area. 
The counsel for the defendant wo d defer to the legal standards as articulated in the 
Supplemental brief in Support of the efendant's Motion to Suppress, which delineates why 
p.5 
there must be probable cause to searc the trunk before it can be searched. In this case, the 
officer who actually searched the tru k did not have probable cause to do so. The officer who ran 
the drug dog around the car did not r ceive an alert from the dog when he ran him around the 
entirety of the vehicle, according to s testimony on the stand. He alerted on the passenger side 
of the vehicle, and the officer who ac ally conducted the search can be seen immediately 
walking to the trunk to search it, wi ut waiting to see if there was any kind of an alert from the 
dog. The officer who conducted the arch of the trunk area did not testify at the suppression 
hearing, so his actual knowledge is n t in evidence. Therefore, there would be insufficient 
evidence as to whether he possessed robable cause to search the trunk itself prior to his search, 
and no exception to the warrant req ment applies. As a result, the evidence found in the trunk 
must be suppressed. 
DATED thi,23V:y ofOct er 2013. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Defendant's Closing Arguments- Page 5 
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CER ~CATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~fay of October 2013, I caused a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing document to be serv d upon the following as indicated below: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise> Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
Ada County Clerk 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-6919 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jill Longhurst 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant, 
) 
) Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250 
) 
) STAT~'S WRITTEN CLOSING 
) STATEMENTS REGARDING 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) SUPPRESS ) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Defendant Kelley has moved this court for an order suppressing evidence against 
the defendant for three reasons. 
Kelley claims that LC. §49-808 is unconstitutionally vague. 
Kelley claims that he was detained longer than the original purpose of the stop 
without reasonable suspicion. 
Kelley claims that there was "no justification" for the search of the trunk area of 
his vehicle. 
The State believes that the defendant's claims are all incorrect and his motion to 
suppress should be denied. 
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 1 of 19 
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I. I.C.§49-808 is not vague. 
J.C. §49-808 is not vague. In order to prevail on a claim that a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, a defendant must show either the statute is vague on its face or 
vague on its application. Defendant Kelley has done neither. 
To be void on its face, Kelley would have to have demonstrated that the statute 
would lack sufficient clarity for "ordinary people" to understand what "conduct is 
prohibited." Burton v. State, Dept. ofTransp. 149 Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d 933, 935 
(Ct.App.2010) (citation omitted). To the contrary, I.C. §49-808(2) delineates both when 
a driver is required to signal an impending change in his vehicle's position and the 
appropriate method, by either distance or time, to perform and signal depending on the 
nature of the roadway. The statute requires drivers on a controlled access highway, such 
as an interstate highway, shall signal their intention to move their vehicles to the left or 
right for not less than five seconds. 
The statute is not vague on its face. The Idaho Court of Appeals has specifically 
held that as to the requirement to signal, this statute is not vague stating that there are "no 
exceptions to the signal requirement" and that a signal is required "whenever a movement 
is made to the left or right on a highway, regardless of whether the movement is made 
necessary to comply with highway signage." State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 666, 991 
P.2d 388, 391 (Ct.App.1999)( citing State v. Pressley, 131 Idaho 277,279, 954 P.2d 
1073, 1075 (Ct.App.1998)). Clearly motorists like Kelley are on notice that a signal is 
required prior to changing lanes. There is no vagueness on the face of this statute. 
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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Similarly, Kelley has failed to show that this statute was vague as to the 
application to his driving. Kelley's claim is that because of vagueness in the statute the 
signal requirements were unclear as to how the statute applied to him. Kelley bases this 
claim, primarily, on his assertion that he was unclear by statutory definition as to 
whether I-84 is a controlled access highway and therefore, he was unclear as to whether 
he 'Yas required to signal for 100 feet or for five seconds due to what he alleges is 
"confusing" comma placement in the statute. 
Interstate 84 is the definition of a controlled access highway. I.C. §49-109(5)(b). 
A review of the officer's dash cam, which was admitted into evidence during the 
suppression hearing, clearly demonstrates that there are no accesses to the interstate from 
abutting lands. This testimony was supported by the officers' testimony and specifically 
by the testimony of David Szplett from the Idaho Transportation Department. Abutting 
landowners are not given access to the interstate. Access and egress are controlled by 
ramps. Moreover, Mr. Szplett testified that I-84 is a controlled access highway as 
designated by the Idaho Board of Transportation. I.C. §40-310(9) grants the Board 
authority to make the designations of highways as controlled access and the Board has 
declared I-84 as a controlled access highway. There is no confusion as to whether I-84 is 
a controlled access highway. 
Moreover, there is no confusion as to comma placement in I.C. §49-808 and what 
type of a signal is required for drivers on a controlled access highway. "The plain, 
obvious and rational [statutory] meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or 
irrational meaning." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40,966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.App.1998). 
Interpretation of statutes requires interpretations which give "effect to the legislature's 
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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intent and purpose." Dewbre, Idaho at 665; P.2d at 390 (quoting State v. Coleman, 128 
Idaho 466,469, 915 P.2d 28, 31 (Ct.App.1996)). A review of this statute for its meaning 
clearly indicates that drivers on a controlled access highway are required to signal for five 
seconds. 
Likewise, a reasonable common sense read of this statute indicates the 
legislatures' intent to promote safety on our highways by requiring a driver to give other 
motorists advanced notice of their lane changes. Not only is the language of the statute 
clear, it is irrational to argue that on a roadway where motorists can legally travel 75 
m.p.h. the legislature meant to require drivers to give notice to other motorists for only a 
fraction of a second while covering only 100 feet of roadway at high speeds rather than 
the longer, safer notices, of five seconds. 
Finally, there is no vagueness as to the application of this statute to the defendant 
because the factual situation and the statute's plain language are in accord. This statute 
clearly has a rational and expected application to drivers who changes lanes on multi-
laned interstate highways as was the case here. This is not a situation where it may be 
unclear whether a particular road way is a controlled access roadway because of its 
commercial nature, such as roadways like Chinden Boulevard in Ada County like in 
Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232,235,207 P.3d 963, 966 (2009)(noting the 
Chinden Boulevard is a controlled-access highway), or a situation where citizens are 
trying to determine whether roadways where one lane ends and one lane continues 
require a signal like in Burton v. State, Dept. ofTransp. 149 Idaho 746,240 P.3d 933, 
(Ct.App.2010) or whether a signal is required when motorists are required to move lanes 
due to highway signs, State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663,666, 991 P.2d 388,391 
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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(Ct.App.1999). In the instant case, it is clear that the interstate is a controlled access 
' 
highway and it is clear that moving from one lane to another requires a signal. These are 
not facts subject to multiple interpretations. 
As demonstrated by Trooper Higley's dash cam, which was admitted into 
evidence during the hearing, Defendant Kelley's vehicle first signaled a lane change at 
00: 18:24. The signal lasted for only two seconds before the defendant's vehicle right 
passenger tires had both entered into the right hand lane at 00:18:26. Kelley's signal 
prior to moving his vehicle into another lane was for two seconds or less which is an 
appropriate basis for a traffic stop. 
Accordingly, Defendant Kelley had failed to demonstrate that I.C.§49-808 is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as it is applied to the facts of this traffic infraction. 
The State asks the Court to deny the defendant's motion to suppress on this ground. 
II. Reasonable Suspicion and the Length of the Traffic Stop 
· Kelley presumably believes that any drug dog sniff at a traffic stop or any 
questions not directly related to a traffic infraction during law enforcement/citizen 
contacts are presumptively an illegal detention. That is not the case. "The U.S. Supreme 
Court has also recently held that a drug dog sniff is not a search and therefore may be 
done during a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of drug activity. It is therefore 
not necessarily a Fourth Amendment violation for an officer who has stopped someone 
for a traffic stop to ask unrelated questions about drugs and weapons, or to run a drug dog 
around the perimeter of the vehicle." State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563, 112 P.3d 848, 
851 (Ct.App.2005)( citations omitted). 
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
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Although the investigative detention necessarily should be "related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the stop," the scope of the detention may be expanded based 
on events occurring during the scope of the stop. State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59,266 
P.3d 1161, 1164 (Ct.App. 2011). Accordingly, during the course of an investigative 
detention, "[i]f a police officer's suspicions are 'confirmed or further aroused, the stop 
may be prolonged and the scope of the investigative stop enlarged."' State v. Wright, 134 
Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292, 295 (2000) (quoting State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 877, 736 
P .2d 1327, 1331 (1987)). The totality of the circumstances relayed to, observed by and 
inferred by Trooper Higley during the brief course of this traffic infraction gave him 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to investigate further. 
Moreover, Trooper Higley had not yet finished the purpose of the traffic stop by the time 
the drug dog positively alerted to the odor of narcotics at the defendant's vehicle thereby 
giving him probable cause to search the car. 
Trooper Higley observed, and captured on his dash cam, a violation ofldaho's 
traffic laws, specifically, LC. 49-808. "Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may 
stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior ifthere is articulable and 
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." State v. 
Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416,419 (Ct.App. 2000)(citations omitted). 
Trooper Higley's stop of the defendant's vehicle was clearly proper and based on 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws. 
From the time the defendant's vehicle yielded to the trooper's lights and came to a 
complete stop and the time Trooper Higley approached the vehicle and began 
investigating the traffic infraction, only about 30 seconds had passed. 00:19:00 to 
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00: 19:32. When Trooper Higley approached the defendant's vehicle from the passenger 
side, he immediately noticed a dog in the car and at that point he verified with Kelley that 
the dog was friendly and not a threat. Higley then identified himself as a law 
enforcement officer and explained to the defendant the reason for the stop. It took Higley 
just over 30 seconds to ask these questions and to ask the defendant for his license, 
registration and proof of insurance. 00:20:06. When he looked at the license and 
registration, Higley merely commented "New Hampshire license and California plate. 
00:20:18 
Defendant Kelley was nervous and talkative with the trooper and after the 
trooper's statement immediately began volunteering information to the trooper about a 
traffic stop in Oregon. The topic was introduced by the defendant; it was out of context 
to the comment about the license. The defendant's statements were contrary to 
information the trooper knew about the Oregon stop. 
Kelley then began describing details of a trip from Lake Tahoe California, to 
Jackson Hole Wyoming which included traveling through Oregon and the Boise area. 
Trooper Higley knew that the route described by Kelley was not a route to Jackson Hole 
and would have added many hours to the trip. Kelley had already commented that he 
hadn't had problems with snow on the roadways and he never offered that as an 
explanation for his circuitous route to Jackson Hole. 
By 00:22:32, Higley's supervisor had already approached the traffic stop and 
notified him that there was a drug dog on scene. By that time, Higley had already asked 
for proof of insurance from Kelley again. Kelley explained why he did not have the 
required insurance. 00:22:50 Kelley's failure to provide motor vehicle insurance when 
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asked by a peace officer was a further violation ofldaho's motor vehicle laws. LC. §49-
1232. See also, §49-1229. 
During the two and a half minutes that Trooper Higley had been talking to the 
defendant he had noticed rolling papers in the vehicle and indications from defendant 
Kelley that Kelley had been using a controlled substance - specifically red eyes and 
eyelid tremors. After making this observation, Higley asked Kelley to tilt his head and 
close his eyes so he could further ascertain whether there was a concern about Kelley 
being impaired. 00:23:04. Higley's observations of Kelley, his eyelid tremors and red 
eyes as well as his nervous manner, lead Higley to believe Kelley had used marijuana in 
the recent past. In the brief conversation that followed, Higley asked the defendant when 
the last time he used marijuana was. Initially Kelley denied using marijuana ever and 
then changed his statement to say that he had used marijuana in the past, but not for two 
years. This statement was not consistent with Higley's observations. 
Kelley then provided the trooper more information regarding his trip and how 
long he was planning to be in Jackson Hole and why. Trooper Higley knows that the I-84 
corridor between Oregon and through Idaho is a route frequently used to transport 
narcotics. He also knew that individuals who distribute or traffic in narcotics frequently 
make short fast trips between locations. Higley also knows that because marijuana is not 
illegal to "medical card" holders in Oregon, this controlled substance is frequently 
purchased in Oregon and transported through surroundings states such as Idaho. 
Higley is familiar with indications of controlled substances use and possible 
impairment and he is aware that use of marijuana can lead to eyelid tremors. At 00:24:25 
Trooper Higley asked the defendant to secure his dog and to step from the vehicle in 
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order to allow Officer Plaisted's already present narcotics detection dog to sniff the 
vehicle. Higley' s conversation with Kelley had been brief and directed to the traffic 
infraction, the lack of insurance, identification and clarifying the defendant's statements 
regarding the nature of the trip, the vehicle's owner and related matters. At the time that 
Higley asked Kelley to step from the vehicle, just less than five minutes had passed since 
Higley had first approached Kelley and began speaking to him. 
At that point, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to believe that Kelley was 
involved in criminal activity. Kelley had demonstrated physical characteristics consistent 
with fairly recent marijuana use, though Kelley had lied to the Trooper and told him that 
he had never used and then that he had not used in two years. Kelley had volunteered 
that he had been stopped in Oregon by law enforcement there, and described facts 
different than those which Higley knew had occurred. 
Higley had observed the partially visible trunk from outside the vehicle and knew 
that the defendant had very few possessions/luggage with him on this trip. Kelley had 
described a circuitous trip plan which significantly added time to the short trip and was 
consistent travel plans of known marijuana and narcotics dealers. Similarly, Trooper 
Higley had information from Oregon law enforcement regarding this specific vehicle, 
identified by make, color and license number being involved in suspicious activity. 
"Articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion, while usually grounded in an 
officer's personal perceptions and inferences may, in appropriate circumstances, be based 
on external information. Whether an officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances - the 
STATE'S WRITTEN CLOSING STATEMENTS REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
(State v. Kelley, Case No. CR-FE-2013-005250), Page 9 of 19 
000143
collective knowledge of all those officers and dispatchers involved." State v. Baxter, 144 
Idaho 672, 677-78, 268 P.3d 1019, 1024-25 (Ct.App.2007)(citations omitted). 
Higley's initial detention was directly related to the observed traffic infraction. 
Although the investigative detention necessarily should be "related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the stop," the scope of the detention may be expanded based 
on events occurring during the scope of the stop. State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59, 266 
P.3d 1161, 1164 (Ct.App. 2011). Accordingly, during the course of an investigative 
detention, "[i]f a police officer's suspicions are 'confirmed or further aroused, the stop 
may be prolonged and the scope of the investigative stop enlarged."' State v. Wright, 134 
Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d 292,295 (2000) (quoting State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 877, 736 
P.2d 1327, 1331 (1987)). The defendant's nervous behaviors, prior use of marijuana and 
deceit about his use, his circuitous route through Oregon and along known drug 
distribution routes and his failure to produce insurance aroused further suspicion which 
justified an extension of the stop to further investigate. 
It took Kelley an additional one to one and a half minutes to leash and safely 
remove his dog from his vehicle in order for the narcotics detection dog to approach his 
vehicle. During that time, Kelley made further statements to Trooper Higley about the 
Oregon law enforcement traffic stop which were significantly suspicious and was not 
consistent with what Higley's knowledge of the events were or his own observations 
about the contents of his vehicle. Kelley claimed that Oregon had a drug dog with them 
and had emptied his vehicle and it took him more than an hour to repack all of his 
personal items. Higley knew that the Oregon law enforcement did not have a drug dog 
available and had released him from the stop without a search. He also observed very 
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few personal items in the vehicle and trunk area and knew that the defendant's timeline 
and explanations of the length of his detention in Oregon were false. During that time, 
Kelley acknowledged that he had beer cans in the back seat of the car - though he denied 
drinking that night- causing further suspicion of criminal activity. 
Officer Plaisted and his narcotics detection dog initially approached Kelley's 
vehicle around 00:25:49. Within 27 seconds of his initial approach to Kelley's vehicle, 
Officer Plaisted's narcotic detection dog gave a positive alert to the odor of narcotics and 
sat at the driver's side door. 00:26: 12 At the point the narcotics detection dog alerted, 
officers had probable cause to believe there were narcotics substances in the defendant's 
vehicle. When Officer Plaisted's dog gave the first affirmative alert to the odor or 
narcotics at the driver's side door, less than seven minutes had elapsed from Trooper 
}.ligley's first comments/statements to the defendant when he approached the passenger 
door of Kelley's vehicle. 
Defendant Kelley claims that this seven minute time frame was unreasonable and 
that the defendant was unlawfully detained because the traffic stop had been 
unreasonably extended. Even without the trooper's observations regarding the 
defendant's eyelid tremors and red eyes, the defendant's volunteered and contrary 
statements about his Oregon law enforcement contact and his convoluted explanation for 
his circuitous route from Lake Tahoe to Jackson Hole via Oregon and Boise, Idaho, it is 
implausible to believe that any Idaho law enforcement officer would have been able to 
verify the status of a New Hampshire driver's license, a California vehicle registration, 
and write and serve traffic infractions for the moving violation and the lack of insurance 
proof in the four minutes that passed between the time the defendant affirmatively 
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confirmed he did not have proof of vehicle insurance (00:22:50) and the positive alert of 
the narcotics detention dog (00:26:12). It is hard to imagine a legitimate complaint that 
any traffic stop which lasted seven minutes where moving and non-moving violations 
were involved was unreasonably long. The defendant makes the complaint here because 
this traffic infraction led to the discovery of a trafficking amount of controlled substances 
based on the narcotics detection dog's alert seven minutes after Trooper Higley first 
spoke to the defendant. It is relevant to note, that while the dog sniff was occurring, 
Trooper Higley was still obtaining identifying information from the defendant including 
trying to verify his "current address." 00:26:34-55. It is necessary to know the driver's 
current address in order to issue a citation in Idaho. 
Trooper Higley is entitled to rely on all the information he and other law 
enforcement officers knew and reasonable inferences therefrom at the time of his contact 
with the defendant. If during the course of his routine traffic investigation he acquired 
additional information which gave him reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
extend the detention to investigate. That is exactly what happened in this instance. The 
defendant volunteered almost immediately information which was suspicious and which 
the officer knew to be false. Trooper Higley knew that the defendant's mode of travel 
and unusual circuitous route was consistent with narcotics trafficking. He was nervous, 
had red eyes and eyelid tremors and his story about Oregon law enforcement contact was 
false. The defendant was unable to produce insurance proof and had a changing story 
about ownership of the vehicle and when anyone else had last driven it. As manifest by 
his statements on the audio, he was not the registered owner, but he at different times 
claimed what seems to be exclusive possession of the vehicle which was registered in 
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California while he claim to be a New Hampshire resident. All of the information known 
to Higley at the time, including the information from Oregon law enforcement and the 
defendant's changing story was more than sufficient to give Higley a reasonable 
suspicion that there was criminal activity and to extend the stop long enough to make 
investigate. Indeed, even while the drug dog sniff was occurring, Kelley continued to 
volunteer statements which were more suspicions such as indicating there had been a 
I 
drug dog sniff by Oregon officers and talk about a very extended search and lengthy time 
to repac~ what was obviously minimal personal belongings. 
At the time of the drug dog sniff, Higley had not yet completed the purpose of his 
stop nor issued citations for moving violations and the non-moving violation nor had he 
verified the validity of the defendant's out-of-state driver's license. Moreover, he had 
r.easonable articulable suspicion of further criminal activity based on information 
provided by the defendant and false statements made by the defendant as well as 
observations consistent with fairly recent marijuana use. Higley's detention of the 
defendant was not unlawful and he was not unlawfully detained. 
III. Search of the Trunk 
Kelley argues that officers illegally searched the trunk of his vehicle. In his 
closing statement, Kelley indicates that because the officer who searched the trunk did 
not testify, this court is unable to ascertain his "actual" knowledge. This is an incorrect 
assumption as it is contrary to case law. Officers in the field can and do rely on 
information known to other officers routinely. It is error to assume that each individual 
officer must have independent information amounting to probable cause before they may 
act. "An officer in the field may rely on information supplied by other officers and the 
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collective knowledge of police officers involved in the investigation - including dispatch 
personnel - may support a finding of probable cause." State v. Carr, 123 Idaho 127, 130, 
844 P .2d 13 77, 13 80 (Ct.App.1992)( citations omitted). 
In this case, the dog handler clearly testified that the dog alerted to the odor of 
narcotics from the vehicle more than once before he placed the dog inside the vehicle. 
These alerts are plainly visible and easily verified from a review of the dash cam video. 
00:26: 12 and 00:26:43. Moreover, once the handler identified positive alerts to the odor 
of controlled substances from the vehicle, he placed the dog inside the car. The dog 
again was very focused on an area at the base of the back seat. 00:27:30 - 00:29:06. The 
dog continued to focus his attention there and tried to get closer and the officer removed 
items from the rear seat floor to allow the dog to continue his search. The dog continued 
to alert and focus on that particular area. 00:29:50. The dog's alert to this area was a 
clear indication that he detected the odor of controlled substances from the trunk area 
even after items were removed. The trunk area is directly behind the area of the interior 
alert. It is clear that the dog's handler believed that the dog was alerting to the trunk area. 
Similarly, Trooper Higley testified that based on his training and experience, he knows 
that the dog handler would not put the dog in the vehicle unless there has been a positive 
alert. 
This uniform knowledge by Higley and law enforcement is evidenced by the 
audio recorded conversation between the defendant and Trooper Higley when the dog 
entered the vehicle. At 00:27:46, Kelley asked Higley ifhe could tell him why "he was 
in my car." Higley replied that if the dog was in the interior of the car it means that the 
dog alerted "to the exterior of the vehicle to the odor of drugs" and they had "probable 
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cause to search your vehicle." Higley's supervisor was standing with them at the time of 
this conversation. Certainly, the odor detection dog's focus and alert to the rear seat area, 
including his tail wag is plainly manifest even to an untrained eye from the dash cam 
video. Higley's supervisor did not begin to search the trunk area until about two minutes 
of the dog's continued focus on the rear seat had occurred. 00:29:04 Certainly at the 
point Officer Plaisted knew there was probable cause to search the trunk area. Whether 
or not that information was communicated verbally or by observation of officers familiar 
with the narcotic dog process is irrelevant. The collective knowledge of law enforcement 
at the point the dog alerted to the backseat floor area was that there was probable cause to 
believe there were controlled substances in the trunk. 
Moreover, Kelley's argument is in error because he assumes that when a narcotics 
detection dog alerts to the odor of narcotics it must be to the trunk area or the "alert" is 
limited to the passenger compartment only. There is no case law nor was any evidence 
presented at hearing which supports this position. Narcotics detection dogs alert to the . 
odor of narcotics. In this case, the plain testimony is that before ever entering the 
vehicle, the narcotics detection dog clearly alerted more than once to the odor of 
narcotics from the vehicle. The reliability of the dog was not at issue in this hearing. 
Indeed, the dog's alerts were clearly correct as officers found a trafficking amount of 
controlled substances in the vehicle. Kelley's assumption that the alert must be to the 
trunk area from the outside of the vehicle is clearly an unsubstantiated position not 
supported by case law. 
The dog handler clearly testified that the dog alerted to the odor of narcotics from 
the vehicle more than once before he placed the dog inside the vehicle. These alerts are 
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plainly visible and easily verified from a review of the dash cam video. 00:26:12 and 
00:26:43. Moreover, once the handler identified positive alerts to the odor of controlled 
substances from the vehicle, he placed the dog inside the car. The vehicle's windows 
were down. As Officer Plaisted and his dog approached the defendant's vehicle to begin 
the search, the dog clearly lifts his head and begins to sniff toward the driver's window as 
they walk past the open driver's side window. 00:25:50. Once the vehicle sniff began, 
the dog can be seen to clearly sniff intently at the open window area at the driver's door 
and then immediately sit and give a positive alert, 00:26:07. And then, again, the dog 
clearly sniffed and focused at the open passenger window first and then immediately 
gave his second positive alert to the odor or narcotics from the exterior of the vehicle. 
00:26:38. 
The testimony of Trooper Higley is that the rear seat of the vehicle was down and 
open to the trunk area allowing him to see into part of the trunk from outside the vehicle. 
Certainly the odor of anything in the trunk would have been inside the vehicle interior. It 
seems that Kelley's argument is that the dog must alert to the exterior of the trunk area 
before officers could search the trunk. It is irrational to assume that the odor of drugs 
would be stronger at the closed trunk area than it is from the open windows of the 
passenger compartment when the trunk area is open to the passenger compartment. A 
clear review of the dash cam video demonstrates a dog that very clearly identified the 
odor of narcotics from the two open windows where the odor would be stronger:.... and 
then became immediately focused once in the rear seat/floor board interior of the vehicle 
once he was in the car. It isn't an accident that the controlled substances were found in 
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the trunk and the dog remained focused and alerting to an area identifying the trunk for a 
lengthy time once in the car since that is exactly where the drugs were located. 
"The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is not defined by the nature 
of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather it is defined by the object of 
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found." 
State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,210,226 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct.App.2011) citing United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.24 572 (1982). Furthermore, the 
search of a trunk area is lawful "[ u ]nder the automobile exception, police officers may 
search an automobile and the containers within it where they have cause to believe that 
the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 
925, 939, 71 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Ct.App.2003)(citations omitted). 
Law enforcement officers at the scene had probable cause to believe that Kelley's 
trunk contained controlled substances. The search of the trunk was lawful and falls 
squarely within the recognized automobile exception. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
LC. § 49-808 is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or in its application. The 
trooper's stop of Kelley for failing to properly signal was proper. 
Based on a totality of the circumstances, information known to Trooper Higley 
and other officers as well as Higley' s training and experiences with narcotics intervention 
and reasonable inferences therefrom, Higley had reasonable articulable suspicion to 
extend the length of Kelley's detention and traffic stop to investigate further criminal 
activity. The length of Kelley's detention relating to this traffic stop was reasonable and 
there was no constitutional violation. 
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Officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant has controlled 
substances in his vehicle - including in his trunk and the search of the defendant's 
vehicle including the trunk and containers therein for controlled substances was proper 
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
Accordingly, the State respectfully asks the court the deny the defendant's motion 
to suppress. 
GREG H. BOWER/. 
Ada County Prosec mg Attorney 
i 
secuting Attorney 
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., 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 71),e day of October 2013, I caused 
to be served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Discovery upon 
the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Gerald/Jessica Bublitz 
604 N. 16th St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
)t By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
first class. 
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available 
for pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
)( By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: 
3~3~ lolD~ 
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Hansen, Miren, 11/06/13, Gosney 
) 
Courtroom501 
Time Speaker Note 
3:36:33 PM l !State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 
-::~::~:-:~ i~:=n~::::;ney -!~!s~~:g:~~;tz--- ---- ------- ------ -
4:04:25 PM iJudge Hansen icalls case, def. is not present - Ms. Bublitz is here on his 
l lbehalf - both sides submitted written closings - will note that 
l lat the last hearing Mr. Kelley waived his right to be present 
~ l 
................................................ ,i. .................................................................... ~ ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
4:05:38 PM \Defense Attorney \would intend to proceed without the defendant 
4:05:49 PM f Judge Hansen ihas reviewed both closing statments - in making closing 
l \arguements would ask the parties to not restate what is in 
I \the written statements 
_ ::~::~~ ··=~···i~=~n;::,~:~ney _ -i::~:~::g o:::;:~t- _ _ _ ___ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
4: 13:08 PM l Defense Attorney jfinal comments 
4: 19:06 PM \Judge Hansen \will take the matter under advisement and issue a written 
l \decision - will note that there is a waiver of speedy trial -
1 1 PTC is scheduled for 11 /15 at 1 :30 
4:20: 18 PM istate Attorney twould ask to be able to release witnesses for the 12/02 trial 
1 !date 
4:20:35 PM tDefense Attorney tno objection to that · 
· 4:20:38 PM iJudge Hansen iwill vacate the December 2 trial date and will keep the PTC 
! !as a status or review hearing 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
4:20:55 PM I \END CASE 
I I 
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Hansen, Miren, 11/15/1;:s, Bohr (a.m.), Medrano (p.m.) Courtroom507 
Time Speaker Note 
1 :34:20 PM \ \State v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 
1 :34:33 PM jstate Attorney [Jill Longhurst 
1 :34:38 PM f Defense Attorney )essica Bublitz 
1 :34:44 PM jJudge Hansen jcalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel 
1 :34:54 PM JJudge Hansen jreviews file- notes the previous waiver of speedy trial 
: : 
1 :35:33 PM f Judge Hansen f comments to the Court 
1 :37:44 PM fJudge Hansen \will set for a 2 day JT on 03/17/14 at 9 and PTC on 
I j03/05/14 at 3:00 p.m. 
1:39:21 PM • [END CASE 
I 
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NO.-----=:Fl:-::LE::"'D -/-:-Jl-r:-::-,::-a~:;--
A.M. _____ ,P.M.,...a---LL'--6-
NOV 1 8 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST&IfRTSYOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MIREN OLSON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ) Case No. CRFE13-5250 
) 
THOMAS KELLEY, ) 
) ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL 
Defendant. ) CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL 
A jury trial will be held on March 17, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. 
A pretrial conference will be held on March 5, 2014 at 3:00 pm. The defendant must be 
personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a written 
list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all parties. If 
the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be continued. 
Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that 
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a 
list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G.D. Carey 
Hon. Dennis Goff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr. 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. Renae Hoff 
Hon. W.H. Woodland 
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen 
Any sitting Fourth District Judge 
Hon. James C. Morfitt 
Hon. Gerald Schroeder 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Gregory Culet 
Hon. Michael McLaughlin 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
IT IS SO ORDERED this ..£-day of November, 2013. 
cc: ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
JESSICA BUBLITZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
604 N 16TH STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL - PAGE -1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE coUNfi: OF ADA!;'.'~,(~ 15' 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
DEC 1 8 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KARI MAXWELL 
D!PUTY 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant Thomas Kelley is charged with the felony offense of Trafficking in Marijuana. 
On April 19, 2013, at approximately 12:20 a.m., Idaho State Police Trooper Blake Higley initiated a 
traffic stop of a green Honda Civic on Interstate 84 in Ada County, Idaho, for failure to signal a lane 
change for a minimum of five seconds as required under I.C. § 49-808(2). Prior to the stop, the 
Idaho State Police received information from the Oregon State Police that the vehicle had been 
stopped in Oregon earlier that night. The information from the Oregon State Police indicated that 
the encounter had aroused suspicion, but as no K-9 unit was available and the driver did not consent 
to a search of the vehicle, the driver was allowed to continue on his way. This information from the 
Oregon State Police had been communicated to Trooper Higley and other Idaho State Police 
officers. When Trooper Higley stopped the vehicle, the driver, Defendant Thomas Kelley, produced 
a New Hampshire driver's license. Defendant indicated the vehicle belonged to a friend and 
produced registration that showed the vehicle was registered in California. Defendant was unable to 
provide proof of insurance. Trooper Higley observed a dog in the vehicle, as well as a few 
backpacks, a pair of skis, and some dog items. The passenger side of the back seat had been folded 
down to accommodate the skis, and Trooper Higley could see into part of the trunk area. 
Defendant indicated he was coming from the Tahoe area and heading to Jackson Hole. He 
said he planned to stay in Jackson Hole for a short time, return to the Tahoe area, and then leave 
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Tahoe again to drive to New Hampshire for his summer job. Shortly into the conversation, 
Defendant volunteered that he had been stopped in Oregon earlier that night and that he had been 
"searched." Defendant indicated that the search took over two hours total, that it took thirty minutes 
for the K-9 unit to arrive, and that it took an hour for Defendant to put everything back into his 
vehicle after the search. 
During the conversation, Trooper Higley observed that Defendant had reddened conjunctiva 
and exhibited eyelid tremors. Trooper Higley observed some Zig Zag rolling papers in the vehicle, 
which Defendant stated he used for rolling tobacco. Trooper Higley also observed rolling tobacco in 
the vehicle. When asked when he had last used marijuana, Defendant indicated that he did not 
smoke marijuana but that he had used marijuana about two years previously, while he was in 
college. Trooper Higley was concerned that there were narcotics in the vehicle. Trooper Higley 
asked for consent to search the vehicle, which Defendant declined. While Trooper Higley was 
speaking to Defendant about the details of his trip and the stop in Oregon, Officer Marshall Plaisted 
of the Boise City Police Department arrived on the scene with his drug detection K-9, Turk. 
Sergeant Jason Cagle, Trooper Higley's supervisor, had also arrived on the scene to assist. Trooper 
Higley had Defendant exit the vehicle along with his dog. While Officer Plaisted was deploying his 
drug detection K-9 around the vehicle, Defendant continued to talk to Trooper Higley about the 
search of his vehicle in Oregon earlier that night, reiterating how long the search took and other 
details of the search. 
Officer Plaisted presented the exterior of Defendant's vehicle to his K-9 in a 
counterclockwise manner. The K-9 alerted at the driver's side door, where the window had been 
rolled down. Officer Plaisted continued to present the exterior of the vehicle, and the K-9 alerted at 
the passenger's side door, where the window had also been rolled down. Officer Plaisted then 
placed the K-9 inside the vehicle from the driver's side door. The K-9 immediately jumped into the 
back seat, where there was a large bag of dog food. The K-9 attempted to sniff around the bag and 
put his nose underneath it, so Officer Plaisted removed the bag of dog food from the vehicle. The K-
9 continued to alert in that area, attempting to put his nose in between the seat back crevice and also 
around the seat cushion at the floor board area in the rear of the vehicle. 
After the K-9 was placed inside the vehicle, Trooper Higley and Sergeant Cagle began to 
search the vehicle. Sergeant Cagle focused his search on the trunk area of the vehicle. Three 
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vacuum-sealed containers of marijuana were found in the vehicle, two of which were located in the 
trunk area. The third was packaged separately in a Tupperware container. 
On July 18, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and Notice of Hearing, along with a 
supporting memorandum. An Affidavit of Thomas Campbell Kelley in Support of Motion to 
Suppress was filed on July 26, 2013. The State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress was filed on August 16, 2013. On August 30, 2013, the State filed an Objection 
to the Form of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Limit Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress to Issues Identified by the Defendant in his Motion/Brief. A Supplemental Brief in 
Support of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress was filed on September 4, 2013. 
Hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress was held on September 9 and October 16, 2013. 
Defendant's Closing Arguments were filed on October 23, 2013. The State's Written Closing 
Statements Regarding Defendant's Motion to Suppress were filed on October 30, 2013. The parties 
presented oral closing arguments on November 6, 2013, at which time the Court took the matter 
under advisement. 
DISCUSSION 
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the State had filed an objection to the form of 
Defendant's motion to suppress, asserting that the bases for the motion had not been clearly defined. 
At the hearing, Defendant clarified that the motion involves three issues: 1) whether LC. § 49-
808(2) is void for vagueness; 2) whether Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to extend the 
duration of the traffic stop; and 3) whether there was probable cause to search the trunk of the 
vehicle. · With the understanding that the motion was limited to these three issues, the parties then 
proceeded with the presentation of evidence. 
Idaho Code section 49-808(2) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to Defendant's 
conduct. 
The "void-for-vagueness doctrine," which is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "requires that a statute defining criminal conduct or imposing civil 
sanctions be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited, and the statute must be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary 
and discriminatory· enforcement." Burton v. State, Dep't. ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746,748,240 P.3d 
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933, 935 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a statute may be "void for vagueness if it 
fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, 
or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce 
the statute." State v. Fluewelling, 150 Idaho 576, 578, 249 P.3d 375, 377 (2011), quoting State v. 
Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003). A statute may be challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct. Burton, 149 Idaho at 
748, 240 P.3d at 935 (citation omitted). To succeed on a facial vagueness challenge, a defendant 
must show that the statute is "impermissibly vague in all its applications." State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 
919, 931, 231 P.2d 1016, 1028 (2010), quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman 
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed. 2d 362, 371 (1982). To succeed on 
an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a defendant "must show that the statute failed to provide fair 
notice that the [defendant's] specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the 
[defendant]." Burton, 149 Idaho at 748, 240 P.3d at 935 (citation omitted). The paiiy challenging 
the constitutionality of a statute "must overcome a strong presumption of validity." State v. Hart, 
135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001) (citation omitted). The constitutionality of a statute is 
a question of law. Hart, 135 Idaho at 829, 25 P.3d at 852 (citations omitted). Finally, a statute 
"should not be held void for vagueness if any practical interpretation can be given it." Harl, 135 
Idaho at 829, 25 P.3d at 852 (citation omitted). 
In the case at bar, Defendant asserts that LC. § 49-808(2) is both unconstitutionally vague on 
its face and unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct. The statute provides: 
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given 
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning 
from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) 
seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet 
traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
The term "controlled-access" highway is defined in LC. § 49-109(5)(b) as "[a]ny highway or 
roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other persons have no legal 
right of access to or from the highway except at such points only or in such manner as may be 
determined by the public authority having jurisdiction over the highway." As the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has noted, 
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"A facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the Act would be valid." ... Stated differently, in a "facial vagueness" 
challenge, "the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in 
all of its applications." ... Because a defendant "who engages in some conduct that is 
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the 
conduct of others ... [a] court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct 
before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." . . . The reason for this 
suggested analytical starting point is readily apparent, for if a statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct, it necessarily is not 
unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 431, 179 P.3d 1084, 1087 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations 
omitted). Accordingly, the Court will first consider whether LC. § 49-808(2) is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to Defendant's conduct. 
When interpreting a statute, a court must begin with an examination of its literal words. See 
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 36,218 P.3d 10, 15 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The statutory 
language "is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning." Id. ( citation omitted). If the 
language is clear and unambiguous, "a court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any 
statutory construction." Id. ( citation omitted). Defendant asserts that the statute is vague because it 
is unclear under what circumstances a motorist must signal continuously for not less than five 
seconds, under what circumstances a motorist must signal for not less than the last 100 feet traveled 
before turning, and/or under what circumstances a motorist must do both. See Defendant's Closing 
Arguments at 2. The Court disagrees. A plain reading of the statute indicates that a motorist must 
signal his intention to turn or move right or left in order to warn other traffic. It is clear from the 
language of the statute that when a motorist is on a controlled-access highway, he must signal 
continuously for not less than five seconds. Likewise, when a motorist is turning from a parked 
position, he must signal continuously for not less than five seconds. In all other circumstances, a 
motorist must signal for not less than the last 100 feet traveled before turning. 
Defendant also asserts that it is unclear what is meant by the term "controlled-access 
highway," as opposed to "all other instances." See Defendant's Closing Arguments at 2. Again, the 
term "controlled-access" highway is defined in LC.§ 49-109(5)(b). A plain reading of that statute 
indicates that a controlled-access highway is any highway or roadway which cannot be accessed 
directly from abutting properties. A controlled-access highway may only be accessed at such points 
or in such manner as is designated by the public authority having jurisdiction over the highway. 
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Defendant was traveling on Interstate 84 when Trooper Higley observed the conduct which led him 
to initiate a traffic stop of Defendant's vehicle. At the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, 
David Szplett, an engineer and manager of development services for the Idaho Department of 
Transportation, testified that Interstate 84 has no private approaches and that access is only permitted 
at designated interchanges. Each exit and entrance area is marked by three signs. Mr. Szplett 
testified that there is no way to exit or enter the interstate system other than at these marked areas. 
Because Interstate 84 cannot be accessed directly from abutting properties and may only be accessed 
at the designated exit and entrance areas, it is clear that Interstate 84 meets the definition of 
"controlled-access highway" which is set forth in LC. § 49-109(5)(b). As Defendant was traveling 
on Interstate 84, he was required to comply with the signaling requirements set forth for motorists 
traveling on controlled-access highways, rather than the signaling requirements applicable in "all 
other instances." 
As noted above, pursuant to LC. § 49-808(2), a motorist traveling on a controlled-access 
highway must signal his intention to move right or left continuously for not less than five seconds. 
The Court concludes that the language of the statute defines the prohibited conduct "with sufficient 
clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," and the 
statute is "worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 
Martin, 148 Idaho at 36,218 P.3d at 15. At the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, the State 
introduced into evidence video taken from Trooper Higley's dash cam. Having reviewed the video, 
the Court concludes that Defendant signaled for approximately two seconds before beginning to 
move his vehicle to the right. See State's Exhibit 1 at 00:18:24-26. Accordingly, Defendant did not 
signal his intention to move to the right continuously for five seconds or more, as required by LC. 
§ 49-808(2). Because LC. § 49-808(2) clearly sets forth the conduct prohibited, the statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant's conduct. See Martin, 148 Idaho at 36, 218 P.3d 
at 15. Further, as the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant's conduct, it is 
necessarily not unconstitutionally vague on its face. See Laramore, 145 Idaho at 431, 179 P .3d at 
1087. 
Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion.to extend the duration of the traffic stop. 
Because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative 
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
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20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405,409,283 P.3d 722, 726 (2012) (citations 
omitted). An investigative detention "must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the p~rpose of the stop." Danney, 153 Idaho at 409, 283 P.3d at 726 (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, where officers extend a routine traffic stop to allow for a drug dog search, "the 
extension must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Id (citation 
omitted). As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted, 
The standard of "reasonable articulable suspicion" is not a particularly high or onerous 
standard to meet. The officer must simply be acting on more than a "mere hunch or 
'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion."' 
Id. at 410, 283 P.3d at 727, quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 
(2009). A reasonable suspicion exists when an officer "can articulate specific facts which, together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify a suspicion that criminal activity is 
occurring." Danney, 153 Idaho at 409-10, 283 P.3d at 726-27 (citation omitted). Further, an officer 
"may take into account his experience and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts 
gathered." Id. at 410, 283 P.3d at 727, citing State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64, 218 P.3d 790, 793 
(Ct. App. 2009). Finally, the reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated "based on the 
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop." Id., citing State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
483,988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The Court concludes that based upon the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Higley had 
reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop. At the hearing on Defendant's motion 
to suppress, Trooper Higley testified that he found Defendant's stated travel plans "confusing," and 
that what Defendant was telling Trooper Higley about his plans did not make sense. In particular, 
Trooper Higley noted the quick duration of the trip, the back and forth travel that was involved, and 
Defendant's route through Oregon and Idaho, which did not appear to be a direct route for one 
traveling from Tahoe to Jackson Hole. Trooper Higley testified that he is familiar with the problem 
of drug trafficking along the I-84 corridor through Oregon and Idaho and, through Drug Interdiction 
Training, he is trained to look for indicators of such drug trafficking. Trooper Higley noted that 
Defendant had very few items in the vehicle, and that the vehicle belonged to someone else. 
Trooper Higley testified that based on his training and experience, a driver who is making a quick 
trip in a third-party vehicle, carrying minimal luggage, arouses suspicion. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 7 
000163
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Trooper Higley also noted the false information Defendant provided regarding his encounter 
with the Oregon State Police earlier that night. Trooper Higley was aware from the information 
provided by the Oregon State Police that Defendant's vehicle had not been searched by that agency, 
yet Defendant indicated the Oregon State Police spent two hours searching his vehicle. Defendant 
also stated it took about an hour to put everything back in his car, yet according to Trooper Higley's 
observations, there were very few items in the vehicle, and it would not have taken an hour to reload 
the vehicle. Trooper Higley testified that during his conversation with Defendant, he became 
concerned that there were narcotics in the vehicle, based on the nature of Defendant's trip and the 
false information Defendant was providing regarding his encounter with the Oregon State Police. In 
particular, Trooper Higley was concerned that Defendant was trying to conceal something, by 
providing the false information about his vehicle having been searched and the Oregon State Police 
having used a K-9. 
Trooper Higley observed Defendant's reddened conjunctiva and asked Defendant to tilt his 
head back and close his eyes, at which time he observed the eyelid tremors. Trooper Higley testified 
that he attended an Advanced Roadside Impaired Driver Enforcement class which specifically dealt 
with the symptoms, signs, and behavior of those who are under the influence of drugs other than 
alcohol. Trooper Higley was specifically trained that reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors are 
common indicators of recent marijuana use, and that such indicators of marijuana use can last for 
several days after the use. Trooper Higley testified that he observed those indicators in Defendant. 
As noted above, the reasonableness of the suspicion to extend the 'duration of a traffic stop is 
based upon the totality of the circumstances, including an officer's experience and law enforcement 
training, as well as the inferences which may be drawn from the facts gathered by the officer. See 
Danney, 153 Idaho at 409-10, 283 P.3d at 726-27; Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483, 988 P.2d at 709. The 
Court concludes that based upon Trooper Higley's training and experience with indicators of drug 
trafficking along the I-84 corridor and indicators as to recent marijuana use, as well as the inferences 
which can reasonably be drawn from Trooper Higley's observations of Defendant and the 
information provided by Defendant regarding his trip and his encounter with the Oregon State 
Police, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. Accordingly, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the extension of the traffic stop to investigate possible 
narcotics activity and allow for the K-9 search was justified. See Danney, 153 Idaho at 409, 283 
P.3d at 726. 
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The officers had probable cause to search the trunk area of Defendant's vehicle. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed 
to be unreasonable unless they fall within one of several narrowly drawn exceptions. State v. 
Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012), citing State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 
897, 821 P.2d 949, 952 (1991). The State bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless 
search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise 
reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 
(Ct. App. 1996) ( citations omitted). The "automobile exception" allows the warrantless search of a 
vehicle "if the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other 
evidence of a crime." Id. (citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that this 
exception "include[s] within its bounds the warrantless search of automobile trunks." Gallegos, 120 
Idaho at 898, 821 P.2d at 953, quoting State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, I 096 
(1981 ). Probable cause is established "when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at 
the time of the search would give rise - in the mind of a reasonable person - to a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706, 
302 P.3d at 331, citing State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993). 
A reliable drug dog's alert on the exterior of a vehicle "is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish 
probable cause for a warrantless search of the interior." Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706, 302 P.3d at 
331, citing State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999). When an officer has 
probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, the officer is authorized to 
search "any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found." Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706, 
302 P.3d at 331, citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721, 173 L.Ed. 2d 485, 
498 (2009). 
Officer Plaisted testified that his K-9, Turk, is a certified, single-purpose drug detection dog. 
Turk is certified to detect the odors of narcotics - specifically, the odors of marijuana, 
methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. Officer Plaisted testified in detail regarding the behaviors 
Turk exhibits when alerting on an odor of narcotics and described his observation of those behaviors 
during Turk's sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. After Turk alerted at the driver's side door and 
passenger's side door of the exterior of the vehicle, Officer Plaisted placed Turk inside the vehicle. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 9 
000165
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Trooper Higley testified that when a K-9 officer places his K-9 inside the vehicle after conducting 
the exterior sniff, this is a signal that the dog has alerted on the outside of the vehicle.· Trooper 
Higley can also be heard on his audio explaining this to Defendant. See State's Exhibit 1 at 
00:27:43-53. The fact that Turk was placed inside the vehicle communicated to Trooper Higley that 
he and Sergeant Cagle could begin searching the vehicle. 
Defendant cites State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P.3d 633 (Ct. App. 2001), for the 
proposition that an officer cannot search the trunk area of a vehicle unless the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the contraband or evidence is concealed in the trunk. See Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress at 8. However, the facts of this case are distinguishable 
from those in Schmadeka. In Schmadeka, the officer believed that he smelled "the slight odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from the passenger compartment" of the defendant's car. Under those 
circumstances, the odor of burnt marijuana in the passenger compartment alone did not justify the 
search of the trunk of the vehicle, as such odor only supports the inference of casual drug usage. 136 
Idaho at 599-600, 38 P.3d at 637-38. The Schmadeka court followed the reasoning of United States 
v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222 (10111 Cir. 2000), in which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the 
smell of burnt marijuana is indicative of drug usage, rather than drug trafficking, and because it is 
unreasonable to believe people smoke marijuana in the trunks of cars, the mere smell of burnt 
marijuana does not create the fair probability that the trunk contains marijuana." Schmadeka, 136 
Idaho at 600, 38 P.3d at 638, quoting Wald, 216 F.3d at 1226. In the case at bar, however, Trooper 
Higley testified that he did not smell any odor associated with narcotics emanating from Defendant's 
vehicle. The search of the interior of the vehicle and the trunk area in this case was not based upon 
the slight odor of burnt marijuana coming from the passenger compartment, but rather upon the K-9 
alerting on two places on the outside of the vehicle, under circumstances in which the odor of 
narcotics was apparently not perceptible to the investigating officer. The Court concludes that based 
upon the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to search the interior of 
Defendant's vehicle, including the trunk area. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this~ day of December, 2013. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
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FILED A·~ A.M. _____ 1P.M 'v / 
MAR O 7 2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST~sW:,PHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MIREN OLSON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) ' 
vs. ) Case No. CRFE13-5250 
) 
THOMAS KELLEY, ) 
) ORDER SETTING PRETRIAL 
Defendant. ) CONFERENCE & JURY TRIAL 
A jury trial will be held on June 16, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. 
A pretrial conference will be held on June 4, 2014 at 3:00 pm. The defendant must be 
personally present in court. At this conference, counsel for each party shall deliver a written 
list of prospective witnesses and proposed exhibits to the court and counsel for all parties. If 
the victim has not been notified of this hearing, the matter will have to be continued. 
Alternate judges. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(6), I.C.R. that 
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case. The following is a 
list of potential alternate judges: 
Hon. G.D. Carey 
Hon. Dennis Goff 
Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr. 
Hon. Duff McKee 
Hon. Renae Hoff 
Hon. W.H. Woodland 
Hon. Kathryn Sticklen 
Any sitting Fourth District Judge 
Hon. James C. Morfitt 
Hon. Gerald Schroeder 
Hon. James Judd 
Hon. Gregory Culet 
Hon. Michael McLaughlin 
Hon. Darla Williamson 
Hon. Ronald Wilper 
IT IS SO ORDERED this .£,.day of March, 2014. 
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5:40:58 PM j ! 
5:40:58 PM \Judge (Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5250 - pretrial - bond - Gerald 
! ! Bublitz - Jill Longhurst 
5:41 :35 PM f Judge f notes def to plea guilty -- conditional plea of guilty to 
j !one Ct of Marijuana -- reserving his right to appeal Ct 
I !decision denying motion to suppress 
5:46:13 PM f State {advises the Ct willing to wait and see what the Court of 
! !Appeals decision is in this case 
5:49:31 PM f Def Counsel !advises the Court will be reqt'g sentencing date in 
1 !October 
5:49:48 PM !state lno obj but State is reqt'g a status conf date to make I jsure everything moving in the right direction 
: : 
5:52:16 PM f Defendant fsworn and examined by the Court 
5:55:41 PM !M Wetherell !Accepts guilty plea; orders PSI; def will obtain a 
! !substance abuse eval on his own Oct 15, 2014 at 3:00 I 1-- status revw August 13, 2014 at 8:30 
: : 
...................................................................................................................... + .......................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
5:58:23 PM i !End of Case 
..... 5:58.:24 .. PM i ....... f . . ................. ............. . 
6/4/2014 1 of 1 
000171
/ 
/ 
~ /~ 
.. 
GUil TY PLEA ADVISORY JUN O 4 2014 
Defendant's Name: ::JM-l~~ ~£ 
Date: G/'fl /'{ Case Number(s): CIC ff-~ /3 - S :JS(.;) 
Pleading Guilty to: Charge(s): Minimum & Maximum Prison/Fine 
~~-~~ L --LS 'tlld 
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
I. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about the crime(s) you are 
• accused of committing. If you have a trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you 
any questions. However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court. 
I unde~~ that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent before and during 
trial. --t,t---· 
II. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to the crime(s) in this 
case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any question or 
to provide any information that might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can 
also refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for 
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty. 
- 1 - Judge Hansen July 1, 2001 
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I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the right to remain 
silent with respect to any other crime(s) and ~respect to answering questions or providing 
information that may increase my sentence. · . 
• 
Ill. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney and cannot pay for 
one, you canAk the judge for an attorney who will be paid by the county. I 
understand~. 
IV. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: 1) you plead guilty in front of the 
judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial. 
I un~a~d that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed innocent. 
V. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court hearing to determine 
whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) brought against you. In a jury trial, you have 
the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must 
convince each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I un$an.d that by pleading guilty I am waivi~g my right to a speedy and public jury trial. 
VI. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs during a jury trial where 
the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify under oath in front of you, the jury, 
· and your attorney. Your attorney could then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could 
.also call your own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If 
you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, the state will pay the cost of 
bringing your witnesses to court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my righ~onfront the witnesses against me, 
and to present witnesses and evidence in my defense. . 
QUESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question consult your attorney 
before answering.) 
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
1. Do you read and write the English language? 
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to 
help you fill out this form? 
2. What is your age? __ 'l'-"-7_ 
- 2 -
NO 
YES NO g) 
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3. What is your true and legal name?~ ¥1 ~ 
4. What was the highest grade you completed in school? )6~~/' "' S~~~u_ 
If you did not complete high school, have you received 
either a general education diploma or high school 
equivalency diploma? 
5. Are you currently under the care of a mental health 
professional? 
6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health 
disorder? 
YES NO~ 
YES~ 
YES~ 
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? -------------
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? 
If so, have you taken your prescription medication 
during the past 24 hours? 
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or 
drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages which you 
believe affect your ability to make a reasoned and 
informed decision in this case? 
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable to 
make a reasoned and informed decision in this case? 
10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? 
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? 
(If available, a written plea agreement should be 
attached hereto as "Addendum 'A"') 
~o 
11. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial 
the one paragraph below which describes the type 
of plea you are entering: 
YES~ 
YES NO e 
YES~ 
YES e 
YES NO 
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement. 
This means that if the district court does not impose the specific 
sentence as recommended by both parties, I will be allowed to 
withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. __ _ 
- 3 - Judge Hansen July 1, 2001 
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b. I understand that my plea agreement is a .con-bindino plea 
agreement. This means that the court is not bound by the agreement 
or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence 
authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above. 
Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court 
chooses not to follow th~eement, I will not have the right to 
withdraw my guilty plea. . 
12. As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading 
guilty to more than one crime? 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each 
YES e) 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently ~ 
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after the other)? YES NO ~ 
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which you are 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? 
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal? 
14. Have you waived your t to appeal your judgment 
of conviction and sentence as part of your plea 
agreement? 
& 
15. Have any other promises been made to you which have 
influenced your decision to plead guilty? · 
If so, what are those promises? 
16. Have you had sufficient time to discuss 
your case with your attorney? 
17. Have you told your attorney everything you know about 
the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty? 
18. Is there anything you have requested your attorney 
to do that has not been done? 
If yes, please explain. 
- 4 -
cfjJ NO 
YES r6 
~ YES C__,} 
~NO 
~NO 
YES~ 
Judge Hansen July 1, 2001 
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19. Your attorney can get various items from the 
prosecutor relating to your case. These may include 
police reports, witness statements, tape recordings, 
photographs, reports of scientific testing, etc. This is 
called discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence 
provided to your attorney in discovery? 
20. Are there any witnesses whose testimony would show 
that you are innocent? 
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive 
any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe 
you may have in this case? 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that 
you believe should still be filed in this case? 
If so, what motions or requests? 
23. Do you· understand that if you enter an unconditional 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to challenge 
any rulings that came before the guilty plea including: 
1) any searches or seizures that occurred in your case; 
2) any issues concerning the method or manner of your 
@No 
YES e 
®No 
YES~ 
Arrest; and 3) any issues about any statements you may ~YE 
have made to law enforcement officers? (.!9 NO 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are 
admitting the truth of each and every allegation contained ~ 
in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty? NO 
25. Are you currently on probation or parole? YES @ 
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this case 
could be the basis of a violation of that probation or parole? YES NO N/A 
26. If you are not a citizen of the United States, the entry 
of a plea or making of factual admissions could have 
consequences of deportation or removal, inability to 
obtain legal status in the United States, or denial of 
an application for United States citizenship. Do you 
understand? 
27. Is the crime to which you will plead guilty one which 
will require you to register as a sex offender? 
(I.C. § 18-8304) 
- 5 -
YES NO 
YES i!) 
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.. 
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be 
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case? 
(I.C. §19-5304) 
29. Have you agreed to pay restitution in another case as 
a condition of your plea agreement in this case? 
YES 6) 
YES 6 
If so, to whom? ___________________ _ 
30. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension as a 
result of a guilty plea in this case? YES 6 
If so, for how long must your license be suspended? -------
31. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a mandatory 
domestic violence, substance abuse, or psychosexual ~ 
evaluation is required? ~ NO 
(I.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),-8317) 
32. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you may be 
required to pay the costs of prosecution and ~. 
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K)) ~O 
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you will be ~ 
required to submit a DNA sample to the state? E. NO 
(I.C. § 19-5506) 
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime of violence for which 
the court could impose a civil penalty of up to $5,000, 
payable to the victim of the crime? (J.C.§ 19-5307) YES~ 
35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your ~ 
right to vote in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) ~ NO 
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your righ~ 
to hold public office in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) ~NO 
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your right~ 
to perform jury service in Idaho? (ID. CONST. art. 6, § 3) ~ NO 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony 
you will lose your right to purchase, possess, or carry 4 .1 firearms? (J.C.§ 18-310) 6 NO 
- 6 - Judge Hansen July 1, 2001 
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! 
' 
. . 
39. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney, 
can force you to plead guilty in this case? 
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily? 
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did commit the acts 
alleged in the information or indictment? 
42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill out 
G NO 
® NO 
mi) NO 
this form, have you had any trouble understanding your £.'"-:\ 
interpreter? YES NO <.!:!!!) 
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions 
in this form which you could not resolve by discussion with ~ 
your attorney? YES~ 
I have answered the questions on pages 1-7 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form truthfully, 
understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each question and 
answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no 
one has threatened me to do so. 
Dated this ~-day of _J._W\.A."'"'"'--.___ __ , 20 /l( . 
I hereby acknowledge that I have discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions and answers 
with my · 
FINAL 
- 7 - Judge Hansen July 1, 2001 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
jdl Longbur.11t 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-noo 
NO·-------/],...--// FrLE~ / A.M. _____ ,P.M ~· 
JUN 2 0 2014 
CHRISTOPHEi-; D. RICH, Clerk 
Sy KATRINA CHRISTENSEN 
ocruw 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
I 
THE STA TE OF JpAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF lDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
n::i:o"MAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-----------....----) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
AGREEMENT FOR 
CONDITIONAL PLEA 
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. ll(a)(2) 
COMES NOW, Jill Lonkburs~ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and 
defendant THOMAS CAMPBEL~ KELLEY, through his attorney Gerald Bublitz, and hereby 
stipulate to a conditional plea purs\UJilt to I.C.R. l l(a)(2) as follows: 
The defendant's plea of gdlty is entered conditionally with the defendant preserving the 
right to appeal the issues determined in the court's memorandum decision and order dated 
December 18, 2013. ~ , 
DATED this.fr· <lily of Jtfue 2014. 
GREG B. BOWER 
AGRIEMENT FOR CONDffiONAL PLEA (KELLEY). Page I 
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Hansen, Miren, 08/13/14, Gosney Courtroom503 
Time Speaker Note 
8:41 :41 AM i jState v Thomas Kelley - CRFE13-5258 
8:41 :51 AM (State Attorney (George Gunn 
8:41 :55 AM jDefense Attorney jGerald Bublitz 
: : 
8:41 :59 AM f Judge Hansen f calls case, def. is present out of custody with counsel 
8:42:12 AM !Defense Attorney !comments to the Court 
! ! 
8:42:20 AM tstate Attorney tnothing further 
8:42:28 AM (Judge Hansen 1will leave on for the sentencing date of 10/15 at 3 
8:42:40 AM i i END CASE 
I I 
8/13/2014 1 of 1 
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Oct 08 N-10:05a 
GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BLBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
604 NORTH 16TH ST 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
p.2 
NO. ( ,,.,-
A.M I w;: FIL~.~., ___ _ 
OCT O 8 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I~ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
***** 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE 
) PENDING APPEAL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
COMES NO\V, the Defendant, THOMAS KELLEY, by and through his attorney of 
record Jessica B. Bublitz of the furn of Bublitz Law, P.C., brings this Motion to Stay Sentence 
Pending Appeal before the court; 
I.A.R. 13 (c) states; 
"In criminal actions, unless prohibited by the order of the Supreme Court, the 
district court shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following actions 
during the pendency of an appeal: (7) Determine and order whether there shall be 
a stay of execution of a judgment of conviction upon an appeal to the Supreme 
Court, except where the sentence is capital punishment, in which case execution 
of the sentence shall be automatically stayed pending appeal." 
This :Motion is made because the sentence to be imposed carries a mandatory minimum 
of imprisonment; therefore, the Defendant could be finished with a prison sentence prior to an 
appeal decision. 
MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL- Page 1 
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·Oct 08 ·1410:05a p.3 
Defense counsel further asks that pursuant to I.A.R. 13 (c)(8), the Defendant be allowed 
to continue on his current bail. The Defendant has always traveled for his court hearings and can 
be relied upon to continue to appear at hearings on this case. 
DATED the --5.{ day of October, 2014. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE PEND LNG APPEAL - Page 2 
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"' Oct 08"14 10:05a p.4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lS- day of October, 2014, l caused a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
FAX: 287-7709 
Ada County Clerk 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
FAX: 287-6919 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
121 Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
121 Facsimile Transmission 
~\1~D~i 
Legal Assistant 
MOTION TO STAY SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL -Page 3 
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Hansen, Miren, 10/15/14, Gosney, Madsen (after 5:00 p.m.) Courtroom507 
Time Speaker Note 
03:26:36 PM! 1 State v Thomas Kelly - CRFE13-5250 
03:26:52 PM i State i Jill Longhurst 
!Attorney l 
03:26:57 PM1 Defense 1 Gerald Bublitz 
!Attorney ! 
03:27: 11 PM 1 Judge 1 Calls case, def. is present on bond wtih counsel 
! Hansen l 
03:27:22 PM! Judge 1 reviews file 
l Hansen l 
03:28: 17 PM f Judge f will find good cause and continue the sentencing to 11/05/14 at 
l Hansen l 3:00 p.m . 
................................................ ~ ........................................... ,4>, ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ . 
03:29:02 PM I I END CASE 
I I 
10/15/2014 1 of 1 
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Hansen, Miren, 11/05/14, Gosney Courtroom503 
Time Speaker Note 
3:44:26 PM I !State v Thomas Kelly - CRFE13-5250 
3:44:35 PM jstate Attorney jJm Longhurst 
3:44:39 PM jDefense Attorney }Jessica Bublitz 
3:44:47 PM jJudge Hansen Jcalls case, def. is present on bond with counsel 
3:44:59 PM jJudge Hansen Jreviews file 
3:45:51 PM Jstate Attorney jno additions corrections or objections 
3:45:59 PM jDefense Attorney jno additions corrections or objections 
3:46:21 PM istate Attorney ino evidence or VIS 
3:46:30 PM iDefense Attorney ino evidence 
3:46:34 PM jDefense Attorney jwould be objecting to the resitution and ask that a hearing 
I l~s~onfu~ 
3:47:00 PM fstate Attorney fargues sentencing 
3:51 :06 PM jDefense Attorney iargues sentencing 
4:03:11 PM jstate Attorney jresponse to the motion to stay the sentence pending 
I !appeal 
4:04: 19 PM 1 Defense Attorney i response to Ms. Longhurst's argument 
4:04:55 PM }Defendant imakes a statement to the Court .................... -................... - ................ . 
4:07:02 PM iDefense Attorney ino legal cause 
4:07:05 PM jJudge Hansen jcomments -will enter a JOC of 1+7=8; 5000.00 fine; will 
I I keep resitution open for evidentiary hearing; will deny the 
I I request to stay the execution of this sentence; will schedule 
I lthe restitution hearing to 01/22/15 at 2:00 p.m. 
i i 
4:20:43 PM lJudge Hansen jappeal rights 
4:21 :59 PM l jEND CASE 
: : 
: : 
I I 
11/5/2014 1 of 1 
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NO. Fl~~~.J~ ,t A.M .. __ _ 
NOV O 6 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KARI MAXWELL 
Dl!PUT'I' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
  
  
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
AND COMMITMENT 
On the 5th day of November, 2014, before the Honorable Timothy Hansen, District Judge, 
personally appeared Jill Longhurst, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the Cow1ty of Ada, State of 
Idaho, and Defendant with his attorney, Jessica Bublitz. 
This being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in this matter; said Defendant was duly 
informed by the Court of the nature of the Information filed against him for the crime of: 
TRAFFICKING IN MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l), committed on or about the 
19th day of April, 2013; of his arraignment on the 28th day of June, 2013, at which time 
Defendant appeared in person and with counsel and was advised of the charge(s) and the possible 
penalties and was further advised of the applicable constitutional and statut01y rights. Thereafter, 
on the 4th day of June, 2014, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to: TRAFFICKING IN 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page I 
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MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l); which plea was accepted following examination 
of Defendant under oath and waiver of all applicable rights. Sentencing was continued for 
preparation of a presentence report, which was completed and reviewed by the Court and 
counsel. 
The Court asked whether Defendant had witnesses or evidence to present in a hearing in 
mitigation of punishment; heard statements from counsel; and gave Defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement. 
Defendant was then asked if he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be 
pronounced against him to which he replied that he had none. And no sufficient cause being 
shown or appearing to the Court why judgment should not be rendered; 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant is guilty of 
the crime of: TRAFFICKING IN MARIJUANA, FELONY, LC. §37-2732B(a)(l), and that he 
be sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Correction of the State of Idaho for an 
aggregate term of eight (8) years, to be served as follows: a minimum period of confinement of 
one (1) year, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed seven (7) 
years; with credit for two (2) days served in prejudgment incarceration as provided by§ 18-309, 
Idaho Code. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that pursuant to Idaho Code, Defendant be, and hereby is, 
assessed and Ordered to pay the following fines, fees, and costs: 
1. Court costs in the amount of$17.50 (LC.§ 31-3201A(b), LC. §31-4602). 
2. County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of$10.00 (LC.§ 31-4502). 
3. !STARS technology fee in the amount of$10.00 (LC.§ 31-3201(5)). 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page 2 
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.. 
4. Emergency Surcharge Fee in the amount of$100.00 (LC.§ 31-3201H). 
5. Victim's Compensation Fund Fees in the amount of $75.00 (LC. § 72-1025). 
6. P.O.S.T. fees in the amount of $15.00 (LC.§ 31-3201B). 
7. Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Fund $3.00 
(LC. § 72-1105). 
8. Victims Notification Fee (VINE) in the amount of $10.00 
(LC.§ 31-3204). 
9. A fine in the amount of $5,000.00. 
10. The Court reserves jurisdiction over the amount of restitution. 
11. A $30.00 domestic violence fine (LC.§ 32-1410). 
12. Defendant shall pay $10.00 for the drug hotline fee pursuant to LC. § 37-2735A. 
13. Defendant shall pay an amount to be determined by the Depaiiment of 
Correction, not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100.00), for the cost of 
conducting the pre-sentence investigation and preparing the pre-sentence 
investigation report. The amount will be determined by the Department and paid 
by Defendant in accordance with the provisions of LC. § 19-2516. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall fully comply with the DNA Database Act. 
Defendant was then remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County, to be delivered 
FORTHWITH by him into the custody of the Director of the State Board of Correction of the State 
ofldaho. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified copy of this Judgment and 
Commitment to the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of Defendant. 
DATED this 5th day ofNovember, 2014. 
c > 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the ~ day of ~tY).b,;u , 2014, I caused to 
be emailed I mailed one copy of the within instrument in this cause as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTNG ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
VIA EMAIL 
JESSICA BUBLITZ 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
604 N. 16TH STREET -
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION TEAM/DEPT. OF PROBATION & PAROLE 
VIA EMAIL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
VIA EMAIL 
ADA COUNTY JAIL 
VIA EMAIL 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT - Page 4 
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User: PRFREDSM 
Wednesday, May I, 2013 
Ada County Mugshot - Prosecutor's Office 
Photo Taken: 2013-04-19 0 I :20:00 
Name: KELLEY, THOMAS CAMPBELL 
Case#: CR-FE-2013-0005250 
LE Number: I 051391    
Weight: 180 Height: 600 
Drivers License Number: Drivers License State: 
Sex: M Race: W Eye Color: BLU Hair Color: BLN Facial Hair: 
Marks: SHOULDER, LEFT 
Scars: 
Tattoos: 
.RE\INST ALLS\InHouse\Crystal\Analyst4\Sheriff\SHF MugshotProsecutor.r~ 
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Nov 111411 :44a p.2 
' 
~'~J.~ 
----
NOV 1 2 2014 
GERALD BUBLITZ- ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ- ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P .C. 
604 NORffl 16m STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorney for Defendant 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG 
DePUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant 
***** 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) 
) MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE 
) PURSUANT TO LC.R. 35 AND REQUEST 
) FORBEARING 
) 
) 
) 
--------------) 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, THOMAS KELLEY, by and through his attorney, Jessica 
B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, PC, and moves this Court to reduce the sentence imposed on 
the Defendant on the 5th day of November, 2014. 
TIUS MOTION is made pursuant to Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, based upon the 
following grmmds and reasons: 
1. Defendant requests that the court reconsider its initial sentence and grant the 
Defendant leniency; Specifically, the defendant will be requesting a lesser 
indeterminate sentence than imposed. 
MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE PURSUANT TO 1.c.R. 35 - Page 1 
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DATED this /_j_ day ofNovember, 2014. 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this JL day of November, 2014, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
FAX: 287-7709 
Ada County Clerk 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
FAX: 287-6919 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
~ Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
IZI Facsimile Transmission 
MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 35- Page 2 
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NO, a,/ RLED 
AM.::/!) ~M~~~~ 
GERALD BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
604 NORTH 16TH STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NOV 1 2 2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG . 
D!PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No.CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, GREG BOWER, ADA COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the final Decision and Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 6th 
day of November, 2014, the Honorable Hansen, DistrictJudge presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 11 ( c )(1-10). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then intends to assert 
in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal, is/are: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Pugc 1 
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(a) Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to wit: I.C.§49-808(2) is void fo[ 
vagueness as applied to this case because the statutory terms have not been clearly 
defined so that average individuals would understand what conduct is prohibited 
by the statute; in addition the lack of sufficient clarity in the wording of the 
aforementioned statute invites arbitrazy and discriminatory enforcement. 
(b) Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to wit: The officer in this case did not 
have justification or sufficient information which would give rise to reasonable 
suspicion for the stop. 
(c) Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to wit: There is no probable cause 
which would have justified the search of the trunk area. 
4. There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record that is sealed is 
the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). 
5. Reporter's Transcript. The appellant [equests the preparation of the entire reporter's 
standard transcript as defined in I.AR. 25(c). The appellant also requests the preparation of 
the additional portions of the reporter's transcript: 
( a) Motion Hearing on the 191h day of August, 2013 
(b) Motion Hearing on the 111h day of September, 2013 
(c) Motion Hearing on the161h day of October, 2013 
(d) Motion Hearing on the 6111 day ofNovember, 2013 
(e) Sentencing Hearing on the 5th day of November, 2014 
6. Clerk's Record. The appeqant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 
28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, in 
addition to those automatically included under I.AR. 28(b)(2): 
(a) All items, including any affidavits, objections, responses, briefs or 
memorandums, offered in support of or in opposition to the Motion to 
Suppress filed or lodged, by the state, appellant or the court; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2 
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,. 
(b) Any exhibits, including but not limited to letters or victim impact 
statements, addendums to the PSI or other items offered at sentencing 
hearing. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court 
Reporter,; 
(b) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho Code § § 
31-3220, 31-3220A, I.AR. 24(e)); 
( c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal 
case (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, l.A.R. 23(a)(8)); 
(d) That Ada County will be responsible for paying for the reporter's 
transcript, as the client is indigent, LC. §§ 31-3220, 3 l-3220A, I.AR. 
24(e); and 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.AR20. 
DATED this 10th day ofNovember~ 2014. 
~ s . . Bublitz Aomyfo:C::: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Page 3 
p.4 
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~-- .·~ 
,,. 
CERTIFICATE OF l.\'1AILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, That on the 101h day ofNovember, 2014, I faxed true and correct copies 
of the _foregoing, NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Id 83720-0010 
Fax: (208) 854-8074 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
Ada County Court Reporter 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Fax: (208) 287-7509 
Ada County Clerk 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-6919 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 4 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
[gJ Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
IX] Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
IZ} Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
~ Facsimile Transmission 
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({5l) 
GERALD BUBLITZ- ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
604 NORTH 16T11 STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
\ :~-\1-1(1""'=--~-,~-.i:-_-_ ... _-_-_-_-
NOV 1 3 ·2014 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG 
OePUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JL"'DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
***** 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff7Respondent, 
vs. 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) MOTION FOR EXEMPTIOJ\'" FR0)1 
) PAYING FEE FOR PREPARA.TION OF 
) RECORD 
THOMAS KELLEY, ) 
) 
Defendant/ Appellant. ) 
) 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendant/Appellant, THO.lv1AS KELLEY, by and through his 
attorney of record, Jessica Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, PC, pursuant to his Appeal filed on 
:i\ovember 10, 2014, and moves the Court to order that above named Appellant be exempt from 
paying the estimated fee for the preparation of record because the appellant is indigent. 
THIS MOTIOK is based on and for the following grounds and reasons: 
1. The ind.igency is a basis for exemption to payment. I.C. §31-3220, §31-
3220(a), I.A.R. 24(e). 
Defendant respectfully requests the Court to enter an Order p11rsuant hereto. 
MOTION FOR EXEMPTION FROM PAYJNG FEE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD· Page I 
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DATED this 13111 day of November, 2014. 
~---=------1 Z 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on the 13 111 day of November, 2014, I faxed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing, Motion for Exemption to: 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Id 83720-0010 
Fax: (208) 854-8074 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
Ada County Court Reporter 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Fax: (208) 287-7509 
Ada County Clerk 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Fax: (208) 287-6919 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
[g] Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Deli very 
D U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
lg] Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
D U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
lg] Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
D U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
[gJ Facsimile Transmission 
~~kb~~ myMcK 1e 
Legal Assistant 
MOTIOl'i FOR EXEMPTION FROM PAYING FEE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD. Page 2 
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FILBD P.M ___ _ 
NOV 1 3 ·2014 
GERALD BUBLITZ- ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BLBLITZ - ISB# 6649 
B"l"BLITZ LA ,v, P.C. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG 
604 NORTH 16TH STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DePUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF 1DAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * 
) CASE NO: CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF INDfGENCY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, THOMAS KELLEY, by and through his attorney of 
record, Jessica B. Bublitz of the firm Bublitz Law, P.C., and offers this affidavit of indigency, in 
support of the Defendant's Motion for Exemption from Paying Fee for Preparation of Record. 
I, THOlvfAS KELLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I have been in the Ada County Jail since the 5111 day of November 2014. 
2. 1 have no income or employment at this time. 
3. I do not ovm any assets or real estate. 
4. I do not have a spouse. 
AFFIDAVIT OF' 11':DIC E:'llCY- Page J 
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5. I do not have any dependants. 
6. I do not have any money in my checking account and my savings account balance is 
$ --er . 
7. I have debt in the amount of$ \ tD 1 ~OD~~ 
I 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR.J."\l TO b.efore me this l '2 day of November 2014. 
,,,,, ....... ,,,, . .. ... -· ..... ·-· 
...... , ~ McK.1?,1/'', 
.. ~ .J. •••••••• ~ ;.>_> .,~ 
... ... ... • •.. ,.<'. 
~.::. .. . .. · ~ 
~~.• . ...;.oiARy•. ~. 
: : \-- \ . 
~- : -·-- i 5 
- . . .. 
.. • C ... -
\. • ••• PLJa\..t -~.~~-/ 
~ u':;.. •• •• ~-,:, ~ • .r_;, •••••••• .("\\.~ , ... ,, ·17'p \\.I .... 
'•1, C. Of ,,,, 
, .......... ,,,,,, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 11\'DJG E~CY- Page 2 
THOMAS KELLEY 
Notary 
Residing at Boise , 
Commission Expires 6/l6i2017 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _\Q day of November, 2014, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following as indicated below: 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Id 83 720-00 I 0 
. Fax: (208) 854-8074 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
Ada County Court Reporter 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
.Fax: (208) 287-7509 
Ada County Clerk 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fax: (208) 287-6919 
AFFIDA YIT OF INDIGENCY- Page 3 
D Hand Deli very 
[J U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
[XI Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Deli very 
D U.S. Mai] 
0 Overnight Courier 
IZ] Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S.Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
12:?:] Facsimile Transmission 
D Hand Delivery 
0U.S. Mail 
D Overnight Courier 
12:?:] Facsimile Transmission 
Legal Assistant 
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NO·----=,.-.-----
A.M. ____ FllE_. .• ~ J; j_ % 
NOV 2 0 '2014 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST1fiel~~:~ ~i.:~H, Clerk 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CRFE13-5250 
) 
) 
) ORDER ON RULE 35 MOTION 
) 
DEPUTY 
On November 12, 2014, Defendant Thomas Campbell Kelley filed his Motion to 
Reduce Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 and Request for Hearing. Defendant notes that his 
request for reconsideration of his sentence is one for leniency and specifically asks that a 
lesser indeterminate sentence be imposed. 
The Court would first note the Defendant's Rule 35 motion was filed less than one 
week after of the Judgment of Conviction and Commitment entered in this case on 
November 6, 2014. In addition, ''when a defendant brings a Rule 35 motion and claims 
his sentence is excessive even though it is within statutory limits, the motion must be 
supported by new or additional information." State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 737, 170 
P.3d 397 (2007) (internal citation omitted). 
Therefore, although not specifically requested, Defendant will have forty-five days 
from the date of this order to submit additional information for the Court's consideration. 
The Court will then decide whether to hold a hearing on Defendant's motion or rule 
without one . 
000202
In entering this order, the Court has specifically not determined whether it has 
jurisdiction pursuant to I.C.R. 35 or any other rule to hear a motion or whether there is 
merit to such motion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this / ?~ day of November, 2014. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
000203
I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ~0 day of November, 2014, I mailed (served) a 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
ATTENTION: JILLLONGHURST 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
JESSICA BUBLITZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
604 NORTH 16TH STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
000204
.M .. ) 
NO. ___ ,:ii;;;:.-----,---
A.M. ____ F,~Le.~ IJ.'/f : 
JAN O 5 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~fli'1slrof:,~ o. RICH, Clerk 
By MIREN OLSON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
) Case No. CRFI;:13-5250 
) 
) 
) ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
) 
On November 12, 2014, Defendant Thomas Campbell Kelley filed his Motion to 
Reduce Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 and Request for Hearing. In its Order on Rule 35 
i 
Motion entered on November 20, 2014, this Court gave Defendant forty-five days to 
submit additional materials for the Court's consideration. The deadline for submitting 
those materials has passed an~ the Court has received no additional information from 
Defendant. 
On November 6, 2014, the Court entered its Judgment of Conviction and 
Commitment. Defendant was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of 
Correction for a term of eight years with the first year fixed for the felony offense of 
Trafficking in Marijuana with a fine of $5,000. The Court reserved jurisdiction over the 
amount of restitution. Defendant now asks the Court to reconsider its decision and reduce 
the indeterminate portion of his sentence. However, Defendant has provided no new or 
additional materials in support of his Rule 35 motion. 
Defendant makes no claim his sentence is outside statutory limits. In fact, he 
concedes his Rule 35 motion is a "plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence 
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originally imposed was unduly severe." State v. McCulloch, 133 Idaho 351,352, 986 P.2d 
1017 (Ct. App. 1999) (internal citation omitted). Consideration of Rule 35 motion is left 
to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 114 Idaho 384, 386, 757 
P.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1987). "[W]hen a defendant brings a Rule 35 motion and claims his 
sentence is excessive even though it is within the statutory limits, the motion must be 
supported with new or additional information." State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 737, 170 
P.3d 397 (2007) (internal citation omitted). Without any new information from 
Defendant, the Court is being asked to reconsider its Judgment of Conviction and 
Commitment based only on what was available at the time of sentencing. Furthermore, 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was excessive. 
In imposing sentence, the Court considered the four factors set forth in State v. 
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). Defendant has provided 
nothing that would affect this Court's prior consideration of the Toohill criteria and, as 
noted above, has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was excessive or unduly severe. 
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 and 
Request for Hearing is denied without further proceedings. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this S~ day of January, 2015. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
000206
I ,. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ((J day of January, 2015, I mailed (served) a 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
ATTENTION: TILL LONGHURST 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
JESSICA BUBLITZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
604 NORTH 16TH STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
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FILED 
Wednesday, January 21, 2015 at 11 :00 AM 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
Inmate Number: 
  
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody of the Idaho State Board of 
Correction, and that it is necessary that THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY be brought before 
this Court for: 
Hearing Scheduled ........ Thursday, January 22, 2015@ 02:00 PM 
It is THEREFORE ORDERED That the Ada County Sheriff bring the Defendant from 
the Penitentiary to the Court at said time and on said date; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That immediately following said Court appearance the 
Sheriff will return the said Defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction until 
the court orders otherwise; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Idaho State Board of Correction release the said 
Defendant to the Ada County Sheriff for the purpose of the aforementioned appearance and await 
further order of the court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk of this Court serve a copy hereof upon the 
Idaho State Board of Correction forthwith and certify to the same. 
Dated Wednesday, January 21, 2015. 
. Order to Transport 
t·-4 j 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
000208
Jan 22 'i 5 02:28p :. J: S-9- Fl~~----
JAN 2 3 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MIREN OLSON 
.J 
GERALD. BUBLITZ - ISB# 7562 
JESSICA BUBLITZ - lSB# 6649 
BUBLITZ LAW, P.C. 
604 NORTH 16TH STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-5500 
Facsimile: (208) 343-6104 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF 1DAHO, 11\" AND FOR THE COONTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2013-5250 
) 
) ORDER FOR EXEMPTI01\" FROM 
) PA YING FEE FOR PREPARATION OF 
) RECORD 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Based upon Motion of counsel and good cause appea1ing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER that the above named 
Defend~ntiApp;ll~Thom~ Kelley, is hereby exe~pt from paying fees for preparation of /1....,., .. ,cc cs 
,~,~ ~o,.,.e..,./' t'f&V ~-- ~ 
record~:J::i~ fu?Jtranscript J.>£ the 8f3~i!ll&te.!j:.otei, t;;~~ the Motion to Suppress Hearing 
held on the recorcJ.ta;ans@:t:'ie8ili.._.,. 
SO ORDERED this~ day of--1-d=~-' 2015. r r 
~~·-
HONORABLE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ORDER FOR EXEMPTION FROM PAYING FEE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD- Page 1 
000209
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I hereby certify that on this !J:3 day of ~C.Ui\,(.Q..i~ 2015, I caused a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing documents to be placed in the UnitedT tates Mail, postage prepaid to: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
Court Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Clerk of the Court 
Idaho State Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720-0101 
Boise, Idaho 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Jessica Bublitz 
604 N. l 6th St 
Boise, ID 83 702 
LEm ./- 0• .;- .• ~ 
., «': ••• '? •• """ 
".-., J/J, o••• • •• I"\\.'"' .... . 
.. ,, q'Js1a 1~\..., .. .. 
.... .. .. . .... -.......... ' . '... ..... .. . . ·--·· -.............. ····-· ............... ,.,'6, .... -· ....... ,, .. ~"-· ..... __ ................. - . 
......... ,, 
ORDER FOR EXEMPTION FROM PAYING FEE FOR PREPARATION OF RECORD- Pagel 
000210
Hansen, Miren, 01/22/15, .::,tarr Courtroom501 
Time Speaker Note 
9:18:50 AM l \State v Thomas Kelley- CRFE13-5250 
2:05:47 PM \State Attorney jBen Harmer 
2:05:51 PM f Defense Attorney jGerald Bublitz 
2:05:56 PM !Judge Hansen icalls case, def. is present in custody with counsel - reviews 
I lfi~ 
2:07:43 PM 1state Attorney !with an affidavit in the file would withdraw the objection 
! I 
2:08:54 PM 1Judge Hansen lwill set over the restitution hearing to 02/06/15 at 3:00 p.m. 
/ /and will have the clerk do the transport order 
~ i 
2:09:15 PM iJudge Hansen iwill turn to the request for indigency on the clerks record for 
l /the appeal and given the affidavit of indigency and Mr. 
l l Kelley's custody status - the Court will find good cause and 
l /grant the motion at this time and will have Mr. Bublitz 
l !submit an order consistent with the ruling 
i ~ 
2:11 :32 PM I IEND CASE 
I I 
~ I 
~ I 
1/22/2015 1 of 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
Inmate Number: 
  
Case No. CR-FE-2013-0005250 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody of the Idaho State Board of 
Correction, and that it is necessary that THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY be brought before 
this Court for: 
Hearing Scheduled ........ Friday, February 06, 2015@ 03:00 PM 
It is THEREFORE ORDERED That the Ada County Sheriff bring the Defendant from 
the Penitentiary to the Court at said time and on said date; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That immediately following said Court appearance the 
Sheriff will return the said Defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction until 
the court orders otherwise; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Idaho State Board of Correction release the said 
Defendant to the Ada County Sheriff for the purpose of the aforementioned appearance and await 
further order of the court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk of this Court serve a copy hereof upon the 
Idaho State Board of Correction forthwith and certify to the same. 
Dated Friday, January 23, 2015. ~ 
Order to Transport 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
000212
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
451 WEST STATE STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
)Supreme Court No. 42680 
) 
)Case No. CRFE-13-5250 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_________________ ) 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on January 23, 2015, I 
lodged a transcript 206 pages of length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
the County of Ada in the Fourth Judicial District. 
HEARING DATES INCLUDED: 
Motion to Suppress, 9-11-13 
Cont. Motion to Suppress, 10-16-13. 
Sent. 11-5-14 
Vanessa M. Starr, Official Court Reporter 
~Al~"' c:931 dotV 
at 'er \ 
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Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
In re: State of Idaho v. Thomas Kelley, Docket No. 
N0._~~:.7ii'En"----
A.M. __ j......_: 4.J..Y~FILE:O P.M. __ _ 
JAN 2 6 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KELLE WEGENER 
DEPUTY 
Notice is hereby given that on Wednesday, January 21, 2015, I lodged 
a transcript of 9 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
' 
The following files were lodged: 
Proceedings 8-19-2013 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
000214
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
In re: State of Idaho v. Thomas Kelley, Docket No. 42680 
No. 
A.M 
·---- F=Jf.Eo 
----P.M. ~! 
JAN 29 
CHA!S7io 2015 
PHf=Ao 
By Ki:LLE: VVs. AICH, Cle k 
DE:Pury Gi:Nt:A I'. 
Notice is hereby given that on Tuesday, January 27, 2015, I lodged a 
transcript of 19 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Proceedings 11-6-2013 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc: sctfilings@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
000215
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
Supreme Court Case No. 42680 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Presentence Investigation Report. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 28th day of January, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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A 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY HANSEN 
CLERK: MIREN OLSON 
CT REPTR: VANESSA GOSNEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS KELLEY, 
Defendant. 
September 11, October 16, 2013 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CRFE13-5250 
) 
) 
) EXHIBIT LIST 
) 
_______________ ) 
Counsel for State: 
Counsel for Defendant: 
STATE'S EXHIBITS 
Video and Audio 
Jill Longhurst 
Jessica Bublitz 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Map (Illustrative Only) 
Map (Illustrative Only) 
Admit - 09/11/13 
Admit 10/16/13 
Admit - 10/16/13 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42680 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRJSTOPHER D. RlCH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JESSICA B. BUBLITZ 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: 
JA~ 2 % 2Jlt5 
--------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
,,,, ........ ,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIQJ,l~~ \UDICJ,4;111,, 
Clerk of the District ~~ •••• ••• • •••••• '°.~/'",:. 
: -~ •• G c,'\'.P,.'\'E •• ~ ,:, 
.. "'-,J • .~'y ., • - .. ~ 0 8 4\V i·c:. ': 
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Depu~~~ :~$ 
...... ;.; •• •• ,.$) .: 
... v; J">. •• • • t," .. 
,., ~(l ••••••• .... .. . , I ~~" .,., 
,,,, N AND f0¥- ,,,, 
,,,, ...... "''' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS CAMPBELL KELLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 42680 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct ~ecord of the 
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
as well as those requested by Counsel. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
12th day of November, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
,,11111110,, 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~11111 \\JDICJA ;,,,,, 
.. , ~~ 'l<. ,, Clerk of the District Co~ ':>." ••••• ••••• •• .0/. ',, 
} ~ .... ~;~f>.'fE ••.i\ 
'.')g. . "' . , -1-~ ~ ..... • ( ... 0 • .... • (') -~ :~= By A ' 0 • :... : 
Deputy Clerk ,, ~t>-~ l ~: 
,:, "-'· . .. .:::; ~ 
., ";.;' •e • r~ .. 
, '(;_n • •• '-' .. 
.... 07,() ••••••• <'\~ ...... ,, ~v I 
,,,, IN AND fQi. ,,,, 
, ......... ,,,,, 
